BILL SMITH OUTDOOR ADVERTISING COMPANY V. UNIVERSAL OUTDOOR, INC.
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RENDERED: December 17, 1999; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-001323-MR
BILL SMITH OUTDOOR
ADVERTISING COMPANY
V.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM DAVIESS CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GARLAND W. HOWARD, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CI-1325
UNIVERSAL OUTDOOR, INC.
APPELLEE
OPINION AFFIRMING
* * * * * * * *
BEFORE:
GUDGEL, Chief Judge; BUCKINGHAM and JOHNSON, Judges.
GUDGEL, CHIEF JUDGE:
This is an appeal from a partial summary
judgment, granted by the Daviess Circuit Court, dismissing
appellant's claim for damages against appellee stemming from an
alleged tortious interference with a contractual relationship.
For the reasons stated hereafter, we affirm.
Viewed in the light most favorable to appellant, the
record shows that appellant and Parr Trucking Service, Inc.
(Parr) entered into contracts in 1989 and 1991 for appellant's
lease of space and erection of billboards at two locations on
Parr's property.
Although billboards were erected only on the
land leased pursuant to the 1989 contract, both contracts
afforded appellant the right of "first refusal for advertising
use for 10 years after the termination date of this lease."
Parr's owner, Larry Parr, died in 1995 and his
surviving spouse assumed operation of the business.
Mrs. Parr
subsequently requested appellant to remove its billboards from
Parr's property, and Parr's attorney sent appellant written
notices of termination of the contracts.
Several days after
appellant removed its billboards from the property, appellee and
Parr executed leases entitling appellee to erect billboards on
the Parr property, including in the locations previously leased
by appellant.
Appellant then filed this action, seeking damages
both against Parr for breach of contract and against appellee for
tortious interference with a contractual relationship.
The trial
court granted a final, partial summary judgment dismissing the
claim against appellee.
This appeal followed.
The Kentucky Supreme Court examined issues relating to
allegations of improper interference with a prospective
contractual relationship in National Collegiate Athletic
Association v. Hornung, Ky., 754 S.W.2d 855 (1988).
Noting that
"[s]everal other Kentucky decisions recognize that contractual
relations or prospective contractual relations are protected from
improper interference," the court concluded that Sections 766B,
767, and 773 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1979) "fairly
reflect the prevailing law of Kentucky."
Hornung, supra at 857.
More specifically, the court stated that in order
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[t]o determine whether the interference is
improper, Section 767 sets forth seven
factors to be considered by the court in
ruling on the motion for directed verdict
and, if the case is submitted, considered by
the jury. Unless there is evidence of
improper interference, after due
consideration of the factors provided for
determining such, the case should not be
submitted to the jury.
Id. at 858.
Moreover, the court concluded that "it is clear that
to prevail a party seeking recovery must show malice or some
significantly wrongful conduct."
Id. at 859.
Section 766B of the Restatement (Second), as cited in
Hornung, addresses the intentional interference with a
prospective contractual relationship as follows:
One who intentionally and improperly
interferes with another's prospective
contractual relation (except a contract to
marry) is subject to liability to the other
for the pecuniary harm resulting from loss of
the benefits of the relation, whether the
interference consists of
(a) inducing or otherwise causing a
third person not to enter into or continue
the prospective relation or
(b) preventing the other from acquiring
or continuing the prospective relation.
Although Hornung pertained to a prospective rather than an
existing contractual relationship such as the one in the instant
action, the court also cited with approval to other Kentucky
cases which, in accordance with Section 766 of the first
Restatement of Torts, recognize that both existing and
prospective contractual relationships are protected from improper
interference by third parties.
See, e.g., Carmichael-Lynch-Nolan
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Advertising Agency, Inc. v. Bennett & Associates, Inc., Ky. App.,
561 S.W.2d 99 (1977).
Section 766 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts now addresses intentional interference with existing
contractual relationships in essentially the same manner as
Section 766B:
One who intentionally and improperly
interferes with the performance of a contract
(except a contract to marry) between another
and a third person by inducing or otherwise
causing the third person not to perform the
contract, is subject to liability to the
other for the pecuniary loss resulting to the
other from the failure of the third person to
perform the contract.
