DARRYL EDWARD BAKER v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY and WILLIAM VINCENT HENDERSON v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: December 17, 1999; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-001830-MR
DARRYL EDWARD BAKER
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES E. KELLER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 1998-CR-479-1
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
NO.
APPELLEE
1998-CA-001831-MR
WILLIAM VINCENT HENDERSON
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES E. KELLER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 1998-CR-479-2
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN APPEAL NO. 1998-CA-001830
REVERSING AND REMANDING IN APPEAL NO. 1998-CA-1831
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
KNOPF, MILLER AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
These are consolidated appeals from judgments of
conviction against the appellants, Darryl Edward Baker and
William Vincent Henderson.
We find that Baker’s conviction for
second degree robbery was supported by substantial evidence.
Hence, we affirm his conviction.
However, we find that the trial
court erred in denying Henderson’s motion for a directed verdict
on the charges of tampering with physical evidence and being a
persistent felony offender in the first degree.
Hence, we
reverse his conviction on these counts.
There is no dispute regarding the underlying facts of
these appeals.
During the early morning hours of April 1, 1998
in Lexington Kentucky, Lea Anna Toney drove her daughter-in-law
to work.
She returned to the parking lot of her apartment around
5:20 a.m.
As she began to get out of her car when another car
pulled up beside her.
The driver got out of the car, pointed at
her purse and said, “I want that.”
times until the strap broke.
car and drove away.
the police.
He yanked the purse several
The driver then got back into his
Toney immediately reported the incident to
In addition to her assailant, she told the police
that she also saw a passenger in the vehicle.
She further
reported that her purse contained approximately $133.00 in cash.
Shortly thereafter, Lexington-Fayette County Police
Officers Todd Combs and Todd Johnson heard the call concerning
the robbery, along with a brief description of the automobile and
the suspects.
Upon driving to the area, they observed a car
matching the general description given by Toney.
the vehicle for a while, they pulled it over.
After following
Baker was the
driver and Henderson was the passenger.
Officer Combs walked up to the passenger side door and
looked in the car.
He observed a black purse on the floorboard
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behind the driver’s seat.
He asked Baker about the purse, and
Baker replied that it belonged to his sister.
turned to Henderson.
Officer Combs then
He asked Henderson about the purse, but
before Henderson could answer, Baker restarted the engine and
drove away.
A high speed chase ensued, finally ending up in
Paris, Kentucky.
After the two men were apprehended, Baker admitted
taking the purse, claiming that he needed the money for gas.
police retrieved $130.00 from Henderson’s shoe.
The
He initially
claimed that it was his own money, but soon afterward, he
admitted that he had put the money from Toney’s purse in his shoe
when the police began following him.
Henderson also told the
police that Baker spent $3.00 of the stolen money on gas for the
car.
During the chase, Henderson threw the purse out the window.
Later that morning, the police recovered the purse in a ravine
along the roadway, in an area where Henderson told them it would
be.
Baker and Henderson were tried together on the charges
arising out of the incident.
Following the trial, the jury found
Baker guilty of second degree robbery (KRS 515.030) and
attempting to elude (KRS 189.393).
The jury fixed his punishment
at five years on the robbery charge, and ninety days and a
$500.00 fine for attempting to elude.
The jury found Henderson
guilty on the charges of criminal facilitation of robbery (KRS
506.080), tampering with physical evidence (KRS 524.100), and
being a persistent felony offender in the first degree (KRS
532.080) (PFO I).
The jury fixed his punishment at twelve months
and a $500.00 fine on the facilitation charge, and five years for
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tampering with physical evidence, enhanced to thirteen years by
virtue of the PFO I.
The trial court imposed the jury’s
sentences for both Baker and Henderson.
These separate appeals
followed, although they have been consolidated before this panel.
Both Baker and Henderson primarily argue that the trial
court erred in denying their motions for directed verdicts on the
charges, respectively, of second degree robbery and tampering
with physical evidence.
The Kentucky Supreme Court restated the
directed verdict standard in Commonwealth v. Benham, Ky., 816
S.W.2d 186 (1991), holding as follows:
On a motion for directed verdict, the trial
court must draw all fair and reasonable
inferences from the evidence in favor of the
Commonwealth. If the evidence is sufficient
to induce a reasonable juror to believe
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
is guilty, a directed verdict should not be
given. For the purpose of ruling on the
motion, the trial court must assume that the
evidence for the Commonwealth is true, but
reserving to the jury questions as to the
credibility and weight to be given to such
testimony.
Benham, 816 S.W.2d at 187.
We shall address Baker’s ground of appeal first.
His
sole argument on appeal is that the Commonwealth failed to
establish that he took Toney’s purse with the use or threatened
use of physical force.
KRS 515.030.
The gravamen of the offense
of robbery is the use or the threat of use of physical force
against another person in order to accomplish a theft.
Commonwealth, Ky., 730 S.W.2d 935, 938 (1987).
Morgan v.
"Physical force"
means ". . . force used upon or directed toward the body of
another person."
KRS 515.010.
While taking Toney’s purse, Baker
yanked it with sufficient force to break the shoulder strap.
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We
have no difficulty finding that such conduct is within the
definition of physical force.
