KATHLEEN HURD v. GLORIA HURD MOORE AND CURTIS MOORE, HER HUSBAND
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: December 10, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-001153-MR
KATHLEEN HURD
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM LAUREL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LEWIS B. HOPPER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 1994-CI-000590
v.
GLORIA HURD MOORE AND
CURTIS MOORE, HER HUSBAND
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GARDNER, KNOPF, AND McANULTY, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
Kathleen Hurd appeals from an April 22, 1998,
judgment of Laurel Circuit Court establishing a boundary between
her real property on the Parris Karr Road in Laurel County and
that of her former sister-in-law, the appellee Gloria Hurd Moore.
Hurd maintains that, relying on inadmissible parol evidence, the
trial court misconstrued the deed description of the boundary
line.
We agree and accordingly reverse the circuit court’s
judgment and remand.
By survivorship deed executed in October 1974, Kathleen
Hurd and her husband, Clayton Hurd, purchased approximately four
(4) acres of unimproved Laurel County real estate from one Arthur
Causey.
Almost immediately thereupon, Kathleen and Clayton sold
approximately half of the four-acre tract (the southeastern half)
to Clayton’s brother, Robert Hurd, and his wife, Gloria Hurd.
The deed of conveyance from Clayton and Kathleen to Robert and
Gloria describes Robert and Gloria’s lot as follows:
BEGINNING at a steel stake, in the right-ofway of the County Road at a new corner common
to Clayton Hurd; Thence with the right of way
of the County Road, and continuing with the
driveway of Arthur Causey, approximately 120
feet to a concrete post in the property line
of Arthur Causey; Thence with the property
line of Arthur Causey, Eastward to a concrete
post in Ray’s line; Thence about North with
Ray’s line 131.9 feet to a steel stake, a new
corner; Thence a straight line, up the hill,
a Western direction to the beginning corner,
and containing 2 acres more or less. . . .
By the end of 1978, both couples had erected dwellings on their
respective lots; Kathleen and Gloria have resided there since.
The present controversy began in 1993, when Kathleen’s
daughter and son-in-law began preparing to move a house trailer
onto Clayton and Kathleen’s lot.
The Hurd’s wished to extend
their driveway to the trailer site, but Gloria, now Gloria Moore,
and her new husband1 objected.
The proposed driveway, they
insisted, would encroach upon their property.
Kathleen
commissioned a survey of the lots in April 1993.
Because the
steel stakes mentioned in the deed were no longer existing, the
surveyor, Brock, followed the calls one-hundred twenty (120) feet
backward from the concrete post on the Causey line to what he
determined to be the southern end-point of the Hurd/Moore
1
Robert Hurd died in about 1985, and by 1993 Gloria Hurd had
become Gloria Hurd Moore.
-2-
boundary line.
He also followed the calls forward from the
concrete post to the northern end-point of the boundary line,
then established the line by connecting the two ends.
If one
assumes that the beginning point of the survey can not be
located, there is no dispute that this is a standard and
appropriate method of reconstructing the boundary.
Indeed, the
parties agree that Brock correctly determined the northern end of
the boundary line in this fashion.
Gloria insists, however, for
reasons discussed below, that the southern end of that line was
about thirty feet (30') farther to the northwest along the county
road (closer to the Hurds’ house) than Brock placed it.
She
commissioned a survey (the Cannon survey) that incorporated this
more northwesterly point.
The Brock survey locates the boundary
line farther to the east than does the Cannon survey, such that
the Hurds’ driveway is entirely on their own property and such
that both lots comprise approximately one and nine tenths acres
(the Hurds’ lot being about 1.92 acres and the Moores’ lot about
1.91 acres).
According to the Cannon survey, however, the
boundary line passes within a few feet of Kathleen’s house, and
the extension of the driveway to her daughter’s trailer lies
almost entirely on the Moores’ property.
Also according to the
Cannon survey, the Hurds’ lot is about one and seven tenths (1.7)
acres, and the Moores’ lot is about two and one tenth (2.1)
acres.
The dispute eventually gave rise to a bench trial, at
which Moore explained why she disagreed with the Brock survey’s
placement of what the deed refers to as the beginning corner.
-3-
She did not dispute that the monument mentioned in the deed, the
steel stake, had disappeared.
She testified, however, that,
immediately prior to the 1974 transaction between Clayton and
Robert Hurd, the parties established the disputed end of the
boundary line in the following manner.
They measured a straight
line from the southwest corner of the Hurd lot (in the deed, the
concrete post in Ray’s line) to the southeast corner of the Moore
lot (the concrete post in Causey’s line), a line which did not
follow the county roadway or the Causey driveway, and agreed that
the center of that line would be on the boundary line between
their lots.
The Cannon survey’s boundary line was based upon
Moore’s recollection of the point so determined.
It so happened
that the center point of the straight line between the two (2)
concrete posts was about one-hundred twenty (120) feet from the
post at the southeast corner of the Moore lot.
This was why,
according to Moore, the deed referred to a distance of 120 feet
from the boundary stake to the post on the Causey line.