Further, as the Hornung court noted, Section 767 of the
Restatement (Second) sets out the factors which must be
considered in determining whether a party improperly interfered
with either an existing or a prospective contractual
relationship:
In determining whether an actor's conduct in
intentionally interfering with a contract or
a prospective contractual relation of another
is improper or not, consideration is given to
the following factors:
(a) the nature of the actor's conduct,
(b) the actor's motive,
(c) the interests of the other with
which the actor's conduct interferes,
(d) the interests sought to be advanced
by the actor,
(e) the social interests in protecting
the freedom of action of the actor and the
contractual interests of the other,
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(f) the proximity or remoteness of the
actor's conduct to the interference and
(g) the relations between the parties.
Our review of the record, in light of Section 767,
shows that appellant failed to adduce evidence, in opposition to
the summary judgment motion, to support its allegation that
appellee intentionally and improperly interfered with its
contracts with Parr.
Indeed, the record includes direct evidence
to the contrary in the form of affidavits, adduced by appellee,
from the two individuals who were accused of interfering with the
contract's performance.
The affidavit of William G. Barron,
Parr's exclusive real estate leasing agent, states in pertinent
part:
3.
Although he was aware Bill Smith
Outdoor Advertising Company ("Bill Smith")
had signs located on the Property, he
believed there was potential for adding signs
because of 2000 ft. of frontage on U.S. 60
Bypass, thus increasing income from the
property. With this in mind, affiant
approached Leon Howell ("Howell") with the
suggestion that Howell's employer Universal
Outdoor, Inc. ("UO") should be interested in
developing the Property for billboards.
4.
Howell informed Barron that his
company did not "jump" leases, i.e., attempt
to get a landowner to put off another sign
company in favor of a new lease with UO.
5.
Affiant told Howell that Bill Smith
had no enforceable contract with Parr that he
knew of and that he would check into the
matter.
6.
Larry Parr, who was the President
of Parr, told Barron he was predisposed to
terminate the leases with Bill Smith before
Barron ever approached UO about leasing the
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Parr property, and that he always believed
Parr's lease agreements with Bill Smith were
terminable "for any reason." Larry Parr died
in May, 1995.
7.
In early 1996, it is the Affiant's
understanding that Judie Parr requested
Parr's attorney, Jeff Taylor, to review the
written leases, It is the Affiant's
understanding that Taylor advised Judie Parr
that it was his opinion that the 1989 lease
could be terminated "for any reason" as set
forth therein, and that the 1991 lease did
not appear to be in force or effective since
no rents had been paid for five years.
8. Judie Parr directed the leases
terminated by notice from Jeff Taylor, by
letter of March 15, 1996, and Barron so
advised UO. Subsequent thereto, Parr entered
into four leases covering the Property with
UO on April 2, 1996.
9.
No representative of UO encouraged
or induced Barron or Parr to terminate or
cancel any contract or lease it had with Bill
Smith.
Similarly, the affidavit of appellee's employee, Michael Edward
Murphy, states in pertinent part:
3.
At all times relevant to leasing
the Parr Trucking Service, Inc., ("Parr")
property in Owensboro, Kentucky, affiant has
been responsible for signage locations for UO
of the type involved in this case in six
counties in Kentucky and seven counties in
Indiana for UO and its predecessor companies.
4.
In January, 1996, the general
manager of UO in the Evansville district
area, Leon Howell ("Howell"), told affiant
that he had been contacted by Realtor,
William G. Barron, Chairman of Barron Homes,
Inc. ("Barron"), who wanted to lease to UO
signage locations on Parr land in Daviess
County, Kentucky, . . . near the intersection
of US 60 East and Wendell Ford By-pass.
Barron said he represented Parr. UO never
dealt with anyone but Barron in connection
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with the leases hereinafter identified
between Parr and UO.
5.
Subsequently affiant and Howell
went to the office of Barron with questions
of whether the moratorium applicable to
Owensboro, Kentucky, would permit such
billboards from being constructed in the
Owensboro, Kentucky area of Parr's land.
