DELORES JOHNSON v. CITY OF COVINGTON
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RENDERED: November 24, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
MODIFIED: December 10, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-001519-MR
DELORES JOHNSON
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PATRICIA M. SUMME, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 93-CI-01506
v.
CITY OF COVINGTON
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
DYCHE, GARDNER, AND HUDDLESTON, JUDGES.
DYCHE, JUDGE.
This is a termination of employment case in which
Delores L. Johnson appeals from a decision of the trial court
granting summary judgment in favor of the City of Covington on
her claim for handicap discrimination under the Kentucky Equal
Opportunities Act, KRS 207.130-260.
Johnson also appeals the
trial court’s decision to instruct the jury, as a matter of law,
that the city’s personnel policy manual did not apply to Johnson.
On November 1, 1990, Johnson began working as an
employee of the City of Covington as an Administrative Assistant
to the mayor.
Johnson testified that at the beginning of her
employment she spent 90 per cent of her time typing, while toward
the end of her employment that function decreased to 50 to 60
percent of her work time.
Johnson
developed carpal tunnel
syndrome in her right hand, and eventually filed a workers’
compensation claim for the injury.
On July 2, 1992, Johnson went on sick leave to have
surgery for her carpal tunnel injury.
to be off work for six to eight weeks.
She was initially expected
In the sixth week, the
office began calling Johnson to ascertain when she could return
to work.
The city was anxious to have Johnson return to work, as
no one was performing her duties.
On August 12, 1992, Johnson’s treating physician, Dr.
Sommerkamp, wrote a letter to the city indicating that Johnson
could return to light duty in 2 weeks, but that now she
was complaining of carpal tunnel symptoms in her left hand.
The letter further indicated that it would be very helpful in
returning Johnson to the workplace if she could be placed in a
position of light duty with minimal typing.
On September 1,
1992, Dr. Sommerkamp wrote a letter to the city indicating that
Johnson was released to return to work on September 8, 1992, so
long as she worked no more than four hours per day with minimal
repetitive motion with her right hand.
The letter stated that
Johnson would need to follow this restricted duty regimen for an
estimated minimum of 4-8 weeks before converting to full duty.
However, the city instructed Johnson not to return to work
because it did not have a light duty policy and needed someone
who could work full time and perform the full-duty job functions.
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On September 10, 1992, the city sent a certified letter
to Johnson telling her that she was going to be terminated on
September 22, 1992, by an official vote of the Commissioners,
because of excessive absenteeism.
Prior to September 22, Johnson
went to Sommerkamp and asked him to release her back to work full
duty.
According to Johnson, she was released to full duty
effective September 21, 1992, and immediately contacted Assistant
City Manager Robert Horne and informed him that she could return
to work.
Johnson contends that Horne told her that it was too
late and that the city was going to proceed with her termination.
Johnson was terminated on September 22, 1992, by vote of the City
Commissioners.
On September 22, 1993, Johnson filed a lawsuit against
the City of Covington for violation of KRS 342.197 (retaliation
for filing a workers’ compensation claim); outrageous conduct;
wrongful discharge; and for violation of the Kentucky Equal
Opportunities Act.
On January 15, 1998, Covington filed a motion
to dismiss Johnson’s claims of outrageous conduct and wrongful
discharge.
On February 9, 1998, the trial court ruled that those
claims were preempted by Johnson’s retaliatory discharge claim
under KRS 342.197.
On March 11, 1998, Covington moved to dismiss Johnson’s
claims for retaliatory discharge and handicap discrimination.
On
April 6, 1998, the first day of trial, the trial court dismissed
Johnson’s claim for handicap discrimination.
The case proceeded
to trial on the retaliatory discharge count.
The jury returned a
verdict finding that the City of Covington was not liable for
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retaliation under KRS 342.197.
motion for a new trial.
The trial court denied Johnson’s
This appeal followed.
