KAREN MARIE BROWN v. JAMES BAXTER BROWN
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RENDERED: June 4, 1999; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-001592-MR
KAREN MARIE BROWN
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM RUSSELL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE EDDIE C. LOVELACE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CI-00169
v.
JAMES BAXTER BROWN
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: BUCKINGHAM, KNOX, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
KNOX, JUDGE:
Karen Brown (Karen) appeals the decision of the
Russell Circuit Court ordering she and her former husband, James
Baxter Brown (Baxter), share joint custody of the parties’ two
(2) minor
children.
Having reviewed the record, briefs of
counsel and applicable law, we affirm.
Karen and Baxter were married in May 1993 and are the
parents of two (2) minor children, Jordan, born in 1989, and
Christopher (Chris), born in May 1994.
In June 1997, Baxter
filed a petition for dissolution with the Russell Circuit Court
which, at the time, was his county of residence.
Subsequently,
he moved to Guadalajara, Mexico, to pursue a business venture.
An initial hearing with respect to temporary custody, visitation,
and support of the children was held before the domestic
relations commissioner (DRC) on August 13, 1997.
As a result of
that hearing the DRC awarded temporary sole custody of Jordan and
Chris to Karen.
Baxter requested the DRC reconsider this
decision, which request was denied.
Thereafter, Baxter filed
exceptions to the DRC’s recommendations.
The circuit court found
the DRC had not abused his discretion in awarding temporary sole
custody to Karen.
The parties were able to reach a settlement agreement
on all issues excepting permanent custody, visitation, support
and other issues regarding the children.
Following a May 14,
1998, hearing on the matter, the court entered its findings of
fact, conclusions of law and decree, granting the parties, inter
alia, permanent joint custody of Jordan and Chris, naming Karen
as the primary residential custodian.
This appeal ensued on the
sole issue of custody.
Karen argues it was an abuse of discretion for the
court to award joint custody as such an award was not supported
by the evidence.
She relies on the DRC’s earlier recommendation
of sole custody as well as testimony from the May 14, 1998
hearing which indicates Baxter has had limited involvement with
the children throughout the course of their young lives.
Karen
posits that given this history, the only proper custodial
arrangement is to vest sole custody with her.
Baxter points out that Karen’s brief is devoid of any
case law or statutory authority in support of her argument.
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He
contends the circuit court correctly applied the statutory
factors enumerated in KRS 403.270 and the dictates of Squires v.
Squires, Ky., 854 S.W.2d 765 (1993).
We agree.
As a primary matter we look to the statutory
directives.
The applicable statute unquestionably directs the
court to determine custody in conformity with the best interests
of the child.
KRS 403.270(1).1
Similarly, our legislature
envisioned joint custody as an acceptable arrangement whereby the
best interests of the child will be served.
KRS 403.270(4).
The
standard by which the circuit court should evaluate whether an
award of joint custody is appropriate has been examined by our
appellate Courts on numerous occasions and we heed to the
established law.
Specifically, our Supreme Court has opined:
Initially, the court must consider those
factors set forth in KRS 403.270(1). By
application of these, the child whose custody
is being litigated is individualized and his
or her unique circumstances accounted for.
In many cases, appropriate consideration of
KRS 403.270(1) may reveal the result which
would be in the child’s best interest.
Thereafter, we believe a trial court should
look beyond the present and assess the
likelihood of future cooperation between the
parents. It would be shortsighted to
conclude that because parties are
antagonistic at the time of their divorce,
such antagonism will continue indefinitely.
Emotional maturity would appear to be a
dependable guide in predicting future
behavior. By cooperation we mean willingness
to rationally participate in decisions
affecting the upbringing of the child.
Squires, 854 S.W.2d at 769 (1993).
1
We cite the statutory subsections in effect at the time
this case was decided, prior to the effective date of the 1998
amendments to KRS 403.270 which are, nonetheless, inapplicable to
the matter sub judice.
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Having reviewed the videotape record of the May 14,
1998, hearing, we believe the court correctly decided the matter
when it made the following finding of fact:
10. The Court is reasonably satisfied that
joint decision making serves the best
interest of these children and believes that
these parties have the ability and
willingness to rationally participate in the
decisions with regard to the upbringing of
these children. The Court, in analyzing the
current situation of the parties, had initial
concerns with regard to the long distant
nature of the relationship and whether these
parties could make decisions jointly
regarding the children under those
circumstances. However, upon further
reflection, the Court is satisfied that with
the use of communication systems which are
readily available, the parties can
communicate through e-mail, fax, internet,
and phone, and therefore, determines that
joint custody is appropriate for the parties.
Although Karen testified that she had previously
experienced a less than communicative relationship with Baxter
regarding the children, she further testified that she would,
from that point forward, be willing to cooperate with him
respecting the upbringing and care of the children.
We believe
this testimony comports with the Squires instruction that the
court is to look at the likelihood of the parents future
cooperation, rather than focus on past acrimonious attitudes.
Further, there is no evidence in the record which might give rise
to the notion that the Brown children’s best interest would not
be served through their parents’ joint participation in their
upbringing.
Our examination of the court’s findings of fact and
conclusions of law reveal no departure from the mandates of KRS
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403.270 and case law interpreting application of that statute.
The decision is amply supported by the evidence contained in the
record and well within the court’s proper exercise of judicial
discretion.
We will not disturb the court’s findings unless they
are clearly erroneous.
This standard is particularly applicable
in domestic relations matters.
S.W.2d 612, 615 (1995).
Aton v. Aton, Ky. App., 911
We do not believe the circuit court
erred in granting joint custody of Jordan and Chris to their
parents.
As such, the judgment of the Russell Circuit Court is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Robert E. Gillum
Somerset, Kentucky
Laura Henry Harris
Columbia, Kentucky
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