CHARLES TORAIN; and DEBORAH TORAIN v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, CABINET FOR FAMILIES AND CHILDREN
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RENDERED: April 2, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO. 1998-CA-001283-MR
CHARLES TORAIN; and
DEBORAH TORAIN
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM L. GRAHAM, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CI-01246
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
CABINET FOR FAMILIES AND CHILDREN
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
KNOPF, KNOX, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
SCHRODER, JUDGE:
This is an appeal from an order dismissing
appellants’ claim for benefits for special-needs adoptive parents
retroactive to the date of the adoptions.
Upon review of
appellants’ arguments in light of the record herein and the
applicable law, we agree with the circuit court that appellants
have waived their right to bring this claim.
In July of 1984, appellants adopted James and Shameika.
In April of 1995, appellants sought payment of certain benefits
as parents of adoptive children with special needs (“SNAP”
benefits) pursuant to KRS 199.555.
Appellants requested these
benefits retroactive to the date of the children’s adoption.
Although KRS 199.555 was in effect at the time appellants adopted
the children, appellants never sought SNAP benefits prior to
1995.
After a hearing on appellants’ request, the Cabinet for
Families and Children (“the Cabinet”) awarded appellants postadoptive benefits beginning in April 1995 pursuant to an
agreement between the Cabinet and appellants.
Appellants did not
appeal this decision.
In February 1997, the Cabinet informed appellants that
SNAP benefits would be terminated as of March 1, 1997 on their
son James because he would be eighteen (18) years of age at that
time.
In June 1997, appellants requested a hearing on the
Cabinet’s denial of extended benefits for James and requested
that the Cabinet issue an order regarding appellants’ request for
retroactive benefits.
In a final order entered on June 12, 1997,
the Cabinet denied appellants’ request for extended SNAP
benefits, but made no ruling concerning retroactive SNAP
benefits.
On August 21, 1997, appellants filed an action in the
Franklin Circuit Court seeking retroactive SNAP benefits on
grounds that the Cabinet failed to notify appellants of their
right to such benefits at the time they adopted the children.
The court dismissed appellants’ complaint due to the fact that
the Cabinet had already disposed of the issue in 1995, the
appellants failed to properly raise the issue before the Cabinet
in 1997, and the appellants’ failure to timely appeal the 1995
and 1997 orders.
This appeal followed.
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Appellants’ sole argument on appeal is that the
Franklin Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction to dismiss appellants’
claim because the Cabinet had made no final decision or order
regarding retroactive benefits.
Appellants raised the
retroactive benefits issue in their 1995 request for a hearing
and again in 1997, although appellants apparently did not argue
the retroactive benefits issue in the 1997 hearing before the
Cabinet.
While there has been no formal ruling by the Cabinet on
the issue of retroactive benefits, the evidence is disputed as to
whether the Cabinet informed appellants after the 1995 request
that they were not entitled to retroactive benefits.
The Cabinet
claims and the circuit court found that the Cabinet did so inform
appellants.
Appellants maintain, however, that they were never
so informed.
The only record before us is the circuit court’s
record, which does not contain a record of any proceedings before
the circuit court.
Likewise, there is no record of the hearings
before the Cabinet.
The only evidence in the record pertaining
to this issue is a copy of Social Services Policy #407.6 which
states that SNAP benefits can be paid no earlier than the date of
request for a hearing.
In our view, even if the Cabinet did not inform
appellants of their ineligibility for retroactive SNAP benefits,
appellants should have appealed the Cabinet’s 1995 ruling which
failed to address the retroactive benefits issue, as that issue
was raised by appellants in their 1995 request.
Where a statute
prescribes the method for taking an appeal from an administrative
action and the time in which the appeal must be taken, such
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requirements are mandatory and must be met in order for a circuit
court to obtain jurisdiction to hear the case.
Frisby v. Board
of Education of Boyle County, Ky. App., 707 S.W.2d 359 (1986).
KRS 13B.140 provides that “[a] party shall institute an appeal by
filing a petition in the Circuit Court ... within thirty (30)
days after the final order of the agency is mailed or delivered
by personal service.”
By not appealing the Cabinet’s ruling,
appellants waived their right to later, in a separate action,
raise this issue before the circuit court.
Similarly, appellants
should have timely appealed the 1997 ruling wherein this same
issue was raised by appellants.
Like the circuit court, we are perplexed by appellants’
argument that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to dismiss
the claim.
Appellants were the ones who initiated the action
asking the circuit court to exercise its jurisdiction and award
them retroactive benefits.
Moreover, the lack of jurisdiction
was the very basis of the court’s ruling dismissing the claim
because appellants failed to exhaust their administrative
remedies by timely appealing the Cabinet’s decisions which should
have addressed an issue raised by appellants.
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the order of
the Franklin Circuit Court dismissing appellants’ action.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Claud Porter
Owensboro, Kentucky
Karen V. Murphy
Frankfort, Kentucky
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