RICHARD W. HILL GUARDIAN AD LITEM FOR PETITIONER v. FINANCE AND ADMINISTRATION CABINET, COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY LOUISE B. WELCH v. NO APPELLEE
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RENDERED: December 10, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-001863-MR
RICHARD W. HILL
GUARDIAN AD LITEM FOR
PETITIONER
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE MARTIN MCDONALD, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-FJ-02127
v.
FINANCE AND ADMINISTRATION
CABINET, COMMONWEALTH OF
KENTUCKY
AND:
APPELLEES
1998-CA-002242-MR
LOUISE B. WELCH
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE MARTIN MCDONALD, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-FJ-02127
v.
NO APPELLEE
OPINION AND ORDER
VACATING AND REMANDING IN 1998-CA-001863-MR
DISMISSING APPEAL 1998-CA-002242-MR
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, GUIDUGLI AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE.
In these consolidated appeals, Richard W.
Hill (Hill) and Louise B. Welch (Welch) appeal from several
orders of the Jefferson District Court which either reduced or
denied altogether their respective motions for attorney fees
arising from their representation of T.R.B., a minor under the
age of 18.
Although these appeals arise from the same facts and
despite the fact that we previously consolidated these cases only
for the purpose of assigning them to the same three judge panel,
for purposes of this opinion we choose to treat each appeal
separately.
Accordingly, we vacate and remand for further
proceeding in regard to Hill’s appeal and dismiss Welch’s appeal.
BACKGROUND FACTS
On May 29, 1998, T.R.B. filed an abortion petition with
the trial court seeking permission to undergo a self-consent
abortion pursuant to KRS 311.732.
In the petition, T.R.B.
specifically requested appointment of both counsel and a guardian
ad litem and asked that any applicable fees be waived as she was
unable to pay them.
Although Welch signed the petition in her
capacity as counsel for T.R.B., she was never formally appointed
to represent TRB.
On June 1, 1998, the Clerk of the Court contacted Hill
and asked if he would be willing to serve as guardian ad litem
for T.R.B. at a hearing to be held the next day.
Hill consented,
and although the trial court never formally signed the order
appointing him as guardian ad litem, it subsequently acknowledged
his appointment as such in a writing at a later date.
On June 3, 1998, the trial court entered an order
denying T.R.B.’s petition.
Welch subsequently appealed the
trial court’s order on behalf of T.R.B.
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On June 10, 1998, a
three judge panel of this Court reversed the trial court’s order
insofar as it denied T.R.B.’s petition for a self-consent
abortion.
In conjunction with this Court’s opinion, the trial
court entered an order granting T.R.B.’s petition on June 12,
1998.
HILL’S APPEAL
In conjunction with the hearing on June 2, 1998, Hill
tendered a form “order for attorney’s fees in case of juvenile
dependency, neglect or abuse, termination of parental rights, and
mental inquest” seeking a fee of $250.
Hill indicated in writing
on the form that it was filed pursuant to KRS 311.372.
In the
order entered June 3, 1998, the trial court denied not only
T.R.B.’s petition, but also Hill’s motion for attorney fees,
stating:
[T]he application for attorney’s fees
submitted by [Hill] who was appointed
Guardian Ad Litem in this action is not
approved. KRS 311.372 provides no mechanism
for payment concerning these petitions and
there has been no showing by [Hill] that he
is entitled to recover any fees, the legal
authority for such claim, an affidavit in
support of any fees, and who or what entity
is to pay such fees if the application is
otherwise approved.
Subsequent to the trial court’s second order following
the appeal, Hill again filed a motion and affidavit in support of
an award of attorney fees.
In his motion, Hill provided a
breakdown of the time spent acting as guardian ad litem and
sought fees in the amount of $462.50 representing 3.7 hours of
work at the rate of $125 per hour.
Once again, Hill stated that
he was acting as guardian ad litem for T.R.B. pursuant to KRS
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311.372 and the Rules of Civil Procedure.
In an order entered
June 22, 1998, the trial court ordered that Hill be paid $125 for
his services as guardian ad litem pursuant to KRS 311.732 and
directed that a copy of the order be sent to the Finance Cabinet
for payment.
On July 21, 1998, Hill filed his notice of appeal from
the trial court’s order of June 22, 1998, naming the Finance and
Administration Cabinet, Commonwealth of Kentucky (the Cabinet) as
the appellee.
The Cabinet initially sought dismissal of Hill’s
appeal on the grounds that (1) it was not a party to the action
before the trial court and hence was not a proper party on
appeal; and (2) that Hill failed to first pursue an appeal to the
Jefferson Circuit Court pursuant to CR 72.
The Cabinet’s motion
was dismissed by order of a three judge motion panel of this
Court entered September 24, 1998, and Hill’s appeal was
ultimately perfected.
Hill contends that the trial court erred in reducing
his fee from $462.50 to $125.
In its appellee brief, the Cabinet
indicated that it does not oppose Hill’s argument to the extent
that he is not seeking a fee greater than $500.
We agree with
Hill that the trial court erred in setting his guardian ad litem
fee at $125.
Pursuant to KRS 311.732(3)(c), appointment of a
guardian ad litem is mandatory when a minor petitions for a selfconsent abortion.
Although that statute does not provide that
the guardian ad litem is to be paid for his services, support for
that proposition can be found in House Bill 321, the
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appropriations bill passed by the 1998 Kentucky General Assembly.
Under Section 21(d) of the Bill, the General Assembly
appropriated $2,000,000 for the years 1998-2000 for the payment
of guardian ad litem fees.
