SPEARS WATER COMPANY v. KENTUCKY PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION AND KENTUCKY PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION SPEARS WATER COMPANY and KENTUCKY-AMERICAN WATER COMPANY
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RENDERED: NOVEMBER 12, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-001925-MR
SPEARS WATER COMPANY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM GRAHAM, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CI-00669
KENTUCKY PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
and KENTUCKY-AMERICAN WATER COMPANY
APPELLEES
AND
NO.
1998-CA-001994-MR (CROSS)
KENTUCKY PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
vs.
CROSS-APPELLANT
CROSS-APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM GRAHAM, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CI-00669
SPEARS WATER COMPANY and
KENTUCKY-AMERICAN WATER COMPANY
CROSS-APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, EMBERTON, and GUIDUGLI, Judges.
COMBS, JUDGE: The appellant, Spears Water Company, appeals from
the order of the Franklin Circuit Court affirming the decision of
the Kentucky Public Service Commission (the Commission).
The
Commission cross-appeals the circuit court’s judgment.
Having
carefully reviewed the record, we reverse the judgment of the
circuit court.
On September, 1991, the Kentucky-American Water Company
(KAWC) filed an application for Certificate of Public Convenience
and Necessity to construct a high service water line, commonly
referred to as the “Jack’s Creek Pipeline.”
The Jack’s Creek
Pipeline was to run from Jack’s Creek road in southeast Fayette
County, westerly into Jessamine County, and then northerly into
Fayette County to an existing water line at U.S. Highway 27.
KAWC contended that the proposed water line was necessary to
relieve low pressure problems caused by customer growth in
southern Fayette County.
The proposed route of the Jack’s Creek
Pipeline was to run near the existing water lines of the Spears
Water Company (Spears).
On November 4, 1991, Spears filed a motion before the
Commission to intervene in the proceedings on KAWC’s application
for a certificate, alleging that the Jack’s Creek Pipeline would
result in wasteful duplication of services and would place KAWC
in direct competition with it.
Spears maintained that direct
competition with KAWC would have an adverse financial impact on
its businesses.
On April 17, 1992, the Commission rendered an
order granting KAWC’s application for a certificate to construct
the Jack’s Creek Pipeline.
As to Spears’s contention that it
would be unfair and illegal for it to have to compete for
business with KAWC, the Commission stated that water companies
did not have defined service areas and that it lacked the
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authority to create defined service territories.
Spears filed a
motion for a rehearing, which the Commission granted for the
purpose of clarifying its finding that the proposed Jack’s Creek
Pipeline did not constitute wasteful duplication of services.
Spears appealed the Commission’s decision to the Franklin Circuit
Court.
On May 9, 1993, the circuit court rendered an opinion
affirming the Commission’s decision to grant KAWC’s application.
Spears did not appeal.
Approximately three years later, after construction of
the Jack’s Creek Pipeline, Spears filed a complaint against KAWC
with the Commission in September 1996 alleging duplication of
services and adverse impact of competition with KAWC for
customers.
It also filed a motion for a cease-and-desist order
to prohibit KAWC from contacting and offering services to
existing customers of Spears.
On February 19, 1997, the
Commission dismissed Spears’s complaint against KAWC and denied
both its request for a hearing and its motion for a cease-anddesist order.
The Commission held that utility companies in
Kentucky were not entitled to protection from competition.
Spears filed a motion for a rehearing, which the Commission
denied by an order entered on April 2, 1997.
On April 23, 1997, pursuant to KRS 278.410, Spears
filed an action in the Franklin Circuit Court for review of the
Commission’s decision.
Subsequently, on May 19, 1997 (some
twenty-five days later), the Commission filed a motion to dismiss
the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground
that Spears had failed to comply with KRS 278.420(2).
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KRS
278.420(2) mandates that “[u]nless an agreed statement of the
record is filed with the court, the filing party shall designate,
within ten (10) days after an action is filed, the portions of
the record necessary to determine the issues raised in the
action.”
(Emphasis added.)
As of the time of filing of the
Commission’s motion to dismiss, Spears had not filed an agreed
statement of the record nor had it designated any portions of the
record.
