BOBBY WILLIAMS v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
September 3, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-001131-MR
BOBBY WILLIAMS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MONROE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PAUL BARRY JONES, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-CR-00069
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
* * * * * * * * * *
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, HUDDLESTON, and KNOPF, Judges.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE.
Bobby Williams (Williams) appeals from a
judgment of the Monroe Circuit Court sentencing him to ten years
in prison following his conviction for trafficking in cocaine.
Finding no error, we affirm.
On the night of August 24, 1997, Tompkinsville City
Police Officer Chan Brown (Officer Brown) pulled over a truck
being driven by Williams because it had a broken taillight.
Williams got out of his truck after Officer Brown asked him for
his driver’s license and insurance card.
After Williams exited
his truck, Officer Brown spotted some rolling papers on the seat.
Upon inquiry from Officer Brown, Williams consented to a search
of the vehicle.
Officer Brown noticed that Williams appeared
nervous and that he kept his hands in his pants pockets.
When
Officer Brown asked him to take his hands out of his pockets,
Williams ran from the scene.
Officer Brown and Officer Rickey Richardson, who had
arrived at the scene shortly after Williams was stopped, pursued
Williams.
As Williams started to enter a wooded area, Officer
Brown saw him throw away two small sandwich-type baggies.
After
the two police officers apprehended Williams and placed him under
arrest, Officer Brown retrieved the two small plastic baggies,
both of which contained several pieces of an off-white substance,
and several loose pieces that had fallen out of one of the
plastic baggies.
Upon searching Williams’s pockets, Officer
Brown discovered a few more loose pieces of a similar hard offwhite substance.
Officer Brown placed the unopened plastic baggie, the
opened plastic baggie, and the loose pieces of suspected crack
cocaine together in a larger plastic bag.
A later chemical test
confirmed that both the substance in the small plastic baggies
and the loose pieces were cocaine.
A separate laboratory
analysis of Williams’s pants pockets was negative for the
presence of cocaine.
In December 1996, Williams was indicted on one felony
count of first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance
(cocaine)(KRS 218A.1412).
Following a two-day trial, a jury
found Williams guilty of the charge.
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In April 1998, the trial
court sentenced Williams consistent with the jury’s
recommendation to ten years in prison for first-degree
trafficking in cocaine.
This appeal followed.
Williams, who is African-American, raises three issues
on appeal, including the Commonwealth’s striking of an AfricanAmerican venireman, the Commonwealth’s failure to preserve
physical evidence, and the trial court’s failure to grant a
directed verdict.
Based on a review of the record and the
applicable law, we believe none of these issues have merit.
First, Williams contends that the Commonwealth used a
peremptory challenge to exclude the only African-American person
from the jury in violation of his constitutional right to equal
protection under the 14th Amendment as required by Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 90 L. Ed. 2d
69 (1986).
Prior to seating the jury, the court conducted a hearing on the
Commonwealth’s exercise of its peremptory challenge to strike
Angela Mink.
During the hearing, the prosecutor explained that
he had received information from three Tompkinsville police
officers that Ms. Mink’s brother was under indictment in Monroe
County for trafficking in cocaine.
He stated that he believed
Ms. Mink’s close relationship to a relative facing trial on the
same type of drug offense for which Williams was being tried
would unduly affect her ability to be an impartial juror.
The prosecutor stated that he would have stricken any
person, “black, white, green or purple” in a similar situation.
Defense counsel objected to the exclusion of the juror, noting
that the prosecutor had failed to explicitly ask her about the
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situation with her brother during voir dire.
Defense counsel did
not question the validity of the fact that Ms. Mink’s brother was
under indictment.
The trial court held that the Commonwealth had
properly exercised its right to strike Ms. Mink.
In the seminal case of Batson v. Kentucky, supra, the
United States Supreme Court set out a three-step process for
evaluating an equal protection challenge to a prosecutor’s use of
a peremptory challenge to exclude a member of the venire: 1) the
defendant must make a prima facie showing that the prosecutor has
exercised a peremptory challenged based on race; 2) if the
defendant makes the requisite prima facie showing, the burden
shifts to the prosecutor to articulate a race-neutral explanation
for striking the juror; and 3) the trial court must determine
whether the prosecution satisfied its burden by rebutting the
initial prima facie showing of discrimination.