Johnson first contends that the trial court erred in
its decision to grant summary judgment to Covington on her Equal
Opportunities Act claim.
In order to qualify for summary judgment, the movant
must “show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law."
CR 56.03.
“The record must be viewed in the light most
favorable to the party opposing the motion for summary judgment
and all doubts are to be resolved in his favor."
Steelvest, Inc.
v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., Ky., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480
(1991)(citations omitted).
Summary judgment should only be used
“‘when, as a matter of law, it appears that it would be
impossible for the respondent to produce evidence at the trial
warranting a judgment in his favor and against the movant.’"
at 483, citing
Id.
Paintsville Hospital Company v. Rose, Ky., 683
S.W.2d 255 (1985).
Johnson advances four reasons that summary judgment was
improperly granted by the trial court.
In the first of these,
Johnson argues that the trial court erred in its determination
that the definition of “handicapped”1 under the Equal
Opportunities Act is the same as the definition of “disability”
under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).
is a misrepresentation of the trial court’s order.
However, this
1
The trial
The Equal Opportunities Act does not use the term
“handicapped.” We construe Johnson’s argument to refer to the
Equal Opportunities Act’s definition of “physical disability.”
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court in its order granting summary judgment, quoted the
applicable section of the Equal Opportunities Act, KRS
207.130(2), which defines “physical disability” for purposes of
the act.
KRS 207.130 defines a physical disability as follows:
"Physical disability" means the physical
condition of a person whether congenital or
acquired, which constitutes a substantial
disability to that person and is demonstrable
by medically accepted clinical or laboratory
diagnostic techniques.2
The trial court continued, “[b]ased upon the entire
record of the case, Plaintiff has failed to establish under the
deposition of Dr. Sommerkamp that her carpal tunnel disease
constituted a substantial disability as required under statute.”
(emphasis added).
Hence, the trial court explicitly applied the
proper statute, KRS 207.130(2).
In order to further explain its reasoning, however, the
trial court further stated that, “[t]he Court is persuaded that
the logic of [the] ADA demonstrates that a disability is a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more of the major life activities of an individual and the logic
of the Equal Opportunity [sic] Act demonstrates that a
substantial disability requires more than a short term injury;
otherwise, the power of these acts are deluded [sic].”
2
The
In this proceeding, Johnson has argued that the
phrase “to that person” is intended to establish a subjective
standard to the effect that the relevant test is whether the
physical condition constitutes a substantial disability in the
mind of the person alleging a physical disability. While it is
possible to read the sentence that way, we disagree with
Johnson’s interpretation of the statute. Under our
interpretation, “to that person” merely relates back to “a
person” and does not establish a subjective test in determining
whether a person has a physical disability.
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inclusion of this reference to the ADA in its order does not, as
Johnson contends, mean that the trial court concluded “that the
definition of ‘handicapped’ under KRS 207 . . . is the same as
the definition of disability under the ADA.”
Johnson’s second, third, and fourth arguments that the
trial court improperly granted summary judgment, are,
respectively, that the trial court erred in determining that a
short term injury caused by work and capable of healing can never
constitute a handicap under KRS 207; that the trial court erred
in failing to consider the issue of whether Johnson was
handicapped at the time the decision to terminate her was made by
the appellee; and that there are genuine issues of material fact
relating to whether Johnson was discriminated against.
It is not necessary to address these arguments
individually because, under the Equal Opportunities Act, it is
clear that the trial court properly granted summary judgment.
conclude that the Equal Opportunities Act does not cover
Johnson’s situation.
KRS 207.150(1) provides, in pertinent part, that
No employer shall fail or refuse to hire,
discharge, or discriminate against any
individual with a disability with respect to
wages, rates of pay, hours, or other terms
and conditions of employment because of the
person's physical disability unless the
disability restricts that individual's
ability to engage in the particular job or
occupation for which he or she is eligible,
or unless otherwise provided by law. . . .
