MINE 25 CORPORATION; MINE 26 CORPORATION; MINE 26 PROCESSING CORPORATION; and UNINSURED EMPLOYERS' FUND v. HURSHEL FLEMING; WILLIAM WINDCHY; SUN GLO CORPORATION; TROJAN MINING, INC.; HON. DONNA TERRY, Chief Administrative Law Judge
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RENDERED:
May 28, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-001813-WC
MINE 25 CORPORATION;
MINE 26 CORPORATION;
MINE 26 PROCESSING CORPORATION; and
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS' FUND
APPELLANTS
v.
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-91-039972, WC-91-015781, WC-90-016772
HURSHEL FLEMING;
WILLIAM WINDCHY;
SUN GLO CORPORATION;
TROJAN MINING, INC.;
HON. DONNA TERRY, Chief
Administrative Law Judge
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
KNOPF, KNOX, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
KNOX, JUDGE:
In their petition for review of a decision of the
Workers’ Compensation Board (Board), appellants argue the Board
exceeded its authority in reviewing, reversing and remanding a
decision of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).
Although we do
not believe the Board exceeded the proper scope of review, having
examined the record and applicable law, we reverse.
The underlying facts and procedural history of this
matter have been thoroughly set forth in Fleming v. Windchy, Ky.,
953 S.W.2d 604 (1997).
For the sake of simplicity we will
summarize only those facts relevant to the immediate appeal.
On
March 16, 1990, claimant, Hurshel Fleming (Fleming), injured his
back while in the employ of Sun Glo Coal Company (Sun Glo).
For
this injury he received temporary, total disability (TTD)
benefits until August 1990.
Thereafter, he returned to work and
suffered yet another back injury, on April 19, 1991, while in the
employ of Trojan Mining, Inc. (Trojan), Sun Glo’s successor
corporation.
Fleming received TTD benefits until July 1991 and
has not returned to work since that time.
A claim of permanent
total disability benefits was filed on Fleming’s behalf for both
the 1990 and 1991 injuries.
Prior injuries sustained by Fleming
included a 1977 back injury, for which a six percent (6%)
occupational disability was awarded, and a 1988 knee injury, for
which a ten percent (10%) occupational disability was awarded.
Following the Supreme Court decision, the case was
remanded to the ALJ for further proceedings consistent with that
opinion.
On remand, the ALJ entered an initial order on January
26, 1998, and modified order on March 3, 1998.
The Special Fund
appealed that decision to the Board, which reversed and remanded.
This appeal ensued.
In the appeal sub judice, appellants argue the Board
exceeded its authority in reversing the ALJ’s decision.
They
contend the Special Fund sought review from the Board solely on
the issue of apportionment of lifetime benefits between Trojan,
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its successors, and the Special Fund.
Rather than limit the
scope of review strictly to apportionment of liability, the
Board, in part, increased the actual weekly payment sum arising
from the 1991 injury.
Appellants contend the Board’s
construction of the issue raised before it was an abuse of its
jurisdictional authority.
We disagree.
KRS 342.285(2)(c) provides:
(2) The board shall not substitute its
judgment for that of the administrative law
judge as to the weight of the evidence on
questions of fact, its review being limited
to determining whether or not:
(c)The order, decision, or award is not
in conformity to the provisions of this
chapter[.]
Our review of the Board’s opinion reveals that it made every
effort to interpret and apply the holding in Fleming, albeit
inaccurately.
Moreover, it appears the Board’s decision was
premised on the fact that KRS 342.1202(1) directs that any award
of income benefits for permanent total or partial disability,
under KRS Chapter 342, based in whole or part on a pre-existing
back condition, shall be apportioned fifty/fifty (50/50).
Relying on this statutory provision, the Board modified the
amounts and durations of Fleming’s combined awards.
In that the
Board’s opinion was an effort to conform with the provisions of
KRS Chapter 342, it acted within the scope of its conferred
authority.
Nonetheless, we believe the Board misinterpreted the
instructions set forth in Fleming and, therefore, reverse its
decision.
See Western Baptist Hosp. v. Kelly, Ky., 827 S.W.2d
685 (1992).
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In Fleming v. Windchy, Ky., 953 S.W.2d 604 (1997), our
Supreme Court addressed, inter alia, the appropriate manner in
which to ascertain and apportion disability benefits where a
prior injury is being compensated as a permanent, partial
disability and the claimant is subsequently rendered totally
disabled by another work-related injury.
The difficult question
remained in how to allocate liability where the first compensable
injury rendered the claimant only partially occupationally
disabled, however the subsequent injury, when combined with the
prior partial disability, rendered the claimant totally
occupationally disabled.
