NATIONWIDE MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY v. CHARLES E. DAVIS, JR.
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RENDERED: July 16, 1999; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-001309-MR
NATIONWIDE MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEVE MERSHON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 95-CI-002116
v.
CHARLES E. DAVIS, JR.
APPELLEE
OPINION AND ORDER
DISMISSING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: HUDDLESTON, MCANULTY, AND MILLER, JUDGES.
MILLER, JUDGE:
Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company
(Nationwide) brings this appeal from a March 1998 judgment of the
Jefferson Circuit Court.
We dismiss.
In April 1994, the home of Charles E. Davis Jr. (Davis)
was severely damaged by fire.
The home was insured by a standard
homeowner's policy issued by Nationwide.
the parties concerning repair cost.
Dispute arose between
As a result, Davis filed an
action in the Jefferson Circuit Court against Nationwide.
Therein, Davis contended that Nationwide breached the terms of
its insurance contract and did so in “bad faith” contrary to Ky.
Rev. Stat. (KRS) 304.12-230.
The trial court bifurcated the
proceedings, trying the breach of contract allegation initially
and reserving the bad faith allegation for later adjudication.
The jury found in Davis's favor on breach of contract, and, in
conformance therewith, the court entered judgment on March 3,
1998, in the amount of $11,997.97 for home repairs.
The March
judgment included the following Ky. R. Civ. P. (CR) 54.02
language: “This is a final judgment and there is no just cause
for delay in its entry.”
Thereupon, Nationwide filed a CR 59
motion to set aside the jury verdict.
The trial court denied the
motion and further indicated that “[t]his matter remains on the
Court's docket on August 19th, 1998, at 9:30 a.m. for trial on
all remaining issues.”
Nationwide pursued the instant appeal
from the March judgment.
We believe the March judgment is interlocutory and this
appeal should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
provides for appeals only from final judgments.
CR 54.01
A final judgment
is generally one that adjudicates all the rights of all parties
or one that is made final pursuant to CR 54.02.
Under CR 54.02,
a judgment may be made final if it adjudicates one claim as to
all parties or adjudicates all claims as to some of the parties.
It is, however, well established that where a judgment is, by its
very nature, interlocutory, a recitation making it final and
appealable under CR 54.02 will not render same appealable so as
to provide the appellate court with jurisdiction.
Hook, Ky., 563 S.W.2d 716 (1978).
See Hook v.
Doubtless, the March judgment
was given CR 54.02 finality based upon the belief that it fully
adjudicated a claim between the parties.
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We disagree.
Under CR 54.02, the “determination of multiplicity of
claims must rest on whether the underlying factual basis for
recovery states more than one claim which could have been
separately enforced.”
Jackson v. Metcalf, Ky., 404 S.W.2d 793,
794 (1966); see also Webster County Soil Conservation District v.
Shelton, Ky., 437 S.W.2d 934 (1969).
In the case at hand, we
perceive but one claim within the meaning of CR 54.02 as the
allegations of bad faith and breach of contract cannot be
separately enforced.
We believe this determination bolsters the
public policy of CR 54.02, which is, of course, to prevent
piecemeal appeals.
See Cornette v. Wilder, Ky., 307 S.W.2d 752
(1957).
For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion that
the March judgment is interlocutory and that this appeal should
be DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.
ALL CONCUR.
/S/
John D. Miller
JUDGE, COURT OF APPEALS
ENTERED:
July 16, 1999
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
John G. Crutchfield
Louisville, KY
Mark A. Weis
Louisville, KY
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