STANLEY MARCINEK ON DISCRETIONARY REVIEW v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, EX REL RANDI J. MARCUM
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED:
September 3, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-001416-DG
STANLEY MARCINEK
APPELLANT
ON DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
FROM JACKSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE R. CLETUS MARICLE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-XX-00002
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, EX REL
RANDI J. MARCUM
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, EMBERTON, and McANULTY, Judges.
COMBS, JUDGE.
This Court granted discretionary review of a
Jackson Circuit Court opinion which affirmed an order of Jackson
District Court continuing Stanley Marcinek’s (Marcinek)
obligation to pay child support after his daughter, Courtney
Marcum (Courtney), became eighteen years of age.
Pursuant to an
order entered by this Court on September 2, 1998, the sole issue
on appeal is whether the lower courts erred in construing what
constitutes being a "high school student" for purposes of
Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 403.213(3).
In August 1994, Courtney withdrew from the Jackson
County School System and enrolled in the South Laurel Academy.
Apparently, she withdrew from school because of problems with her
nerves brought on by the ambiance of the public school.
Courtney
continued her education and completed the equivalent of her
sophomore and junior years of high school through the South
Laurel Academy home-bound program.
She was in the process of
completing her senior year in the home-bound program when she
became eighteen years old on October 21, 1996.
On January 24, 1997, Marcinek filed a motion to stay
child support, claiming that Courtney had attained the age of
eighteen and was not currently enrolled in school.
After a
hearing, the Jackson District Court found that Courtney had
indeed reached the age of eighteen and that she was enrolled in a
private school with a graduation date set for May 1997.
As a
result, the district court continued Marcinek’s obligation to pay
child support until May 1997.
Marcinek appealed the district
court’s order to the Jackson Circuit Court.
The circuit court
affirmed the order in an opinion entered on May 15, 1998.
Marcinek then filed a motion for discretionary review with this
Court, which was granted on September 2, 1998.
On appeal, Marcinek argues that Courtney is not a "high
school student" for purposes of KRS 403.213(3), which provides in
pertinent part:
Unless otherwise agreed in writing or
expressly provided in the decree, provisions
for the support of a child shall be
terminated by emancipation of the child
unless the child is a high school student
when he reaches the age of eighteen (18). In
-2-
cases where the child becomes emancipated
because of age, but not due to marriage,
while still a high school student, the
court-ordered support shall continue while
the child is a high school student, but not
beyond completion of the school year during
which the child reaches the age of nineteen
(19) years.
The record reflects the absence of an agreement or order that
expressly provided child support for Courtney after she reached
the age of eighteen.
Therefore, unless Courtney was a high
school student at the time she became eighteen on October 21,
1996, Marcinek’s child support obligation terminated by operation
of law.
The traditional rule was that in the absence of a
contractual agreement to the contrary, a parent was legally
obligated to support a child only until the child reached the age
of majority.
See Wilhoit v. Wilhoit, Ky., 521 S.W.2d 512, 513
(1975); Showalter v. Showalter, Ky., 497 S.W.2d 420, 422 (1973).
As amended in 1992, KRS 403.213(3) represents a change in
Kentucky's public policy regarding the duration of child support.
Pursuant to the more recent enactment, if the child is still in
high school when she reaches the age of eighteen, the parent’s
child support obligation continues — but not beyond the end of
the school year during which the child becomes nineteen.
The
statutory intent to recognize the necessity of a high school
education in today’s society is readily apparent.
With this
intent in mind, our focus turns to the language of KRS
403.213(3).
Where there is no specific statutory definition, we
must construe the words of the statute according to their common
-3-
usage.
Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission v. Jones, Ky.
App., 809 S.W.2d 715 (1991).
This Court has the duty to give
statutory language its literal meaning unless to do so would
produce a wholly absurd result.
Id.
When interpreting statutes,
we must give them a reasonable construction and attempt to
effectuate the legislature's intended purpose.
Beckham v. Board
of Education of Jefferson County, Ky., 873 S.W.2d 575 (1994).
A
student is normally understood to mean "one who attends a school.
. . ."
Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (1976).
The school
in which Courtney was enrolled at the time she became eighteen
years of age was the South Laurel Academy.
According to the testimony of Wayne Cornett, the
founder and Headmaster of South Laurel Academy, Courtney was
enrolled in the home-bound program offered by South Laurel
Academy during the 1996-1997 school year.
She was scheduled to
graduate in May 1997, the same date that she would have graduated
from the Jackson County School System had she remained in the
public school.
The school would conduct a graduation ceremony
and Courtney would be awarded a diploma.
The school also
provides the students with a transcript which can be used for
college applications.
Marcinek argues that the South Laurel Academy is not a
"qualified" private school and that the home-bound program does
not "qualify" for an exemption under KRS 159.030 from compulsory
attendance laws.
In Kentucky State Bd. for Elementary and
Secondary Educ. v. Rudasill, Ky., 589 S.W.2d 877, 878 (1979),
the Kentucky Supreme Court established "the perimeter within
-4-
which the Commonwealth may regulate the curriculum and
instruction in private and parochial schools."
If the General
Assembly wishes to monitor the work of private and parochial
schools in accomplishing the constitutional purposes of
compulsory education, then it may do so in the form of an
appropriate standardized achievement testing program.
Id. at
884.
If the results show that one or more private
or parochial schools have failed to
reasonably accomplish the constitutional
purpose, the Commonwealth may then withdraw
approval and seek to close them for they no
longer fulfill the purpose of ‘schools’.
Id.
Marcinek argues that this Court should refuse to define
or recognize South Laurel Academy as a "high school" for failing
to comply with the compulsory attendance laws.
However, the
Supreme Court in Rudasill, supra, clarified that it is not within
the province of the courts to approve or to discredit schools for
purposes of compulsory education in the Commonwealth.
Until this
Court is empowered otherwise by the General Assembly or informed
otherwise by the State Board of Education, we must consider the
South Laurel Academy as a "high school" qualified to educate the
children of Kentucky.
Because Courtney was enrolled and
participating in the South Laurel Academy home-bound program when
she became eighteen years of age, Marcinek’s child support
obligation did not automatically terminate on her eighteenth
birthday.
KRS 403.213(3).
-5-
For the reasons stated above, the opinion of the
Jackson Circuit Court which affirmed the Jackson District Court’s
order is hereby affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
David C. Graves, III
Lexington, Kentucky
George T. Hays
McKee, Kentucky
-6-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