But for the other injury, neither,
standing alone, would have been totally disabling.
Moreover, the
question remained on the new nature of the prior partial
disability and, to what extent and by what method was the
employer liable for compensating the injured worker.
Our Supreme
Court opined:
[W]e remain committed to the principle
embodied in the [Campbell v. Sextet Mining
Co., Ky., 912 S.W.2d 25 (1995)] holding, that
a worker who is rendered permanently and
totally disabled by a work-related injury
which occurs during the compensable period of
a prior, work-related injury is entitled to
an award of lifetime benefits, computed
pursuant to KRS 342.730(1)(a), for the entire
amount of disability not excluded as a prior,
active condition.
. . . Likewise, a defendant may not
be held liable for any additional
occupational effect which results from the
fact that a subsequent disabling injury is
superimposed upon the injury for which the
defendant is liable. . . . [W]e agree that
the award for the 1990 injury may extend only
for 425 weeks, with benefits payable at the
1990 rate pursuant to KRS 342.730(1)(b).
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. . . KRS 342.120(6) provides that
where the combined effect of a worker’s
previous disability and a new injury results
in a greater overall degree of disability
that the latest injury, alone, would have
caused, the employer is liable only for the
percentage of disability attributable to the
latest injury. Pursuant to KRS 342.120(7),
that greater disability which results from
the combined effect of the latest injury
superimposed upon the previous disability is
apportioned to the Special Fund.
Fleming, 953 S.W.2d at 607.1
The essence of Fleming holds that where a worker is
being compensated for a partial injury, and during the period of
compensation receives a subsequent work-related injury which when
taken with the prior injury has a combined effect of rendering
the worker totally disabled, the latter injury is superimposed on
the former entitling the worker to total disability benefits for
as long as he remains disabled.
In other words, the permanent,
partial disability is transformed into a permanent total
disability.2
The net effect of this treatment permits the worker
1
We note that the Court’s opinion refers to the pre-1997
amendments to KRS Chapter 342.
2
As the Court notes, one source of controversy is the rate
of compensation for partial and total disabilities which are
permanent. Permanent, total disability is compensated at a
higher maximum rate for a longer duration. KRS 342.730 provides
income benefits for a permanent, totally disabled employee to be
paid for life (provided the employee remains totally disabled) at
66 2/3% of the employee’s average weekly wage, but not more than
100% of the state average weekly wage. KRS 342.730(1)(a). As
where a permanent, partial disability is compensated at 66 2/3%
of the employee’s average weekly wage multiplied by the permanent
impairment rating, but not to exceed 75% of the state average
weekly wage. KRS 342.730(1)(b). Further, where the permanent,
partial disability rating is 50% or less as a result of the workrelated injury, the period of compensation is 425 weeks. KRS
342.730(1)(d).
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entitlement to lifetime benefits computed in accordance with KRS
342.730(1)(a), addressing permanent, total disability awards.
The next application of Fleming calls for the method of
apportioning liability where the subsequent injury would not, in
and of itself, have rendered the worker totally disabled.
applying the facts of this matter the Court stated:
Here, the sum of claimant’s 16%
noncompensable disability and the percentages
of occupational disability attributed to the
1990 and 1991 injuries totals 100%. However,
since the 1991 injury rendered claimant
totally, occupationally disabled, the
occupational effect of the injury exceeded
that which would have been the case had there
been no prior disability. The occupational
effect of the 1991 injury was twofold.
First, together with the arousal of ongoing
degenerative back problems, it accounted for
42% of claimant’s permanent, total
disability. Second, due to the difference in
KRS 342.730(1)(a) and (b), it caused the 1990
injury, which was being compensated as only
42% permanent, partial disability, to become
42% of a permanent, total disability. It is
this second effect which the Special Fund
would have us ignore but which we determined,
in Campbell, should be compensable. We are
aware that, in doing so and in placing
liability on the Special Fund pursuant to KRS
342.120(6) and (7), we broadened the concept
of “excess disability.” However, we are not
persuaded that we erred in doing so.
. . . .
. . . [S]ince, we have reaffirmed the
principle of Campbell, we conclude that the
correct method for excluding the percentage
of prior, active disability on these facts is
to permit an offset against Trojan’s and the
Special Fund’s liability pursuant to the
award of total disability to the extent that
benefits paid by the defendants pursuant to
the partial disability award overlap the
compensable period of the subsequent total
disability award. In this way, there will be
no duplicate compensation for the disability
caused by the 1990 injury, each defendant
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In
will be held liable only for the disability
which resulted from the injury for which it
is held liable, and claimant will be
compensated for the whole of his disability
at each point in time.
Id. at 608. (Footnotes omitted).
