SHANE DOUGLAS WILLIAMS v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
September 17, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-001638-MR
SHANE DOUGLAS WILLIAMS
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES E. KELLER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CR-0461-001
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
EMBERTON, GUIDUGLI AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE.
Shane Douglas Williams (Williams) appeals from
a final judgement of the Fayette Circuit Court entered June 25,
1998, which found him guilty of receiving stolen property and
being a second degree persistent felony offender and sentenced
him to five years’ imprisonment.
We affirm.
On March 8, 1998, Susan Wornall (Wornall) robbed a Shell gas
station in Lexington, Kentucky.
After obtaining approximately
$734 in cash, Wornall drove away in a small red car.
According
to the station attendant and a customer, Pat Wells, there was a
passenger in the car.
the same day.
Wornall and Williams were arrested later
Following a jury trial, Williams was convicted of
receiving stolen property over $300 and being a second degree
persistent felony offender.
I.
This appeal followed.
Should the prosecution have been allowed
to present evidence of Williams’ alleged
involvement in an unrelated robbery?
On May 26, 1998, the prosecution gave Williams written
notice that it intended to introduce “evidence of the Defendants
[sic] presence and involvement in a similar robbery in Paris,
Kentucky...as proof of preparation, plan and knowledge with
respect to the Defendant’s activities on the day in question.”
Williams’ initial objection to this evidence was over-ruled.
During opening statements, the prosecution informed the
jury that the evidence would show that on March 3, 1998, Wornall
robbed a service station in Paris, Kentucky at Williams’
direction.
According to the prosecution, Wornall obtained
approximately $200-$300, which she gave to Williams.
The pair
then proceeded to Lexington, where they paid for a hotel room and
went on a drug buying spree.
The prosecution then stated that
the pair ran out of money “from the robbery of the service
station in Paris and they needed more money.”
When Wornall
refused to shoplift items from K-mart and Wal-Mart and then
return them for cash, they decided to rob the Shell station.
It
appears that the prosecution anticipated that Wornall, who was
scheduled to testify against Williams, would testify about the
Paris robbery.
Williams made no objection to the prosecution’s
opening statement.
At a bench conference following the lunch break, the
trial court was informed that Wornall had met with her attorney
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over lunch and had been advised not to testify about the Paris
robbery.
When questioned by the trial court, Wornall stated that
she would plead the Fifth Amendment if questioned about the Paris
robbery.
It appears that Wornall had been charged with the Paris
robbery, but had not yet been tried.
Counsel for Williams then
requested a mistrial due to the prosecution’s inability to bring
forward any evidence to support its allegations pertaining to the
Paris robbery.
The trial court denied Williams’ motion on the
ground that the prosecution’s statements were made in good faith.
The Commonwealth had no prior knowledge of Wornall’s last-minute
decision not to testify in regard to the Paris robbery.
The
trial court offered to give an admonition to the jury concerning
this situation.
Wornall’s testimony proceeded, but she was not
questioned by either party regarding the Paris robbery.
Prior to instructing the jury, the trial court
admonished the jurors to disregard the prosecution’s statements
pertaining to the earlier robbery due to lack of evidence.
The
trial court further told the jury that remarks made during
opening statements are not to be considered as evidence.
At the
close of all evidence, Williams objected on the ground that the
admonition was insufficient to cure the damage caused by the
prosecution’s unsupported allegations concerning the Paris
robbery and once again requested a mistrial.
The objection was
over-ruled.
Williams contends that the trial court erred in failing
to sustain his objection to introduction of evidence pertaining
to his alleged involvement in the Paris robbery.
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While we agree
with Williams that the trial court should have taken further
action aside from admonishing the jury once it became evident
that the prosecution would be unable to bring forth evidence in
support of its allegations, we do not believe that a new trial is
warranted in this case.
In order for Williams to be entitled to
reversal, he must not only show that an error occurred, but also
that the error was prejudicial.
Decker v. Commonwealth, Ky., 198
S.W.2d 212, 214(1946); RCr 9.24.
Where there is strong direct
evidence of a defendant’s guilt of the crime for which he is
charged and it is apparent from the examination of the entire
record coupled with no substantial possibility that the outcome
would have been different had the evidence of prior crimes been
excluded, the error is non-prejudicial and no relief is
warranted.