Moore
also testified that the brothers marked the point with a stake or
piece of pipe (the steel stake referred to in the deed), and that
she could remember where the stake had been because sometime
thereafter Robert had planted near it a tree, which was still
living.
Moore’s brother corroborated Moore’s testimony
concerning the parties’ manner of initially establishing the
corner, and her son corroborated her testimony concerning the
tree.
In deciding in favor of Moore and adopting the boundary
line represented on the Cannon survey, the trial court ruled that
-4-
the deed’s reference to a distance of 120 feet from the steel
stake at the boundary line corner to the concrete post in the
Causey line had been shown to be ambiguous and thus that parol
evidence was admissible to prove what had been intended by that
reference.
It found Moore’s account of that intent persuasive,
particularly in light of the general rule of deed construction
that monuments be favored over measurements.
Hurd maintains that
the trial court misapplied the parol evidence rule.
We agree.
The trial court decided this case without a jury, so
our review is governed by the standards enunciated in CR 52.01.
The judgment of the trial court must be sustained unless the
reviewing court finds that the judgment is (1) unsupported by
substantial evidence, (2) is against the weight of the evidence,
(3) is an erroneous declaration of the law, or (4) is an
erroneous application of the law.
Appellate courts are further
warned that they should exercise the power to set aside a decree
or judgment of the trial court on the ground that it is against
the weight of the evidence with caution and with a firm belief
that the decree or judgment is wrong.
Owens-Corning Fiberglass
Corporation v. Golightly, Ky., 976 S.W.2d 409 (1998); Morganfield
National Bank v. Damien Elder & Sons, Ky., 836 S.W.2d 893 (1992);
Croley v. Alsip, Ky., 602 S.W.2d 418 (1980).
With regard to this standard, it is well to note that
contract construction tends to blur the distinction between
matters of fact and matters of law inasmuch as what is plainly a
factual question--the meaning the parties attach to the words of
their agreement--has traditionally been regarded as a question of
-5-
law.
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981) remarks on
this tradition as follows:
Analytically, what meaning is attached to a
word or other symbol by one or more people is
a question of fact. But general usage as to
the meaning of words in the English language
is commonly a proper subject for judicial
notice without the aid of evidence extrinsic
to the writing. Historically, moreover,
partly perhaps because of the fact that
jurors were often illiterate, questions of
interpretation of written documents have been
treated as questions of law in the sense that
they are decided by the trial judge rather
than by the jury. Likewise, since an
appellate court is commonly in as good a
position to decide such questions as the
trial judge, they have been treated as
questions of law for appellate review. . . .
Id. § 212 comment (d).
tradition.
Kentucky courts have followed this
Morganfield National Bank, supra.
We are concerned with the parol evidence rule, which
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 213 (1981) formulates as
follows:
(1) A binding integrated agreement discharges
prior agreements to the extent that it is
inconsistent with them.
(2) A binding completely integrated agreement
discharges prior agreements to the extent
that they are within its scope.
(3) An integrated agreement that is not
binding or that is voidable and avoided does
not discharge a prior agreement. But an
integrated agreement, even though not
binding, may be effective to render
inoperative a term which would have been part
of the agreement if it had not been
integrated.
Comment b to this section notes that
[w]hether a binding agreement is completely
integrated or partially integrated, it
supersedes inconsistent terms of prior
agreements. To apply this rule, the court
must make preliminary determinations that
-6-
there is an integrated agreement and that it
is inconsistent with the term in question.
See § 209. Those determinations are made in
accordance with all relevant evidence, and
require interpretation both of the integrated
agreement and of the prior agreement. The
existence of the prior agreement may be a
circumstance which sheds light on the meaning
of the integrated agreement, but the
integrated agreement must be given a meaning
to which its language is reasonably
susceptible when read in the light of all the
circumstances.
Although the trial court did not expressly find that
the deed here in question is an integrated agreement, it is well
established that modern deeds transferring real property are
particularly important instances of such agreements and are
subject to the parole evidence rule.
S.W.2d 894 (1972).
Phelps v. Sledd, Ky., 479
By statute, in fact, deeds are now required
to integrate real property transfer agreements at least to the
extent of identifying the property, the interest therein to be
transferred, and the consideration for the transfer.
382.135.
KRS
There is no dispute that the Clayton Hurd/Robert Hurd
deed before us integrated those terms.
In interpreting such a deed, the fact finder may have
recourse to evidence of prior agreements, negotiations, and other
pertinent circumstances, and, if the interpretation “depends on
the credibility of extrinsic evidence or on a choice among
reasonable inferences to be drawn from extrinsic evidence,” it is
to be regarded as a matter of fact.
Contracts § 212(2).
Restatement (Second) of
See also Croley v. Alsip, supra; Caudill v.
Citizens Bank, Ky., 383 S.W.2d 350 (1964).
On the other hand,
“the asserted meaning must be one to which the language of the
-7-
writing, read in context, is reasonably susceptible.