In a footnote to the above-quoted passage, the Court
recognized that, “[h]ere, it is undisputed that liability is
apportioned equally between Trojan and the Special Fund pursuant
to KRS 342.1202(1).”3
Specifically, this notation followed
reference to the Court’s broadened concept of “excess
disability.”
We believe the Board misconstrued this reference in
modifying the ALJ’s benefits award.
It appears the Board
perceived any and all compensation should be equally divided
between Trojan and the Special Fund.
The Board interpreted the
decision as allocating an 84% occupational disability resulting
from the 1991 injury.
Following the expiration of the maximum
payment period for permanent, partial disability the Board’s
order divided Fleming’s compensation equally between Trojan and
the Special Fund, so long as Fleming remained disabled.
This
result runs afoul of the Court’s holding.
Rather, the intended outcome directs Sun Glo and the
Special Fund to equally share in compensating Fleming for the
1990 permanent, partial disability, at the rate set forth in KRS
342.730(1)(b), for a period not to exceed 425 weeks.
Thereafter,
the Special Fund would remain solely liable for the entire amount
of compensation, for as long as Fleming remained disabled, under
3
Trojan and the Special Fund had further stipulated that
liability would be apportioned 50/50.
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the concept of “excess disability.”
Concerning the 1991 injury,
Trojan, or its successors, and the Special Fund would share
equally in compensating Fleming for the permanent, total
disability for as long as Fleming remained disabled.
During the
compensable period in which the payment of disability benefits
overlap, Trojan’s and the Special Fund’s liability would be
offset to the extent of benefits paid By Sun Glo and the Special
Fund for the partial disability award.
In other words, the ALJ’s
order on remand accurately reflects the Supreme Court’s decision
when it provided, in pertinent part, the following award:
1. Plaintiff Hurshel Fleming is 100%
occupationally disabled, of which 16% was
preexisting active prior to the 1990 and 1991
injuries which formed the subject of the
instant litigation.
2. For Claim No. 90-16772, Hurshel Fleming
shall recover temporary total disability
income benefits already paid from March 17,
1990 to August 19, 1990 and thereafter the
sum of $74.18 per week for 21% permanent
occupational disability from August 20, 1990
and continuing thereafter for so long as he
shall remain disabled, for a period not to
exceed 425 weeks. Hurshel Fleming shall
further recover from the Special Fund the sum
of $74.18 per week representing 21% permanent
occupation disability commencing August 20,
1990 and continuing thereafter for so long as
he shall be disabled for a period not to
exceed 425 weeks and benefits thereafter at
the rate of $148.36 per week for so long as
he shall remain disabled, representing
“excess disability” caused by the combined
effects of the injury occurring on March 16,
1990 and the injury occurring on April 19,
1991. The Special Fund’s liability for this
excess liability is determined pursuant to
the factors set forth in Young [v.]
Fulkerson, Ky., 463 S.W.2d 118 (1971).
3. For claim No. 91-15781, Hurshel Fleming
shall recover from defendant Trojan Mining,
Inc. and pursuant to operation of KRS
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342.610(2), Mine 25 Corporation, Mine 26
Corporation, and Mine 26 Processing
Corporation, temporary total disability
income benefits already paid and thereafter
the sum of $76.03 per week for 21% permanent
occupational disability from July 1, 1991 and
continuing thereafter for so long as he is so
disabled. Both of the latter sums shall be
subject to credit to the extent that the
award of permanent partial disability
benefits from the 1990 injury (Claim No. 9016772) overlap this lifetime disability
award. Successors by merger of Mine 25
Corporation, Mine 26 Corporation and Mine 26
Processing Corporation shall be liable for
said benefits pursuant to KRS 271B.11-060.
“The Court of Appeals is compelled to follow precedent
established by the decisions of the Supreme Court.”
v. Francis, Ky., 708 S.W.2d 641, 642 (1986).
Special Fund
As our analysis of
the Supreme Court’s instructions in Fleming conflicts with the
Board’s opinion but conforms to the ALJ’s revised order, we
reverse the June 19, 1998, order of the Board and affirm the
January 26, 1998, order and March 3, 1998 modification of the
ALJ.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR MINE 25 CORPORATION;
MINE 26 CORPORATION; MINE 26
PROCESSING CORPORATION:
BRIEF FOR SPECIAL FUND:
David W. Barr
Louisville, Kentucky
Robert J. Patton
Prestonsburg, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR SUN GLO CORPORATION:
BRIEF FOR UNINSURED EMPLOYERS’
FUND:
Jeffrey D. Damron
Prestonsburg, Kentucky
Dana C. Stinson
Frankfort, Kentucky
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