JAMES ALBERT PEDIGO v. TAMMY MECHELLE HELSON PEDIGO
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RENDERED: DECEMBER 3, 1999; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-001405-MR
JAMES ALBERT PEDIGO
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS R. LEWIS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CI-00843
v.
TAMMY MECHELLE HELSON PEDIGO
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
* * * * * * * * * *
BEFORE:
GUDGEL, Chief Judge; BUCKINGHAM, and JOHNSON, Judges.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE.
James Albert Pedigo appeals from an order of
the Warren Circuit Court adopting the report of the domestic
relations commissioner (DRC), which required him to pay $203.10
per month in child support to Tammy Mechelle Pedigo.
Finding no
error, we affirm.
James and Tammy were married in 1980 and separated in
July 1997.
On July 28, 1997, Tammy filed a petition requesting
dissolution of the marriage, an award of joint custody with her
having physical possession of the parties’ two children, and
child support payments from James pursuant to the statutory
guidelines (KRS 403.213).
Tammy thereafter filed a motion for
temporary child custody, child support, and visitation.
James
filed a response to the divorce petition in which he agreed with
joint custody but sought to be granted primary physical
possession of the children and requested that Tammy be required
to pay child support in accordance with the child support
guidelines.
The DRC entered an agreed order on Tammy’s motion,
giving her temporary custody of the children and ordering James
to pay $475 per month as child support under the child support
guidelines.
A hearing and settlement conference on the divorce
petition was scheduled for January 6, 1998.
A major issue of dispute raised at the January hearing
concerned custody and visitation.
During the hearing, the
parties agreed to joint custody of the children with Tammy having
physical possession of both children during the week plus one
weekend a month, and James having physical possession on all
other weekends, with alternating bi-weekly possession during the
summer.
Based on the more-extensive-than-normal time James would
have possession of the children, the DRC suggested that neither
party be designated as the primary custodian and that there be a
deviation from the child support guidelines, which are based on
the assumption that one parent acts as the primary residential
custodian.
The DRC proposed that James be required to pay child
support based on the difference between the two guideline amounts
calculated under separate assumptions with each parent being
designated the primary residential custodian.
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Under this
approach, due to a slightly higher gross income, James would have
been required to pay approximately $83 per month.
At the end of the hearing, Tammy expressed reservations
about agreeing to this amount of child support.
Following
further discussions with her attorney, she stated that she agreed
to accept this approach of assessing the child support
obligation, and she also agreed to waive the ten-day period for
filing exceptions to the DRC’s recommended order.
53.06(2).
See CR
The DRC asked the parties’ attorneys to submit a
proposed report and indicated he would issue a final proposed
decree at a later date.
On January 14, 1998, Tammy filed a motion entitled
“Motion to Forestall Entry of Any Final Decree Until Further
Proceedings,” in which she requested a delay in entry of a final
decree that would memorialize the terms of the dissolution as
discussed at the January 6, 1998, hearing.
She specifically
challenged the proposed terms for child support and requested an
additional hearing on that issue before entry of a final report.
James filed a response to the motion arguing that Tammy had
entered into a binding agreement on the question of child support
and seeking specific performance of the terms as agreed to at the
January hearing.
The DRC held a hearing on the motion in February 1998.
At the hearing, Tammy’s attorney maintained that allowing James
to make child support payments below the statutory guidelines
amount as discussed at the earlier hearing was unfair and
inequitable.
James’s attorney argued that the separation
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agreement was not unconscionable and should be enforced.
The DRC
denied Tammy’s motion but suggested to her counsel that he could
file a motion to modify child support at any time.
The DRC issued a report on February 24, 1998,
describing and incorporating the terms of settlement as discussed
at the January 6 hearing.
The report set out a visitation
schedule and indicated that the parties had agreed that James
would pay $100 per month child support because each party was to
have physical possession of the children an approximately equal
amount of time.
Tammy filed exceptions to the DRC’s report,
challenging the child support agreement as unconscionable.
Before the exceptions to the February 24 report were
heard by the trial court, Tammy filed a motion entitled “Motion
to Increase Child Support” with her accompanying affidavit.
After a hearing in April, the DRC issued a report recommending
that James pay $203.10 per month in child support, rather than
$304.65, based on a deviation from the child support guidelines
because of the additional amount of time James was to have
possession of the children under the schedule accepted by the
parties.
James filed exceptions to this report arguing that the
DRC should have followed the initial agreement of the parties on
the amount of child support.
Following a hearing on the exceptions to both the
February and April reports of the DRC, the trial court issued an
order approving and adopting the DRC’s April report.
On
August 17, 1998, the trial court issued a final decree of
dissolution of marriage adopting and incorporating the DRC’s
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report of February 24, 1998, as modified by the report of April
21, 1998.
This appeal followed.
James contends the trial court erred by adopting the
DRC’s April report.
First, he argues that the parties entered
into a settlement agreement during the January 6, 1998, hearing
that is binding and enforceable against Tammy.