On June 5, 1997 (more than forty days having elapsed),
Spears filed a motion for an enlargement of time in which to
designate the record.
In response to the Commission’s motion to
dismiss, Spears argued that its failure to designate the record
did not deprive the circuit court of jurisdiction.
On July 17,
1997, the court entered an order denying the Commission’s motion
to dismiss the action and granting Spears’s motion for an
enlargement of time to designate the administrative record.
On July 10, 1998, the court affirmed the decision of
the Commission.
The Court found that issues raised by Spears in
its complaint before the Commission had previously been
litigated and addressed in the proceeding for KAWC’s Certificate
of Public Need and Convenience to construct the Jack’s Creek
Pipeline.
Spears appeals from the judgment of the Franklin
circuit court, contending that it erred in affirming the
Commission’s decision.
The Commission cross-appeals on the
ground that the court erred in granting Spears’s motion for an
enlargement of time to designate the record.
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We will first address the issue raised by the
Commission on cross-appeal:
over the case.
whether the court had jurisdiction
The Commission argues on appeal that Spears
failed to designate the record within the time period set forth
at KRS 278.420(2); therefore, the Franklin Circuit Court lacked
jurisdiction over the action.
It also contends that the court
erred in granting Spears an enlargement of time to designate the
record and that the court should have simply dismissed the
action.
Conversely, Spears maintains that the circuit court
obtained jurisdiction over the action when it timely filed its
appeal pursuant to KRS 278.410.
As Spears’s
appeal was timely
filed, it contends that jurisdiction had vested with the circuit
court.
Thus, the court had the ongoing authority and discretion
to grant Spears an enlargement of time to designate the record.
“There is no appeal to the courts from an action of an
administrative agency as a matter of right.
When grace to appeal
is granted by statute, a strict compliance with its terms is
required.”
Board of Adjustments of City of Richmond v. Flood,
Ky., 581 S.W.2d 1, 2 (1978).
(Emphasis added.)
The procedure
for appealing an order by the Commission is set forth at KRS
278.410 and KRS 278.420.
KRS 278.410(1) provides:
Any party to a commission proceeding or any
utility affected by an order of the
commission may, within thirty (30) days after
service of the order, or within twenty (20)
days after its application for rehearing has
been denied by failure of the commission to
act, or within twenty (20) days after service
of the final order on rehearing, when a
rehearing has been granted, bring an action
against the commission in the Franklin
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Circuit Court to vacate or set aside the
order or determination on the ground that it
is unlawful or unreasonable. Service of a
commission order is complete three (3) days
after the date the order is mailed. Notice
of the institution of such action shall be
given to all parties of record before the
commission.
KRS 278.420, in pertinent part, requires that:
(1) In any action filed against the
commission because of its order in a
proceeding before it, the commission shall
file a certified copy of the designated
record and evidence with the court in which
the action is pending.
(2) Unless an agreed statement of the record
is filed with the court, the filing party
shall designate, within ten (10) days after
an action is filed, the portions of the
record necessary to determine the issues
raised in the action. Within ten (10) days
after the service of the designation or
within ten (10) days after the court enters
an order permitting any other party to
intervene in the action, whichever occurs
last, any other party to the action may
designate additional portions for filing.
The court may enlarge the ten (10) day period
where cause is shown. Additionally, the
court may require or permit subsequent
corrections or additions to the record.
(Emphasis added.)
In Forest Hills Developers, Inc. v. Public Service
Commission, Ky. App., 936 S.W.2d 94 (1996), this court addressed
the issue of whether failure to designate the record within the
specified ten-day period mandated at KRS 278.420(2) was
jurisdictional.
The circuit court dismissed an appeal from an
order of the Commission on the basis that it lacked jurisdiction
due to the failure of the appellant, Forest Hills, to prosecute
its claim in conformity with KRS 278.420(2).
The circuit court
found that Forest Hills’s failure to abide by the statutory
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scheme for seeking review of the Commission’s order deprived it
of jurisdiction.
This court upheld the circuit court decision,
finding no error in its reasoning.
