WILLIAM D. PRIDDY, JR. v. CITY OF WEST POINT, KENTUCKY, AND GENE SMITH
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RENDERED: September 24, 1999; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-001298-MR
WILLIAM D. PRIDDY, JR.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE HUGH ROARK, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 94-CI-001227
CITY OF WEST POINT, KENTUCKY,
AND GENE SMITH
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, HUDDLESTON, AND McANULTY, JUDGES.
McANULTY, JUDGE: This case involves a question of whether the
Hardin Circuit Court retained jurisdiction over a case after it
was removed to federal district court on federal question
jurisdiction and the federal court dismissed the state law claims
without prejudice.
We agree that the Hardin Circuit Court does
not have jurisdiction over the state law claims, and so we
affirm.
William D. Priddy, Jr. (hereinafter, appellant) filed
an action in the Hardin Circuit Court on September 12, 1994,
alleging the common law torts of malicious prosecution and
intentional interference with prospective business advantage, as
well as various federal constitutional claims against the City of
West Point, Kentucky, and Gene Smith (hereinafter, appellees).
On October 13, 1994, appellees filed a notice of removal to the
United States District Court for the Western District of
Kentucky, Louisville Division pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441.
On February 6, 1996, the federal district court issued
an order in which it dismissed all of appellant's federal
constitutional claims except for his first amendment claims, and
denied summary dismissal of appellant's state law claims.
The
defendants moved for reconsideration, and on June 20, 1996, the
U.S. District Court dismissed appellant's first amendment claims.
The federal court then determined that since it had dismissed all
of appellant's federal claims before trial, the pendent state
claims should be dismissed as well (citing United Mine Workers of
Amer. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966)).
The court entered an
order dismissing the malicious prosecution and interference with
prospective business advantage claims without prejudice.
Appellant moved for reconsideration of the dismissal of his
federal claims, which was denied on July 29, 1996.
only the dismissal of the federal claims.
He appealed
The United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed on December 19,
1997, and denied appellant's petition for rehearing en banc on
January 30, 1998.
On March 23, 1998, appellant filed a motion in the
Hardin Circuit Court to set for trial his state law claims of
malicious prosecution and interference with prospective business
advantage.
Appellees objected to the motion on the ground that
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the Hardin Circuit Court had lost jurisdiction over these claims
when they were removed to federal court.
Appellees asserted that
appellant was required to refile his action, and further claimed
that he was barred from doing so by not filing within 90 days as
required by KRS 413.270(1).
On May 13, 1998, the Hardin Circuit
Court denied the motion for a trial date.
The court found that
upon removal to the federal court, jurisdiction of the state
court over the matter terminated, and that since appellant did
not refile within 90 days of the federal court's dismissal, he
could not pursue the action further.
Appellant appeals this
order.
We agree with the circuit court that a state court's
jurisdiction over a cause of action terminates as soon as removal
proceedings are completed.
This Court in Green Seed Co. v.
Harrison Tobacco Warehouse, Inc., Ky. App., 663 S.W.2d 755 (1988)
stated:
Federal, not state, law governs all removal
proceedings (citation omitted). Removal of
jurisdiction is effected after the movant
files a petition and bond, gives notice to
all adverse parties, and files a copy of the
petition with the clerk of the state court.
28 U.S.C. § 1446(e). Once these steps are
completed, the state court loses jurisdiction
over the case unless and until the case is
remanded by the federal court. Id.
See also Little Sandy Cooperage Co. v. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co.,
Ky., 214 S.W. 912, 185 Ky. 161 (1919)(when proper petition for
removal is filed, state court has duty to order removal as “its
jurisdiction is then at an end.”)
Appellees correctly assert that the state court would
have had jurisdiction if the federal court had remanded the state
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law claims.
See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343,
98 L. Ed. 2d 720, 108 S. Ct. 614 (1988).
Whether to remand
pendent state law claims is in the discretion of the federal
court.
Id. at 357, 108 S. Ct. at 622, 98 L. Ed. 2d at 734.
However, when a federal court instead dismisses the pendent
claims without prejudice, the litigant must refile in state
court, and the state court will have to reprocess the case.
at 353, 108 S. Ct. at 620, 98 L. Ed. 2d at 731-732.
Id.
As a result,
we find that the Hardin Circuit Court was correct in concluding
that appellant had to refile his remaining claims in order to
proceed following the federal court's dismissal.
We do not agree, however, that KRS 413.270(1) required
appellant to file his claim within 90 days of the federal court's
dismissal.
That statute provides:
If an action is commenced in due time and in
good faith in any court of this state and the
defendants or any of them make defense, and
it is adjudged that the court has no
jurisdiction of the action, the plaintiff or
his representative may, within ninety (90)
days from the time of that judgment, commence
a new action in the proper court. The time
between the commencement of the first and
last action shall not be counted in applying
any statute of limitation. (Emphasis added).
This provision does not apply to appellant's case because there
was no determination that the Hardin Circuit Court did not have
jurisdiction over these claims.
Rather, the state court had
jurisdiction (a prerequisite for removal) but the case was
removed to federal court (which had federal question jurisdiction
to decide the federal constitutional questions as well as the
pendent state law claims).
Thus, it has not been adjudged that
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either court did not have jurisdiction, and the Hardin Circuit
Court should not have applied KRS 413.270(1) to this case.
Appellant is required to refile his claims in state court, but he
is not subject to the 90 day limitation period of KRS 413.270(1)
in which to do so.
Wherefore, we affirm the holding of the Hardin Circuit
Court which denied appellant's motion to set a trial date, and
reverse the trial court's holding that he was required by KRS
413.270(1) to file within 90 days.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Philip C. Kimball
Samuel G. Hayward
Louisville, Kentucky
Dave Whalin
Louisville, Kentucky
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