This subsection shall not be construed to
require any employer to modify his physical
facilities or grounds in any way, or exercise
a higher degree of caution for an individual
with a disability than for any person who is
not an individual with a disability.
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We
(Our emphasis.)
Assuming, arguendo, that Johnson was physically
disabled under the Act from July 2, 1992, the day she went out on
sick leave, until she was discharged on September 22, 1992, the
appellee was permitted to discharge her under the Act because she
was incapable of performing her duties during this time.
KRS
207.150 provides an exception to an employer’s duties under the
Act toward a disabled person if “the disability restricts that
individual's ability to engage in the particular job or
occupation for which he or she is eligible[.]”
The particular
job for which Johnson was eligible was the job of Administrative
Assistant to the mayor.
Johnson’s presumed “handicap” prevented
her from performing this job as evidenced by her absence from
work from July 2 until the day of her discharge.
Therefore,
under the statute, the appellee was not prevented from
discharging her.
On the other hand, assuming that Johnson could perform
her Administrative Assistant duties during the relevant period,
then Johnson did not have a “substantial disability” so as to
qualify her as having a physical disability under the definition
provided in KRS 207.130(2).
carpal tunnel syndrome.
The alleged disability related to
According to her testimony, Johnson’s
duties included typing 50 to 60 percent of the time.
If Johnson
were capable of typing twenty to twenty four hours per week,
i.e., four to five hours per day, then beyond doubt she did not
have a “substantial disability” associated with her carpal tunnel
syndrome injury.
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The Equal Opportunities Act, by its structure, is
clearly aimed at preventing a physically disabled person who is
able to perform his or her duties from being discriminated
against.
The Act was not intended to cover this situation, and
the trial court properly granted the appellee summary judgment.
Jury Instruction II stated, “[y]ou are instructed that
under the law of Kentucky, the Plaintiff, Delores Johnson, was an
employee at[-]will, and the City of Covington’s personnel policy
did not apply to her.
In other words, her employment could be
terminated for just cause, no cause, or even for an unfair reason
but not an unlawful reason.”
Johnson argues that the trial court
erred when it instructed the jury that, as a matter of law, the
City of Covington’s personnel policy did not apply to her.
We
disagree.
Section 34.50 of the City of Covington’s personnel
guidelines identifies the position of Administrative Assistant to
the Mayor as a nonuniformed, non-civil service position.
As
such, Johnson was an at-will employee not subject to the special
protections available to a civil service employee.
90.360.
See KRS
“[O]rdinarily an employer may discharge his at-will
employee for good cause, for no cause, or for a cause that some
might view as morally indefensible.”
Firestone Textile Co. Div.,
Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Meadows, Ky., 666 S.W.2d 730,
731 (1983); Production Oil Co. v. Johnson, Ky., 313 S.W.2d 411
(1958);
Scroghan v. Kraftco Corp., Ky. App.,
(1977).
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551 S.W.2d 811
The personnel guidelines do not specify which sections
of the guidelines, if any, apply to non-civil service, at-will,
employees.
It appears that some of the broader sections, for
example § 34.13, “Holidays,” apply to all nonuniformed employees.
However, it seems that the point of Instruction II was to inform
the jury of Johnson’s at-will status.
Johnson argues that,
despite her status as an at-will employee, she nevertheless was
entitled, based upon the employment guidelines, to certain
protections an at-will employee would not normally have.
While
perhaps, technically, certain portions of the guidelines may have
applied to Johnson, we conclude that those portions that would
confer Johnson with any more protections than an everyday at-will
employee did not.
We therefore cannot say that the trial court
abused its discretion in its drafting of Instruction II.
To the
extent that certain portions of the guidelines may have applied
to nonuniformed, non-civil service employees, the trial court’s
generalization that the personnel policy did not apply to Johnson
at all was harmless error.
CR 61.01.
The judgment of the Kenton Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Gail M. Langendorf
Florence, Kentucky
Stephen T. McMurtry
Covington, Kentucky
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