However, we recognized that:
[a]ccepting, arguendo, that Forest Hills is
correct in its assertion that jurisdiction is
found in KRS 278.410 rather than KRS 278.420,
the fact remains that Forest Hills could not
satisfy its burden of proof without reference
to the record. Thus, even if the trial court
erroneously framed the issue as
jurisdictional in nature, dismissal would be
appropriate. Kentucky Rule of Civil
Procedure (CR) 56.02.
In the case before us, Spears filed a timely appeal in
compliance with KRS 278.410 but failed to designate the record or
any portion of the record within ten days of that filing as
required by KRS 278.420.
Approximately forty-three days after
seeking review of the Commission’s order by the circuit court,
Spears filed a motion for an enlargement of time to designate the
record.
However, at this belated juncture, the circuit court no
longer had jurisdiction over the action as the statutory
requirements of KRS 278.420 had not been met.
“Where a statute
prescribes the method for taking an appeal from an administrative
action and the time in which the appeal must be taken, these
requirements are mandatory and must be met in order for the
circuit court to obtain jurisdiction to hear the case."
Frisby
v. Board of Education of Boyle County, Ky. App., 707 S.W.2d 359,
361 (1986).
(Emphasis added.)
KRS 278.410 and KRS 278.420 both set out the
requirements for seeking review of a decision by the Commission.
The procedures outlined by both statutes must be met in order for
the circuit court to obtain (and retain) jurisdiction over the
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action.
Furthermore, although KRS 278.420(2) authorizes the
court to grant enlargements of the ten-day period for cause
shown, some action must be taken within the specified ten-day
period.
“Where the conditions for the exercise of power by a
court are not met, the judicial power is not lawfully invoked.
That is to say, that the court lacks jurisdiction or has no right
to decide the controversy.”
Flood, 581 S.W.2d at 2.
We find that the circuit court erred in granting
Spears’s motion for an enlargement of time to designate the
record.
The court had already lost jurisdiction over the action
due to Spears’s failure to comply with KRS 278.420(2); dismissal
was the only option that remained.
As to the substantive issues
raised by Spears on appeal, we deem them moot.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Franklin
Circuit Court.
EMBERTON, JUDGE, CONCURS.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FURNISHES SEPARATE
OPINION.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE, DISSENTING.
I respectfully dissent.
I agree with the Franklin Circuit Court that the trial court has
discretion under KRS 278.420(2) to enlarge the ten (10) day
period in which to designate portions of the record necessary to
determine the issues raised in the action.
The statute
specifically states that the court may enlarge the ten (10) day
period where cause is shown.
Judge Graham granted Spears’s
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motion for enlargement in this case.
that he found Spears had shown cause.
Thus, it can be presumed
I also believe the facts
of this case are clearly distinguishable from Forest Hills
Developers v. Public Service Commission, Ky. App., 936 S.W.2d 94
(1996).
In that case Forest Hills never filed a motion for
enlargement to designate the record and instead argued the court
did not need the record to decide the case.
I would affirm the
trial court on the cross-appeal filed by the Kentucky Public
Service Commission and then address the real issues of the case
raised by Spears Water Company on direct appeal.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT/CROSSAPPELLEE SPEARS WATER COMPANY:
BRIEFS FOR APPELLEE/CROSSAPPELLANT KENTUCKY PUBLIC
SERVICE COMMISSION:
John M. Tranter
Edwin W. Tranter
Nicholasville, KY
William L. Willis
Gerald E. Wuetcher
Deborah T. Eversole
Frankfort, KY
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE
SPEARS WATER COMPANY:
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
KENTUCKY PUBLIC SERVICE
COMMISSION:
Edwin W. Tranter
Nicholasville, KY
Gerald E. Wuetcher
Frankfort, KY
BRIEFS FOR APPELLEE/CROSSAPPELLEE KENTUCKY AMERICAN
WATER COMPANY:
Lindsey W. Ingram, Jr.
Lizbeth Ann Tully
Lexington, KY
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLEE
KENTUCKY AMERICAN WATER
COMPANY:
Lindsey W. Ingram, Jr.
Lexington, KY
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