That provision included the following
language:
Included in the above appropriation is
funding for fees to be paid to the guardian
ad litem appointed by the court pursuant to
KRS 311.732. The fee shall be fixed by the
court and shall not exceed $500.
Therefore, it is clear that Hill, in his capacity as guardian ad
litem for T.R.B. is entitled to payment for his services.
The
question then becomes how much.
We note that under KRS 453.060(2), KRS 387.305(4), and
CR 17.03(5), court appointed guardians ad litem are entitled to a
reasonable fee for their services.
We believe that the same is
true for guardians ad litem appointed pursuant to KRS 311.732.
In deciding the reasonableness of a guardian ad litem fee, the
following criteria are to be considered:
the character of the litigation, the rights
in controversy, the nature, duration and
extent of the services and the
responsibility, industry, diligence and
accomplishment of the guardian ad litem.
Goldfuss v. Goldfuss, Ky. App., 609 S.W.2d 696, 698 (1980),
citing Black v. Wiedeman, Ky., 254 S.W.2d 344, 347 (1953).
We
will not reverse a trial court’s award of a guardian ad litem fee
unless the trial court has abused its discretion in assessing the
hourly rate.
Cabinet for Human Resources v. S.R.J., Ky. App.,
706 S.W.2d 431, 434 (1986).
We find that the trial court has
abused its discretion in this case.
-5-
First, as Hill demonstrates in his brief on appeal, the
hourly rate assessed by the trial court in this case comes out to
$33.78.
We agree with Hill that attorneys would most likely be
reluctant to serve as guardians ad litem in similar cases for
such a small amount.
Second, and most important, there is absolutely no
evidence in this case that the trial court considered the
elements set forth in Goldfuss and Black in establishing Hill’s
fee.
Upon remand of this matter, the trial court is to re-
examine Hill’s motion for attorney/guardian ad litem fees in
light of the elements set forth in Goldfuss and Black.
While
further examination may or may not result in an increase in the
fee awarded to Hill, he is entitled to have his fee assessed
under the proper standard.
Therefore, the trial court’s order of
June 22, 1998 is vacated, and this matter is remanded for further
consideration in concordance with this opinion.
WELCH’S APPEAL
On July 6, 1998, following the entry of the trial
court’s second order pertaining to T.R.B., Welch filed a motion
with the trial court seeking attorney’s fees in the amount of
$660 for her representation of T.R.B.
In her affidavit, Welch
itemized her services and stated that her normal hourly rate is
$80.
On July 14, 1998, the trial court denied Welch’s motion in
its entirety, stating:
This court appointed Mr. Hill as [guardian ad
litem] pursuant to KRS 311.732(3)(c). There
has been no showing that KRS 311.732 requires
the State to pay for two attorneys.
-6-
Following denial of her motion to reconsider, Welch
filed a notice of appeal on August 25, 1998.
that there was no appellee in her case.
Welch indicated
On September 21, 1998, a
three judge motion panel of this Court entered an order requiring
Welch to show cause as to why her appeal should not be dismissed
for failure to designate a necessary party.
Welch responded to
the order on October 5, 1998, and on November 20, 1998 this Court
entered an order passing the issue raised in the show cause order
and response thereto to the merits on appeal.
In the same order,
the appeals of Hill and Welch were consolidated, but only to the
extent that they would proceed together and be assigned to the
same merits panel.
On appeal, Welch contends that the trial court erred in
denying her motion for fees in its entirety.
Before we address
the merits of her appeal, we must first decide whether her appeal
should be dismissed for failure to designate a necessary party namely an appellee.
Having read and considered Welch’s response to this
Court’s show cause order, we find that dismissal of her appeal is
proper due to her failure to designate an appellee.
The
reasoning for this ruling is fairly obvious; in the absence of an
appellee this Court is without jurisdiction over the party from
whom relief is sought.
At best, it seems that the proper party
to this appeal is the district court judge who entered the order
appealed from.
In light of Welch’s failure to designate an
appellee, this Court would not know who to direct an order to if
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we were inclined to find that Welch is entitled to a reversal of
the trial court’s order.
We are further unpersuaded by Welch’s argument that the
consolidation of her appeal with Hill’s cures this deficiency.
First, there is nothing in the statutes discussed pursuant to
Hill’s appeal which warrant anything other than payment of
guardian ad litem fees by the Cabinet.
Therefore, it would be
improper to name the Cabinet as the proper appellee in Welch’s
appeal by virtue of the fact that these appeals have been
consolidated because the Cabinet is clearly not liable for
payment of attorney’s fees.
Furthermore, as noted by the three judge motion panel
of this court, these appeals were consolidated only “to the
extent that the appeals will proceed together and . . . be
assigned to the same merits panel.”
The fact that they were
consolidated for this purpose does not act to cure any defect
which existed prior to consolidation.
Having considered the arguments of Hill and the Cabinet
on appeal, the order of the Jefferson District Court entered June
22, 1998 pertaining to Hill’s guardian ad litem fee is vacated
and this matter is remanded for further proceedings in accordance
with this opinion.
Having considered Welch’s response to the
show cause order of this Court, her appeal is hereby dismissed
for failure to designate a proper party.
ALL CONCUR.
/s/ Daniel T. Guidugli
JUDGE, COURT OF APPEALS
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ENTERED:
December 10, 1999
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT IN NO.
1998-CA-001863-MR:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE IN NO.
1998-CA-001863-MR:
Richard W. Hill
Louisville, KY
Boyce A. Crocker
Assistant General Counsel
Frankfort, KY
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT IN NO.
1998-CA-002242-MR:
No appellee of record in No.
1998-CA-002242-MR
Louise B. Welch
Louisville, KY
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