Additionally, affiant and Howell were aware
Bill Smith Outdoor Advertising Company ("Bill
Smith"), plaintiff in these proceedings, had
a sign on part of the Parr land Barron
proposed to lease to UO. It was located
close to the intersection. Affiant and
Howell asked Barron about Bill Smith's rights
on the Parr property. Barron told the
affiant and Howell that Bill Smith's use of
the property was based upon no enforceable
contract or lease.
6.
Howell and affiant told Barron that
UO would not "jump" Bill Smith's lease,
explaining that meant they would not pursue a
lease with Barron on the Parr property if
Bill Smith already had a lease on it. This
rule applied whether the lease was written,
oral, or terminable.
7.
To "jump" a lease means to look for
a flaw in an occupant's lease or seek to take
a lease on property where one already
existed. This is an ethical standard
practiced by the affiant, Howell, and the
companies for which both of them have been
engaged since at least 1988. Although
affiant has never been informed of UO's
policy, former employees of affiant and
Howell, predecessors of UO, would terminate
an employee for trying to "jump" a lease.
8.
After meeting with Barron, affiant
went to the Daviess County, Kentucky Clerk's
Office to inquire whether any leases for
billboards were recorded affecting the Parr
property. Affiant was told there were none
recorded.
9.
Barron reported back to affiant and
Howell that Parr had provided Barron with a
written lease to Bill Smith covering the area
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at the corner of U.S. 60 East and the
By-pass. Parr's attorney, Jeff Taylor, had
studied the lease and that the lease was
terminabe [sic] at will. He further advised
affiant and Howell that Judith Parr, who
controlled the Parr interests after the death
of her husband in 1995, did not want to deal
with Bill Smith and that the contract with
Bill Smith had been terminated by Parr.
10. Affiant and Howell were never told
there was a second lease between Parr and
Bill Smith covering the property south of the
location where Bill Smith's billboard was
located at U.S. 60 East and the By-pass. It
was the contract which is Exhibit 2 to the
complaint of which affiant and Howell were
never apprised.
11. Affiant and Howell were told there
was no longer in existence a lease in favor
of Bill Smith, and the Parr property was free
and clear according to Barron and Parr's
attorney. In view of this representation, it
no longer constituted lease jumping for UO to
enter into a lease agreement with Parr.
12. The leases attached hereto as
Exhibits A, B, C and D dated April 2, 1996,
were executed between Parr and UO on the date
indicated which was subsequent to Parr's
terminating both of the written leases with
Bill Smith on March 15, 1996.
8. [sic] At no time did affiant or
Howell encourage, push for, recommend or
suggest that Barron or Parr terminate any
lease or contract rights it had with Bill
Smith. No other person in the employ of UO
or representing UO dealt with Bill Barron in
connection with the Parr leases.
Contrary to appellant's assertions, the foregoing
quoted affidavits and the remainder of the record establish that
Parr's leasing agent solicited appellee to erect billboards on
Parr's property, and that he assured appellee that erecting such
billboards would not violate any valid contractual agreements.
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Appellant failed to affirmatively counter this evidence either by
way of affidavit or otherwise.
Because the adduced evidence
shows, contrary to appellant’s argument, that there is no genuine
issue of material fact as to whether appellee knowingly or
intentionally interfered with, or promoted a breach of, valid
contractual agreements between appellant and Parr, see Steelvest,
Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., Ky., 807 S.W.2d 476
(1991), summary judgment was proper.
Moreover, appellant's claim
would fail even if we were to assume for purposes of this appeal
that there was an issue of fact as to whether appellee was
negligent in failing to take additional steps to learn about the
contracts or their enforceability, as a third party's negligent
interference with a contractual relationship clearly does not
give rise to liability.
Restatement (Second) §766C.
Hence, we hold that the trial court did not err by
concluding that there were no genuine issues of material fact
regarding appellee's alleged liability to appellant.
While
appellant certainly may have a claim against Parr for breach of
contract, no issues regarding any such claim are before us in the
instant appeal.
The court's summary judgment is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
James R. Wood
Owensboro, KY
Ronald M. Sullivan
R. Michael Sullivan
Owensboro, KY
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