He states that
the law favors settlement of issues between parties and that
Tammy should be required to comply with the proposed agreement on
child support.
Second, James argues that Tammy failed to
demonstrate any change of circumstances subsequent to the January
hearing that would justify the higher child support payments.
Unlike provisions for property division and
maintenance, any agreement between the parties in a divorce
action pertaining to child support is not binding on the court.
KRS 403.180 provides in relevant part:
(2) In a proceeding for dissolution of
marriage or for legal separation, the terms
of the separation agreement, except those
providing for the custody, support, and
visitation of children, are binding upon the
court unless it finds, after considering the
economic circumstances of the parties and any
other relevant evidence produced by the
parties, on their own motion or on request of
the court, that the separation agreement is
unconscionable.
(6) Except for terms concerning the support,
custody, or visitation of children, the
decree may expressly preclude or limit
modification of terms if the separation
agreement so provides. Otherwise, terms of a
separation agreement are automatically
modified by modification of the decree.
(Emphasis added).
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In Tilley v. Tilley, Ky. App., 947 S.W.2d 63, 65
(1997), the court stated, “[t]hus, the statute [KRS 403.180]
makes it clear that while the parties are free to enter into a
separation agreement to promote settlement of the divorce, the
court still retains control over child custody, support, and
visitation and is not bound by the parties’ agreement in those
areas.”
This approach giving the trial court extended discretion
in determining child custody and support is premised on the
overriding concern for the best interests of the children.
KRS 403.270.
See
Child support is a statutory duty, based on public
policy intended to benefit the children rather than the parents.
See Clay v. Clay, Ky. App., 707 S.W.2d 352 (1986); KRS 403.211.
Child support cannot be waived or diminished solely by a contract
between the parents.
See Whicker v. Whicker, Ky. App., 711
S.W.2d 857, 859 (1986); Bustin v. Bustin, Ky., 969 S.W.2d 697,
698 (1998).
In the case sub judice, the parties discussed and
expressed agreement to the terms of the divorce at the videotaped
January 6, 1998, hearing before the DRC.
Even assuming this
conduct constituted a valid separation agreement under KRS
403.180, see, e.g., Calloway v. Calloway, Ky. App., 707 S.W.2d
789 (1986)1, any provision dealing with child support was not
binding on the trial court or the DRC.
Moreover, the trial court
was required to apply the child support guidelines and make an
independent determination on the amount of child support, rather
1
But see Jackson v. Jackson, Ky. App., 734 S.W.2d 498
(1987)(party who refused to sign tentative separation agreement
dictated into record not bound by agreement).
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than apply the standard of review of unconscionability applicable
to property and maintenance provisions, in reviewing any
agreement of the parties on the child support amount.
Therefore,
the trial court did not err in refusing to enforce the settlement
agreement of the parties on the amount of child support that
James would pay.
James also argues that the trial court erred in failing
to set his child support payments at the agreed amount because
there was no change in circumstances following the January
hearing to justify the higher support amount.
He maintains that
the parties’ earnings did not change and that Tammy was merely
unhappy with the agreement.
He states that because Tammy entered
into the agreement voluntarily with the assistance of counsel,
any presumption of a material change in circumstances under KRS
403.213 supporting a modification of child support was
irrefutably rebutted.
James’s argument is premised, however, on a
misapplication of the child support statutes.
KRS 403.213
applies to modification of an existing child support order.
As
discussed earlier, any separation agreement between the parents
involving child support is not binding on the trial court and,
therefore, does not act to establish a fixed child support
obligation subject to later modification.
Only a trial court
decree or order setting forth the child support amount creates a
valid enforceable obligation.
It necessarily follows that until
the trial court imposes an initial child support obligation,
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there is no child support decree subject to modification under
KRS 403.213.
In the present case, the child support obligation
requiring James to pay $100 per month constituted a term of the
parties’ separation agreement.
While the DRC issued a report
setting forth this and other terms of the agreement on February
24, 1998, this report merely represented recommendations for the
terms of the final divorce decree and was not binding on the
trial judge.
The trial court has absolute discretion with
respect to the use it makes of a DRC’s report.
See Eiland v.
Ferrell, Ky., 937 S.W.2d 713, 716 (1997); CR 53.06.
A trial
court can adopt, modify, or reject the DRC’s report.
Basham v.
Wilkins, Ky. App., 851 S.W.2d 491, 494 (1993).
Even though the DRC and the parties conducted the April
hearing as a modification of the child support situation, no
initial permanent child support order had been issued by the
trial court and KRS 403.213 simply was not applicable.
The trial
court correctly treated the DRC’s report of April 21, 1998, as a
substitution of the DRC’s initial recommendations, not as a
modification of an existing child support order.
Consequently,
the trial court was free to establish the child support payments
according to the child support guidelines without consideration
of or regard to a review of changed circumstances.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the
Warren Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Matthew J. Baker
Bowling Green, Kentucky
Kenneth P. O’Brien
Bowling Green, Kentucky
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