BRUCE E. MOLLETTE v. KENTUCKY PERSONNEL BOARD AND KENTUCKY TRANSPORTATION CABINET
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RENDERED: JULY 30, 1999; 10:00 a.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-001527-MR
BRUCE E. MOLLETTE
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROGER L. CRITTENDEN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CI-001666
v.
KENTUCKY PERSONNEL BOARD AND
KENTUCKY TRANSPORTATION CABINET
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, HUDDLESTON, AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
This is an administrative law termination of
employment case in which the employee, Bruce E. Mollette, appeals
the decision of the Franklin Circuit Court upholding the decision
of the Kentucky Transportation Cabinet (Cabinet) and the Kentucky
Personnel Board (Personnel Board) to terminate his employment
based upon a positive drug test.
Mollette was employed as an equipment operator with the
Cabinet in Martin County, Kentucky.
Mollette was required to
have a commercial driver’s license (CDL) for this position.
As
an equipment operator, Mr. Mollette operated a truck and other
heavy equipment classified as commercial vehicles.
On April 1, 1996, the Cabinet adopted and put into
effect a “zero tolerance” drug and alcohol testing policy for
employees who hold CDL licenses.
Under the provisions of the
policy as set forth in the Cabinet’s Drug and Alcohol Testing
Handbook for CDL Employees, a CDL holder performing safetysensitive functions such as driving or operating a commercial
vehicle is subject to random drug and alcohol testing.
If the
employee tests positive for any of five prohibited drug
categories, that employee will be automatically dismissed.
Mollette was subject to the zero tolerance policy since he was a
CDL holder and operated commercial vehicles.
On December 16, 1996, Mollette was selected for a
random drug test by the Cabinet.
He went to the collection
facility where he supplied a urine sample for drug testing.
There were approximately 52 men providing samples for drug
testing at the collection site on that day.
No one personally
observed Mollette while he provided his sample.
On January 2, 1997, Mollette was notified by the
Cabinet that he had tested positive for cannabanoid (marijuana).
Mollette was notified that as a result of the positive test, he
would be dismissed from his employment effective January 17,
1997.
A pretermination hearing was held on January 14, 1997.
On
January 17, 1997, the Cabinet issued a letter to Mollette
advising him that he would be officially dismissed for cause from
his position as an Equipment Operator effective the close of
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business on January 21, 1997.
The reason for the dismissal was
the positive test result by application of the zero tolerance
policy.
Mollette appealed the termination through administrative
channels and a hearing was held on May 30, 1997, and June 30,
1997, before the Personnel Board.
At the hearing, the Cabinet introduced various records
of the testing laboratory into evidence, including test results
showing that Mollette had tested positive for marijuana.
No
witnesses were produced to testify that they had observed
Mollette smoking marijuana or had observed him under the
influence of marijuana.
Mollette testified that he had not been
smoking marijuana but had been around individuals who were
smoking marijuana the weekend before the test.
The hearing officer, in her recommended order to the
Personnel Board, found that the Cabinet had properly followed
testing procedures and that the evidence was competent to
establish the positive test results.
dismissal be upheld.
She recommended that the
The hearing officer’s recommended order was
adopted by the Personnel Board and Mollette’s firing was upheld.
Mollette appealed the decision to the Franklin Circuit Court.
The Franklin Circuit Court upheld the decision of the Personnel
Board and this appeal followed.
Mollette first argues that the Personnel Board
committed reversible error in admitting the records of the
laboratory, PharmChem, which conducted the testing.
Mollette
contends that the records constitute hearsay and were not
competent to establish the results of his positive drug test.
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The admission of the PharmChem laboratory records was
proper.
Hearsay evidence is admissible in an administrative
hearing if it is the type of evidence that reasonable and prudent
persons would rely on in their daily affairs.
KRS 13B.090(1).
This is true even though the hearsay evidence alone is not
sufficient in itself to support an agency's findings of fact
unless it would be admissible over objections in civil actions.
Id.
The laboratory evidence in this case would have been
admissible in a civil action.
Kentucky Rules of Evidence (KRE)
803(6) provides an exception to the hearsay rule by permitting
the admission of records of regularly conducted activity.
The
rule permits the admission of any
memorandum, report, record, or data
compilation, in any form, of acts, events,
conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at
or near the time by, or from information
transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if
kept in the course of a regularly conducted
business activity, and if it was the regular
practice of that business activity to make
the memorandum, report, record, or data
compilation, all as shown by the testimony of
the custodian or other qualified witness,
unless the source of information or the
method or circumstances of preparation
indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term
"business" as used in this paragraph includes
business, institution, association,
profession, occupation, and calling of every
kind, whether or not conducted for profit.
KRE 803(6).
In our view, the testing data maintained by
PharmChem falls under the business exception rule.
Mollette further argues that PharmChem records were not
competent because inadequate testimony was provided to establish
chain of custody.
Documents must be authenticated prior to their
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introduction into evidence.
KRE 901.
“The requirement of
authentication or identification as a condition precedent to
admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a
finding that the matter in question is what its proponent
claims.”
KRE 901(a).
This requirement may be met by the
testimony of a witness with knowledge of the document by his
testimony that the document is what it is claimed to be.
KRE
901(b)(1).
