STEVEN EUGENE OVERTURF v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: May 7, 1999; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-001213-MR
STEVEN EUGENE OVERTURF
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES DANIELS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-CR-0050
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, JOHNSON, AND KNOX, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Steven Overturf (Overturf) appeals pro se from
orders of the McCracken Circuit Court entered on May 5, 1998,
that denied his motion for an evidentiary hearing and his motion
to vacate, set aside or correct sentence made pursuant to
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42.
As Overturf’s
allegations were not refuted by the record, we reverse and remand
for an evidentiary hearing on his RCr 11.42 motion.
In August 1995, Overturf sold two syringes filled with
liquid morphine to an undercover police officer.
On February 6,
1996, a McCracken County Grand Jury indicted Overturf for
trafficking in a controlled substance in the first degree
(Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 218A.1412).
Overturf accepted
the Commonwealth’s offer to plead guilty in return for a
recommended prison sentence of six years.
The circuit court
sentenced Overturf to a six-year prison term to run consecutively
with his sentence under 95-CR-00305.
On January 29, 1998, Overturf filed:
(1) a motion to
vacate sentence under RCr 11.42; (2) a motion requesting specific
findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Kentucky
Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 41.02, CR 52.01, and CR 52.04; (3)
a motion for an evidentiary hearing on his RCr 11.42 motion; (4)
a motion for appointment of counsel; and (5) a motion to proceed
in forma pauperis.
On February 23, 1998, the circuit court
granted Overturf’s motion for appointment of counsel and motion
to proceed in forma pauperis.
Overturf’s appointed counsel moved
for an evidentiary hearing and renewed the previous motions.
On
May 5, 1998, the circuit court denied the motion for an
evidentiary hearing and the RCr 11.42 motion.
This appeal
followed.
On appeal, Overturf argues that (1) he was denied
effective assistance of counsel; and (2) the trial court erred
when it denied his motion for an evidentiary hearing.
Our
standard of review is well established and it is limited to
determining whether the RCr 11.42 motion sets forth proper
grounds for relief that cannot be resolved on the record.
If it
does, then the trial court must hold an evidentiary hearing to
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develop the record.
RCr 11.42(5); Stanford v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
854 S.W.2d 742, 743-744 (1993).
From our review of the record,
we do not see where Overturf’s allegations are refuted by the
record.
Accordingly, we must proceed with an inquiry as to
whether Overturf’s unrefuted allegations, assuming they are true,
establish a right to relief.
In an ineffective assistance of counsel claim,
Overturf must first prove that his counsel’s performance was
deficient, and second, that he was prejudiced by the deficiencies
such that there exists a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s errors, he would have insisted on going to trial.
Hill
v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 370, 80 L.Ed.2d 203
(1985); accord Sparks v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 721 S.W.2d 726,
727-728 (1986).
Specifically, Overturf alleges that his trial
counsel erroneously advised him on the defense of entrapment (KRS
505.010) and failed to prepare a defense.
It is fundamental that
defense counsel must investigate all apparently substantial
defenses available to a defendant.
Beasley v. United States, 491
F.2d 687 (6th Cir.1974).
In Overturf’s “MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT” of his RCr 11.42
motion, he states: “. . . but counsel also informed Movant, that
Movant’s suggestion to mount an “Entrapment” defense was not
available to him, because Kentucky does not have an Entrapment
defense law.”
The record does not refute Overturf’s allegations
of his trial counsel’s errant advice as to the non-availability
of an entrapment defense in his case.
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See KRS 505.010.
The
allegations, if true, would form a proper basis for relief under
an RCr 11.42 claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
The Commonwealth argues that Overturf waived his claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel when he entered a guilty
plea.
The Commonwealth incorrectly relies on Quarles v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 456 S.W.2d 693 (1970).
Quarles, supra, is
often cited for the rule of law that “the effect of entering a
voluntary guilty plea is to waive all defenses other than that
the indictment charges no offense.”
Centers v. Commonwealth,
Ky.App., 799 S.W.2d 51, 55 (1990).
The Commonwealth focuses on
the effect of a guilty plea without first determining whether the
plea is valid.
A guilty plea is valid if it represents a
voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of
action open to the defendant.
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S.
25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970).
It logically follows
that a defendant must receive effective assistance of counsel in
order to evaluate and choose among the available courses of
action.
For the reasons stated above, we reverse the orders of
the McCracken Circuit Court denying Overturf’s motion for an
evidentiary hearing and his RCr 11.42 motion and remand for an
evidentiary hearing on the RCr 11.42 motion.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE, CONCURS.
KNOX, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
KNOX, JUDGE, DISSENTING.
I respectfully dissent.
Appellant, in his brief, maintains if his trial counsel had acted
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more diligently, appellant “could have very well had a possible
entrapment defense.”
Appellant then argues if his trial counsel
had investigated his case and interviewed witnesses, he would
have learned that appellant “was nothing more than a drug addict
and not a drug dealer.”
Appellant admits that he sold drugs to a
confidential informant.
As observed in Commonwealth v. Campbell,
Ky., 415 S.W.2d 614 (1967), concerning RCr 11.42 proceedings:
There is a “heavy burden” on the movant in
such a proceeding. He must do more than
raise a doubt about the regularity of the
proceedings under which he was convicted. He
must establish convincingly that he has been
deprived of some substantial right which
would justify the extraordinary relief
afforded by this postconviction proceeding.
Id. at 616.
(Citations omitted).
I do not believe appellant’s contention that he was
deprived of a “possible” entrapment defense is sufficient to
justify an evidentiary hearing in this matter, particularly where
he has entered a guilty plea to the charges.
See Gregory G.
Sarno, Annotation, Adequacy of Defense Counsel’s Representation
of Criminal Client Regarding Entrapment Defense, 8 A.L.R.4th 1160
(1981).
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Steven E. Overturf, Pro Se
Paducah, KY
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Courtney A. Jones
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
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