COREY TOOGOOD v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: July 16, 1999; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-001226-MR
COREY TOOGOOD
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS KNOPF, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CR-01780
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
DYCHE, MCANULTY, AND MILLER, JUDGES.
MILLER, JUDGE: Corey Toogood brings this pro se appeal from an
April 23, 1998, order of the Jefferson Circuit Court.
We affirm.
On November 19, 1997, appellant pled guilty to a charge
of flagrant non-support.
Ky. Rev. Stat. (KRS) 530.050.
He was
sentenced to one year imprisonment to run consecutively with a
previous five year sentence, for a total of six years.
Following
sentencing, appellant informed the circuit court that he intended
to file a motion seeking blood tests to determine paternity of
the child in question.
On December 1, 1997, appellant, Rasian
LaShawn Snardan (the child), and Shanneitha Snardan (child's
mother) were ordered by the Jefferson Circuit Court to undergo
such blood tests.
The order stated that the tests were to be
completed no later than January 5, 1998.
however, were never performed.
The blood tests,
We are not advised as to which of
the parties did not submit to the blood tests, nor as to why.
On
April 16, 1998, appellant filed a “Motion to Dismiss for Failure
to Comply with this Hon. Court”s [sic] Order Dated 12/011997
[sic].”
On April 23, 1998, appellant's motion to dismiss was
denied by the circuit court.
Appellant contends he is entitled to a “dismissal” of
his flagrant non-support conviction because his guilty plea was
contingent upon a verbal agreement entered between himself, his
counsel, the Commonwealth's Attorney, and the judge.
Appellant
claims the alleged agreement was that certain blood tests would
be ordered, and, if he was found not to be the subject child's
biological father then the conviction would be vacated.
Appellant argues that since the ordered blood tests were never
performed, the flagrant non-support conviction should be
dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement.
In essence, appellant
is asserting a factual defense to a charge of which he has
already pled guilty.
It is a well-established rule of law that
pleading guilty unconditionally waives all defenses except that
the indictment did not charge an offense.
Commonwealth, Ky., 875 S.W.2d 99 (1994).
See Hughes v.
In the case sub judice,
appellant pled guilty to an indictment that charged an offense.
The record makes no mention of an agreement whereby appellant's
guilty plea was conditioned upon the results of an ordered blood
-2-
test.
Neither the Commonwealth's Offer on a Plea of Guilty, nor
appellant's Motion to Enter Guilty Plea mention such a condition
in any way.
Furthermore, when asked by the circuit court judge
if appellant had been promised anything other than that which was
mentioned in the Commonwealth's offer, appellant responded, “No
sir.”
Appellant's sole contention is that since the court-
ordered blood tests have not been performed, then his conviction
should be dismissed.
We view this contention, however, as merely
an assertion of a factual defense waived by appellant's
unconditional guilty plea.
As such, we are of the opinion that
appellant's contention is not supported by the record and that
the circuit court did not err by denying appellant's motion.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the circuit
court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Corey D. Toogood, pro se
Eddyville, KY
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General
and
Matthew D. Nelson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
-3-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