While the integrity of weapons or similar items of
physical evidence, which are clearly identifiable and
distinguishable, does not require proof of a chain of custody,
see, Beason v. Commonwealth, Ky., 548 S.W.2d 835, 837 (1977); and
Smith v. Commonwealth, Ky., 366 S.W.2d 902, 906 (1962), a chain
of custody is required for blood samples or other specimens taken
from a human body for the purpose of analysis to show that the
sample tested in the laboratory was the same sample drawn from
the victim.
Calvert v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 708 S.W.2d 121,
124 (1986); Haste v. Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Comm'n, Ky. App.,
673 S.W.2d 740 (1984); R. Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law
Handbook, § 11.00 (3rd ed. Michie 1993);
32A C.J.S. Evidence §
797 (1996); Rabovsky v. Commonwealth, Ky., 973 S.W.2d 6, 8
(1998).
Even with respect to substances which are not clearly
identifiable or distinguishable, it is unnecessary to establish a
perfect chain of custody or to eliminate all possibility of
tampering or misidentification, so long as there is persuasive
evidence that "the reasonable probability is that the evidence
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has not been altered in any material respect."
United States v.
Cardenas, 864 F.2d 1528, 1532 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
491 U.S. 909, 109 S. Ct. 3197, 105 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1989).
also
See
Brown v. Commonwealth, Ky., 449 S.W.2d 738, 740 (1969).
Gaps in the chain normally go to the weight of the evidence
rather than to its admissibility.
United States v. Lott, 854
F.2d 244, 250 (7th Cir. 1988); Rabovsky, 973 S.W.2d at 8.
Here, the chain of custody of Mollette’s sample, as
presented at the evidentiary hearing, was sufficient to establish
the integrity of the sample.
The chain of custody was
established by various chain of custody forms which documented
the handling of the sample throughout each phase of the testing
process.
Moreover, laboratory personnel testified as to the
routine practice employed by PharmChem in handling a specimen to
be tested.
Testimony as to routine practice sufficient to dispel
any inference of substitution or change in the contents of the
exhibit in question may be used to establish a chain of custody.
United States v. Burris, 393 F.2d 81, 83 (7th Cir. 1968).
Upon
review of the chain of custody evidence presented at trial, we
cannot say that reversible error was committed by permitting the
admission of the laboratory test results.
Mollette next argues that the hearing officer,
Personnel Board, and Franklin Circuit Court committed reversible
error by upholding his dismissal because there was insufficient
evidence to support the termination of his employment.
He
contends that the hearing officer relied solely upon the
PharmChem records and that no evidence was introduced to the
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effect that he had at any time exhibited signs of drug induced
behavior.
Where an administrative agency's findings of fact are
supported by substantial evidence, those findings are binding on
the reviewing court.
Kosmos Cement Company, Inc. v. Haney, Ky.,
698 S.W.2d 819, 820 (1985); Kentucky State Racing Commission v.
Fuller, Ky., 481 S.W.2d 298, 307 (1972).
This is true even
though there may be conflicting evidence in the record.
Kentucky
Commission on Human Rights v. Fraser, Ky., 625 S.W.2d 852, 856
(1981).
Urella v. Kentucky Board of Medical Licensure, Ky., 939
S.W.2d 869, 873 (1997).
The test of substantiality of evidence
is whether when taken alone or in light of all the evidence it
has sufficient probative value to induce conviction in the minds
of reasonable men.
Fuller at 307.
The PharmChem lab tests
disclosed that Mollette had evidence of marijuana in his system.
PharmChem personnel, a chemist and a physician, testified that
the test results established that Mollette had evidence of
marijuana in his system.
Although a fact finder may have chosen
to believe Mollette’s denials and reached a different conclusion
in this case, there is clearly substantial evidence in the record
to support the finding that Mollette used marijuana in violation
of the Cabinet’s zero tolerance policy.
This, in turn, supports
his termination of employment.
Finally, Mollette argues that the hearing officer
committed reversible error by admitting the test results because
production and storage of the urine sample was not performed in
compliance with federal regulations.
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See Mandatory Guidelines
for Federal Workplace Drug Testing Programs, Part 40 - Procedures for Transportation Workplace Drug Testing Programs,
Section 40.25(b)(1).
Specifically, Mollette argues that the
collection site for obtaining his urine specimen was not secure
on the basis that the waiting area adjacent to the rest rooms
where the sample was obtained was filled with cigarette smoke.
The party asserting an affirmative defense has the
burden to establish that defense.
KRS 13B.090(7).
The party
with the burden of proof on any issue has the burden of going
forward and the ultimate burden of persuasion as to that issue.
Id.
The only evidence offered by Mollette in support of his
position that there was a violation of security standards is
testimony to the effect that there was a significant amount of
cigarette smoke in the area near where his sample was taken.
However, there is nothing in the record supporting his contention
that the presence of this cigarette smoke was a violation of
federal standards or that it would contaminate the urine sample
so as to give a false positive for marijuana use.
"The party
having the burden of proof before an administrative agency must
sustain that burden, and it is not necessary for an agency to
show the negative of an issue when a prima facie case as to the
positive has not been established."
Personnel Board v. Heck, Ky.
App., 725 S.W.2d 13, 17 (1986); Koo v. Commonwealth of Kentucky,
Department for Adult and Technical Education., Ky. App., 919
S.W.2d 531, 533 (1995).
his burden of proof.
Mollette has accordingly failed to carry
KRS 13B.090(7).
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For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Franklin
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Johnny O. Bolton
Ed Spencer’s Law Office
Paintsville, Kentucky
Edwin A. Logan
Logan & Gaines
Frankfort, Kentucky
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