If no other
meaning is reasonable, the court should rule as a matter of law
that the meaning is established.”
Contracts, § 215, comment b.
Restatement (Second) of
This is the familiar corollary to
the parol evidence rule that extrinsic evidence may not be
employed to contradict the plain terms of an integrated
agreement.
Ball Creek Coal Company v. Napier, 305 Ky. 308, 202
S.W.2d 728 (1947).
Because application of the parol evidence rule, which
precludes recourse to extrinsic evidence to alter the meaning of
an integrated agreement, requires that that meaning first be
established by interpretation, and because interpretation
necessitates the preliminary consideration of extrinsic evidence,
it is sometimes wondered whether the parol evidence rule has any
genuine effect.
See Traudt v. Nebraska Public Power District,
251 N.W.2d 148 (Neb. 1977) (quoting at length from Wigmore’s
analysis of this seeming paradox).
The need for an initial
interpretation, however, does not render the parol evidence rule
ineffective.
It often happens that the language of an agreement is
susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.
See
Intretherm, Inc. v. Coronet Imperial Corporation, 558 S.W.2d 344
(Mo. 1977) (providing a good discussion of several different
types of ambiguity).
Indeed, as the Restatement notes, the
meaning of a writing “can almost never be plain except in a
context.” § 212 comment b.
The interpretation of that language,
therefore, will require consideration of the agreement’s context.
-8-
Under the parol evidence rule, however, the interpretation
finally adopted must be reasonably consistent with the writing’s
actual terms.
Even if the circumstances strongly suggest an
intention at odds with the written terms, a court’s reliance on
those circumstances is precluded unless the writing, without
alteration, can reasonably bear the alternative meaning those
circumstances suggest.
As the Restatement comment just quoted
goes on to say, “after the transaction has been shown in all its
length and breadth, the words of an integrated agreement remain
the most important evidence of intention.”
See also Ball Creek
Coal Company v. Napier, supra.
In the case before us, Brock, in making his survey,
relied upon existing monuments and the standard meaning of the
deed calls to reconstruct a boundary line that divides the
property, consistently with the deed’s stated purpose, into two
(2) nearly equal sections.
Nevertheless, the trial court ruled
that the deed description could “conceivably” be read to mean
that the 120 feet from the beginning stake to the concrete marker
was to be measured not literally as the deed says, “with the
right of way of the County Road, and continuing with the driveway
of Arthur Causey,”
but rather along a straight line between the
county right-of-way and the post, thus bypassing the angle formed
by the county road and Causey’s driveway.
It then resolved this
“conceivable” ambiguity by resorting to Moore’s testimony
concerning the purported method of first placing the steel corner
stake and the purported substitution at some later time of the
tree for the steel-stake monument.
-9-
We believe that the trial
court applied the wrong standard in determining whether the deed
was ambiguous--the ambiguity must be reasonably certain, not
merely conceivable--and we further believe that its construction
of the deed is not reasonably borne by the deed’s language, which
plainly refers to ordinary metes and bounds measurements.
We
conclude, therefore, that the trial court violated the parol
evidence rule by altering the deed on the basis of extrinsic
evidence.
Moore contends, and the trial court apparently agreed,
that application of the parol evidence rule is overborne in this
case by the customary tenants of deed construction.
It is well
established, Moore points out, that where there is a conflict
between a boundary line as determined by monuments and as
determined by course and/or distance calls, the determination by
monument will generally prevail.
S.W.2d 159 (1966).
Marcum v. Cantrell, Ky., 409
She also correctly notes that the intended
location of monuments that have ceased to exist is subject to
proof by competent extrinsic evidence.
S.W.2d 388 (1975).
Powell v. Reid, Ky., 519
Having proved to the trial court’s
satisfaction the location of the disputed corner, Moore claims
that the trial court correctly ordered the deed’s course and
distance calls modified in conformity therewith.
All of this
would be correct if Moore’s evidence concerning the corner
monument were competent.
For the reason’s discussed above,
however, we believe that that evidence is barred by the parol
evidence rule.
Without that evidence there is no inconsistency
-10-
in the deed description nor is there any other reason to reject
the Brock survey.
In sum, the deed employs standard language tracing the
boundary of Moore’s lot.
If, as Moore asserts, a contrary
meaning was intended, it was particularly important, given the
deed’s potential role as a public record, that such meaning be
more clearly expressed than it was.
Such clarity, furthermore,
could easily have been accomplished.
That it was not may be
unfortunate, but under the parol evidence rule, neither this
Court nor the trial court is authorized to substitute a meaning
contrary to that expressed in the deed as it was written.
For these reasons, we reverse the April 22, 1998,
judgment of the Laurel Circuit Court, and remand the matter to
that court for entry of a judgment in favor of appellant.
GARDNER, JUDGE, CONCURS.
McANULTY, JUDGE, DISSENTS.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Brien G. Freeman
Freeman, Copeland, & Jorjani
Corbin, Kentucky
Thor H. Bahrman
Bahrman & Prewitt
Corbin, Kentucky
-11-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.