Yarnell v. Commonwealth, Ky., 833 S.W.2d 834,
837(1992).
We have reviewed the videotape of Williams’ trial and the
evidence presented therein.
Having done so, we do not believe
that Williams would have been acquitted had the prosecution not
discussed the Paris robbery.
Therefore, based upon the entire
record, we do not believe that Williams is entitled to relief on
this ground.
II.
Should Williams have been permitted to
conduct an in-depth examination of
Wornall pertaining to her prior felony
convictions?
At the outset of her testimony on behalf of the
prosecution, Wornall admitted that she had prior felony
convictions.
When asked by the prosecution why she refused to
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shoplift from stores as suggested by Williams, she responded that
she was not a thief.
Williams’ attorney requested permission to crossexamine Wornall on her prior convictions, but the request was
denied.
The trial court limited any questioning as to Wornall’s
prior convictions to (a) stating the charge; and (b) asking
Wornall if she has been convicted.
When Williams’ attorney asked
if she had been convicted of obtaining drugs by fraud, she
responded affirmatively.
Williams argues that because Wornall denied being a
thief and because she admitted to the convictions only “after
repeated questioning by defense counsel,” he should have been
permitted to question her regarding specific facts of her prior
convictions.
We disagree.
As established in Commonwealth v. Richardson, Ky., 674
S.W.2d 515 (1984):
a witness may be asked if he has been
previously convicted of a felony. If his
answer is “Yes,” that is the end of it and
the court shall thereupon admonish the jury
that the admission by the witness of his
prior conviction of a felony may be
considered only as it affects his credibility
as a witness, if it does so. If the witness
answers “No” to this question, he may then be
impeached by the Commonwealth by the use of
all prior convictions[.] After impeachment,
the proper admonition shall be given by the
court.
Richardson, 674 S.W.2d at 517-518.
This case
specifically overruled Cotton v. Commonwealth Ky., 454 S.W.2d
698(1970), upon which Williams relies because Wornall admitted to
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having prior felony convictions, there was no error in the trial
court’s ruling.
III. Should the testimony of Pat Wells been
suppressed?
At trial, Pat Wells, a customer at the Shell station at
the time of the robbery, testified that she saw Williams waving
at Wornall while she was robbing the store.
Although Williams
had previously asked that Wells’ testimony concerning his actions
during the robbery be suppressed, his motion was denied.
Williams contends that the trial court erred in denying
his motion to suppress Wells’ testimony on the ground that pretrial discovery did not disclose the fact that Wells saw Williams
make any sort of motion during the robbery.
Williams maintains
that the prosecution’s failure to advise him of the substance of
Wells’ testimony was violative of the open file discovery policy
of the Commonwealth.
We disagree.
We fail to see how Williams’ could argue he was
surprised by Wells’ testimony.
However, there is no allegation
made that counsel for Williams was unaware that Wells was to be
called as a witness or that he was unaware of her identity.
In
fact, the prosecutor noted during his response to Williams’
motion to suppress that Wells was listed as a witness on the
police report and her address was given as well.
If counsel for
Williams failed to question Wells prior to trial to ascertain the
nature of her testimony, he cannot now be heard to say that he
was somehow surprised at trial.
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Secondly, there is nothing in the criminal procedural
rules which requires the prosecution to divulge the nature of
Wells’ testimony.
RCr 7.26 only requires the prosecution to
produce written or recorded witness statements, and there has
been no allegation that Wells gave a written or recorded
statement which was not produced.
Likewise, there is nothing in
RCr 7.24, which deals with pre-trial discovery and inspection,
which requires disclosure of the substance of a witness’
testimony.
Even if Wells’ testimony should not have been admitted,
Williams’ argument is once again precluded by the fact that the
error was not prejudicial.
Our review of the record shows that
there was substantial evidence presented at trial to support
Williams’ conviction even if Wells’ testimony had been excluded.
Therefore, reversal is not proper on this ground.
Yarnell, 833
S.W.2d at 837.
Having considered the parties’ arguments on appeal, the
final judgement of the Fayette Circuit Court is affirmed.
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ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Karen Mead
Lexington, KY
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Dana M. Todd
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
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