RICKY ALLEN HAYS v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
September 17, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-001173-MR
RICKY ALLEN HAYS
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ERNEST A. JASMIN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 85-CR-0578
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUDGEL, CHIEF JUDGE; HUDDLESTON AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE.
Appellant, Ricky Allen Hays, appeals pro se from a
Jefferson Circuit Court order entered on December 2, 1997, which
denied his motion to vacate, set aside or correct sentence
pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42.
After reviewing the record, we affirm.
In April 1985, appellant was indicted in Jefferson
County for the sale or possession with intent to sell marijuana,
possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine),
possession of a controlled substance (cocaine), and possession of
drug paraphernalia.
In both counts of possession of a controlled
substance, appellant was charged as a second or subsequent
offender of KRS 218A, the Controlled Substances Chapter.
On July
11, 1985, appellant filed a motion to enter a plea of guilty in
Jefferson Circuit Court.
The circuit court accepted appellant’s
guilty plea and sentenced him to a five-year term of
imprisonment.
On September 29, 1997, while incarcerated in federal
prison, appellant deposited in the prison mailing system his RCr
11.42 motion.
Appellant’s RCr 11.42 motion was stamped
"RECEIVED" and was entered by the Clerk of the Jefferson Circuit
Court on October 2, 1997.
On December 2, 1997, the circuit court
denied appellant’s RCr 11.42 motion on grounds that it was filed
outside the three-year time limit imposed by RCr 11.42(10).
On
December 11, 1997, appellant filed a pleading in circuit court
styled, "Motion For Reconsideration or in the Alternative Notice
of Appeal."
On March 4, 1998, the circuit court denied
appellant’s motion for reconsideration.
This appeal followed.
RCr 11.42 allows prisoners in custody under sentence to
raise a collateral attack on the judgment entered against them.
In September 1994, RCr 11.42 was amended in order to limit a
prisoner’s right to file a motion to three years after the
judgment becomes final.
See RCr 11.42(10).
RCr 11.42(10) also
provides that "[i]f the judgment becomes final before the
effective date of this rule, the time for filing the motion shall
commence upon the effective date of this rule."
Because
appellant’s judgment of conviction became final on September 10,
1985, he had three years from the effective date of the rule,
October 1, 1994, to file his RCr 11.42 motion.
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Appellant argues that his RCr 11.42 motion was timely
filed on September 29, 1997, when he deposited the motion in the
prison mailing system.
The Commonwealth argues that appellant’s
RCr 11.42 motion was filed outside the three-year time period
provided in RCr 11.42(10) because it was not received by the
Clerk of the Jefferson Circuit Court until October 2, 1997.
For authority, appellant cites Houston v. Lack, 487
U.S. 266, 108 S. Ct. 2379, 101 L. Ed. 2d 245 (1988), which
involved an appeal by a state prisoner after a federal district
court dismissed his habeas corpus petition.
The prisoner
deposited his notice of appeal in the prison mailing system 27
days after the judgment of dismissal.
However, the notice of
appeal was not received by the district court until the 30-day
filing period for taking an appeal under the Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1) had expired.
The Supreme Court held
that the prisoner’s notice of appeal was filed, for the purposes
of the Rule, when he delivered it to prison authorities for
forwarding to the court clerk.
The Supreme Court’s decision was based on Justice
Stewart’s concurring opinion in Fallen v. United States, 378 U.S.
139, 84 S. Ct. 1689, 12 L. Ed. 2d 760 (1964).
That case involved
the filing of a notice of appeal by a prisoner who had been
convicted of violating postal laws.
The prisoner deposited his
notice of appeal in the prison mailing system within the 10-day
deadline required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(a),
which now appears in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b),
but the district court did not receive it until the 10-day period
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had expired.
The Supreme Court held that Rule 37(a) should not
be read so rigidly as to bar the appeal when the circumstances
indicated that the prisoner did "all that could reasonably be
expected to get the letter to its destination within the required
10 days."
Fallen, 378 U.S. at 144, 84 S. Ct. at 1692.
Justice
Stewart, in his concurring opinion, stated that:
"[A] defendant incarcerated in a federal prison and
acting without the aid of counsel files his notice of
appeal in time, if, within the 10-day period provided
by the Rule, he delivers such notice to the prison
authorities for forwarding to the clerk of the District
Court. In other words, in such a case the jailer is in
effect the clerk of the District Court within the
meaning of Rule 37." Id.
Appellant urges this Court to adopt the same interpretation for
filing a motion under RCr 11.42.
Both Houston, supra, and Fallen, supra, concerned the
interpretation of federal rules of procedure and are
distinguishable from the case sub judice.
Here, our query
relates to the filing of a motion under RCr 11.42(10) in state
court, rather than the filing of a notice of appeal in federal
court.
Our rule relating to the filing of papers is RCr 1.08.
RCr 1.08(2) applies whenever the rules fail to specify the manner
of filing and service of papers.
RCr 11.42(10) does not specify
the manner in which an inmate should file his motion, therefore,
RCr 1.08(2) applies.
RCr 1.08(2)(d)(ii) states that "[t]he
filing of papers with the court as required by these Rules shall
be made by filing them with the clerk of the court . . . ."
Upon
receiving the paper, the clerk "shall endorse. . . the date of
its filing" and "[s]uch endorsement shall constitute the filing
of the pleading or other paper."
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Thus, an RCr 11.42 motion is
not "filed" until it is endorsed by the clerk of court.
1.08(2)(d)(iii).
RCr
Because appellant’s RCr 11.42 motion was
endorsed by the Clerk of the Jefferson Circuit Court on October
2, 1997, his motion was filed outside the three year time limit
established in RCr 11.42(10) and was properly dismissed by the
circuit court.
While we are not unmindful of the fact that
inmates are not free to use alternate
avenues to ensure that
documents are received by courts in a timely manner, any change
in policy relating to the filing of papers by inmates in our
Rules of Criminal Procedure should come from the Kentucky Supreme
Court and not from this court.
For the reasons stated above, the Jefferson Circuit
Court order which dismissed appellant’s RCr 11.42 motion is
hereby affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Ricky Allen Hays, Pro Se
Lexington, Kentucky
A. B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Todd D. Ferguson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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