REGINALD K. MEEKS v. GERRY MARIE ELLIS
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RENDERED:
November 19, 1999; 10:00 a.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO. 1998-CA-001634-MR
REGINALD K. MEEKS
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ERNEST JASMIN, JUDGE
CIVIL ACTION NO. 96-CI-03304
v.
GERRY MARIE ELLIS
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUDGEL, Chief Judge; HUDDLESTON and KNOPF, Judges.
HUDDLESTON, Judge:
Circuit
Court
order
Reginald K. Meeks appeals from a Jefferson
that
denied
his
Kentucky
Rule
of
Civil
Procedure (CR) 60.02(b) motion to relieve him from its final order
declaring his 1996 nomination as the Democratic candidate for 11th
Ward Alderman in the City of Louisville void.
The motion is based
on what Meeks describes as newly discovered evidence.
CR 60.02(b) authorizes a circuit court to relieve a party
from
its
final
judgment
or
order
upon
the
ground
of
newly
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been
discovered in time to move for a new trial under CR 59.02.
The
motion must be filed within one year after the judgment or order
was entered.
The order voiding Meeks’s nomination was entered on
April 20, 1998, after the Supreme Court reversed a Jefferson
Circuit Court judgment that had upheld his nomination and after the
Court directed the circuit court to enter an order declaring
Meeks’s nomination void.
April 30, 1998.
Meeks filed his CR 60.02(b) motion on
Since, as required by CR 59.02, Meeks’s motion was
filed within ten days following entry of the order declaring his
nomination void, we elect to treat the motion as one filed under CR
59.01(g) which authorizes the granting of a new trial based on
"[n]ewly discovered evidence, material for the party applying,
which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and
produced at the trial."
In the May 1996 primary for the Democratic nomination for
11th Ward Alderman, Meeks defeated Gerry Marie Ellis by a margin of
eight votes.
Ellis contested Meeks’s nomination alleging that the
delivery of lunches to precinct workers (some of whom were also
voters) and Meeks’s presence in some ten of fifteen polling places
violated Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 121.055, which restricts
certain candidate expenditures designed to influence voters, and
KRS 117.235(3), which prohibits electioneering at polling places.
The parties entered into a Stipulation of Facts, and the case was
submitted for a decision.
The circuit court found that the election had not been
compromised and upheld the result.
The circuit court’s judgment
was affirmed by this Court, but the Supreme Court reversed our
-2-
decision and held, pursuant to KRS 120.065, that the nomination of
Meeks was void.
Ellis v. Meeks, Ky., 957 S.W.2d 213 (1997).
Following the Supreme Court’s decision and the entry of
the order declaring his nomination void, Meeks sought relief from
the order asserting that subsequent to the trial of this action in
1996 he discovered new evidence which shows that Ellis was not a
valid candidate and thus lacked statutory standing to bring an
election contest.
Meeks relied on KRS 120.055, a statute which
delineates the procedure for the contest of primary elections.
In his new trial motion, Meeks alleged that upon filing
for office on January 30, 1996, Ellis swore under oath that she
resided within the 11th Ward at 2123 Grand Avenue, Louisville,
Kentucky 40210. According to Meeks, Ellis actually resided at 4101
Stone View Drive #4, Louisville, Kentucky 40207, outside the 11th
Ward.
Meeks offered evidence that:
(1) Ellis listed her address
as 4101 Stone View Drive #4 in the April 1996 BellSouth Greater
Louisville White Pages; (2) a complaint was filed against Ellis on
February 17, 1995, as a result of her failure to pay condominium
dues at the 4101 Stone View Drive address; and (3) Ellis filed a
bankruptcy petition on July 11, 1997, in which she listed her
address as 4101 Stone View Drive #4 and swore that she had occupied
no other residence for the immediately preceding two years.
Relying
on
Kelley
v.
Barlow,1
the
circuit
court
determined that even a candidate who is not entitled to the
nomination can contest the nomination of her opponent on the ground
that the opponent violated the Corrupt Practices Act.
1
287 Ky. 680, 155 S.W.2d 10 (1941).
-3-
In denying
Meeks’s motion, the court said that “[KRS 120.055] does not specify
whether [a] candidate who brings an election contest must be a
valid one . . . .”
Because “the previous judgment [i.e., the
decision of the Supreme Court] was based upon the conduct of
[Meeks] and not [Ellis],” the court reasoned, “it must stand as the
law of the case, particularly in light of the mandate of the
Supreme Court of Kentucky [directing that the circuit court declare
Meeks’s nomination void].”
On appeal to this Court, Meeks argues that the circuit
court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a new trial
and
that
the
court’s
reliance
on
Kelley
v.
Barlow2,
was
inappropriate because of the adoption of KRS 120.055 subsequent to
rendition of that decision.
CR 59.02(g) [as well as CR 60.02(b)] authorizes relief
from a final judgment only if: “(1) the evidence was discovered
after entry of judgment; (2) the moving party was diligent in
discovering the new evidence; (3) the newly discovered evidence is
not merely cumulative or impeaching; (4) the newly discovered
evidence is material; and (5) the evidence, if introduced, would
probably result in a different outcome.”3
The fatal flaw in Meeks’s new trial motion, which was not
addressed by the circuit court, is his failure to allege or to
establish by affidavit or other proof that he could not with
reasonable diligence have discovered the evidence which he now
2
Id.
3
Hopkins v. Ratliff, Ky. App., 957 S.W.2d 300, 301-2
(1997). See generally 7 Kurt A. Philipps, Jr., Kentucky
Practice, CR 60.02, cmt. 4 (5th ed. 1995).
-4-
claims is material to his case in time to introduce it during the
trial of this action.
The reason for this deficiency is obvious.
The April 1996 telephone listing allegedly showing that Ellis’s
residence was outside the 11th Ward was readily available to any
resident of Louisville; and the lawsuit brought against Ellis by
the condominium association was filed in Jefferson Circuit Court on
February 17, 1995, more than fifteen months before the lawsuit
challenging Meeks’s nomination was initiated.
The information
gleaned from the subsequently filed bankruptcy petition is merely
cumulative.
Furthermore, Meeks has not shown that he attempted in
any way to discover Ellis’s residence address while this action was
awaiting a resolution in the circuit court.
Finally, it has long
been the rule that the qualifications of a candidate to appear on
the ballot must be challenged before the primary election.4
Because Meeks has not alleged or demonstrated that he
could not have by the exercise of reasonable diligence discovered
the evidence relating to Ellis’s place of residence in time to
produce it at trial, his motion for a new trial based on newly
discovered evidence was properly denied. Therefore, the order from
which this appeal is prosecuted is affirmed, albeit for a reason
other than that relied on by the circuit court.5
ALL CONCUR.
4
KRS 118.176; Noble v. Meagher, Ky., 686 S.W.2d 458, 461
(1985); Fletcher v. Teater, Ky., 503 S.W.2d 732 (1974); Fletcher
v. Wilson, Ky., 495 S.W.2d 787 (1973).
5
Bank One, Pikeville v. Commonwealth, Natural Resources
and Environmental Protection Cabinet, Ky. App., 901 S.W.2d 52, 56
(1995); Vega v. Kosair Charities Committee, Inc., Ky. App., 832
S.W.2d 895, 897 (1992).
-5-
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Kenneth L. Sales
Keith B. Hunter
SEGAL, SALES, STEWART,
CUTLER & TILLMAN
Louisville, Kentucky
Teddy B. Gordon
Louisville, Kentucky
-6-
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