Therefore, we find no error in
denying his motion for a directed verdict.
Henderson argues that the evidence did not support an
instruction to the jury on the charge of tampering with physical
evidence.
He contends that the conduct with which he was
charged, concealing the stolen money in his shoe, does not meet
the definition of tampering with physical evidence contained in
KRS 524.100(1).
The Commonwealth responds that Henderson
concealed the money in his shoe while he was being pursued by the
police.
Thus, the Commonwealth asserts that it proved that
Henderson concealed physical evidence which was about to be
produced in the course of their investigation, with the intent to
impair its availability in an official proceeding.
KRS 524.100(1) provides in pertinent part as follows:
A person is guilty of tampering with physical
evidence when, believing that an official
proceeding is pending or may be instituted,
he:
(a) Destroys, mutilates, conceals,
removes or alters physical evidence which he
believes is about to be produced or used in
the official proceeding with intent to impair
its verity or availability in the official
proceeding.
In two recent cases, the Kentucky Supreme Court
considered the applicability of KRS 524.100 to specific
situations.
In Burdell v. Commonwealth, Ky., 990 S.W.2d 628
(1999), two police officers observing through an open door saw
the defendant place a baggie containing a white powdery substance
on the kitchen counter.
This item disappeared from the kitchen
counter after the defendant became aware of the presence of the
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officers and closed the front door, and before the officers were
granted entry through the back door.
Subsequently, the officers
found a baggie containing cocaine on the floor in the living room
between the couch and the chair.
The Supreme Court concluded
that the sequence of events described by the officers sufficed to
support a conclusion that the defendant participated in the
concealment or removal of this evidence.
Similarly, in Taylor v. Commonwealth, Ky., 987 S.W.2d
302 (1998), the defendant, upon being stopped by the police,
attempted to hide a bag of cocaine under the seat in his car.
He
contended that this conduct did not amount to tampering with
physical evidence because he placed the cocaine under the seat in
the plain view of the officers.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court
found this evidence sufficient to make a case for tampering with
physical evidence.
Id. at 305.
In both of these cases, the defendants actively sought
to disrupt the investigatory process by attempting to separate
themselves from incriminating evidence.
In the present case
however, the charge of tampering with physical evidence was based
on the fact that Henderson concealed the money from the robbery
in his shoe while the police were pursuing him and Baker.
Although there was evidence that he also threw the purse out of
the car window during the chase, that action was not the basis
for the charge.
Unlike the situations in Burdell and Taylor,
Henderson concealed most of the money (except for the $3.00 which
Baker spent at the gas station) on his own person.
His actions
are no different than if he had placed the money in his pocket.
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We are unwilling to stretch the statute to include this
type of conduct within the meaning of concealment.
Merely
concealing evidence is not enough to prove tampering with
physical evidence.
The Commonwealth must prove that Henderson
concealed the money with the intent “to impair its verity or
availability in an official proceeding.”
KRS 524.100(1). There
was no evidence that the money’s availability was even
potentially impaired by Henderson’s act of placing it in his
shoe.
The money was always on Henderson’s person, and it was in
his actual possession when the police officers took custody of
him.
Consequently, we find that Henderson’s actions were not
within the definition of tampering with physical evidence.1
As a
result, we find that the trial court erred in denying his motion
for a directed verdict on this charge.
Since we are setting aside Henderson’s conviction for
tampering with physical evidence, we must also set aside his
conviction for PFO I.
KRS 532.080(3) provides that a “persistent
felony offender in the first degree is a person who is more than
twenty-one (21) years of age and who stands convicted of a felony
after having been convicted of two (2) or more felonies.”
(Emphasis added).
The only remaining conviction against
Henderson is for criminal facilitation of second degree robbery,
a Class A misdemeanor.
KRS 506.080(2)(b).
1
The absence of a
Although theoretically, a defendant who swallowed drugs or
money to prevent its seizure by the police would be guilty of
tampering with physical evidence, even though the evidence
remained “on his person,” because that defendant would intend to
destroy the evidence or otherwise impair its verity or
availability in an official proceeding.
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valid conviction on the underlying felony charge renders improper
Henderson’s conviction for being a PFO I.
Accordingly, the judgment of conviction by the Fayette
Circuit Court against Darryl Edward Baker in Indictment No.
1998-CR-00479 is affirmed.
The judgment of conviction by the
Fayette Circuit Court against William Vincent Henderson on the
charges of tampering with physical evidence and being a
persistent felony offender in the first degree are reversed, and
this matter is remanded for entry of a corrected judgment
reflecting the remaining charge of Criminal Facilitation of
Robbery, the remaining misdemeanor count.
MILLER, JUDGE, CONCURS.
SCHRODER, JUDGE, CONCURS IN 1998-CA-001830-MR (BAKER)
AND DISSENTS IN 1998-CA-001831-MR (HENDERSON).
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
DARRYL EDWARD BAKER
BRIEFS FOR APPELLEE:
Albert B. Chandler, III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Karen Mead
Fayette County Legal Aid, Inc.
Lexington, Kentucky
Kent T. Young
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
WILLIAM VINCENT HENDERSON
Gene Lewter
Lexington, Kentucky
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