106 S. Ct. at 1722-24.
See id. at 96-98,
In reviewing an equal protection
challenge to the prosecutor’s striking a member of the venire, an
appellate court must give great deference to the trial court and
apply a clearly erroneous standard to the court’s decision on
discriminatory intent.
Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 364,
111 S. Ct. 1859, 1868, 114 L. Ed. 2d
395 (1991); McGinnis v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 875 S.W.2d 518, 523 (1994), overruled on other
grounds by Elliott v. Commonwealth, Ky., 976 S.W.2d 416 (1998).
The Commonwealth argues that Williams has failed to
make a prima facie showing that the prosecutor exercised his
peremptory challenge on the basis of race.
In order to establish
a prima facie case, a defendant must show that he is a member of
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a cognizable racial group, that the prosecutor used a peremptory
challenge to remove members of the venire that corresponded to
the defendant’s race, and that these facts and any other relevant
circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor struck the
venireman on account of his or her race.
Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-
97, 106 S. Ct. at 1723.
Generally, the fact that a prosecutor used his
peremptory challenge(s) to remove the only black juror(s) on a
panel is not sufficient in and of itself to create an inference
of discrimination.
As the court indicated in Commonwealth v.
Hardy, Ky., 775 S.W.2d 919, 920-21 (1989), numbers alone do not
establish a prima facie showing of discrimination, and the mere
allegation that the prosecutor struck a certain number of blacks
from the jury panel would not satisfy the requirements of Batson.
An inference of discrimination arises primarily when a black
juror is treated differently than prospective white jurors under
similar circumstances.
See Wells v. Commonwealth, 892 S.W.2d
299, 303 (1995).
Nevertheless, while it is questionable whether Williams
ever established a prima facie showing of discrimination, because
the trial court relied on the prosecutor’s proffered rationale
for exercising a peremptory challenge to remove Ms. Mink, we will
address the other prongs of Batson.
See, e.g., United States v.
Tucker, 90 F.3d 1135, 1142 (6th Cir. 1996)(defendant’s burden to
make prima facie case becomes moot if trial court rules on
prosecutor’s explanation for strikes).
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Williams contends the Commonwealth did not satisfy its
burden in articulating a race-neutral reason for striking Ms.
Mink because the prosecutor’s action was based on neither
information elicited during voir dire nor information within the
personal knowledge of the prosecutor.
The Kentucky Supreme
Court, however, has rejected these types of challenges to a
prosecutor’s use of peremptory strikes.
In Commonwealth v.
Snodgrass, Ky., 831 S.W.2d 176, 179 (1992), the court stated:
We find no fault with the prosecutor for
exercising a peremptory challenge against a
juror where the decision to strike is based
upon information which the prosecutor has
received from a source other than information
received from voir dire. Batson does not
require the neutral explanation for
peremptorily striking a potential juror to be
derived from voir dire. Neither does the
explanation have to rise to a level
sufficient to strike for cause. Batson,
supra. A prosecutor may utilize his own
personal knowledge concerning a juror and
information supplied from outside sources.
Whether the information is true or false is
not the test. The test is whether the
prosecutor has a good-faith belief in the
information and whether he can articulate the
reason to the trial court in a race-neutral
manner which is not inviolate of the
defendant’s constitutional rights. The trial
court, as the final arbiter, then decides
whether the prosecutor has acted with a
forbidden intent.
In the case sub judice, the prosecutor explained that
he had exercised his peremptory challenge to Ms. Mink because her
brother was under indictment in the same county for the same
offense for which Williams was on trial, trafficking in cocaine.
The prosecutor indicated that his knowledge of this circumstance
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was based on information received from three local police
officers, and he submitted a written statement from the officers
to support his action.
In addition, the prosecutor stated that
Ms. Mink failed to reveal the fact of her brother’s indictment
when he asked the potential jurors during voir dire if cocaine
had affected any family member.
In Wells v. Commonwealth, supra, involving a
prosecution for murder and theft surrounding a drug deal, the
Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s finding that no
Batson violation had occurred where the prosecutor had stricken a
black juror because her sister had been arrested for a drug
crime.
In the present case, we cannot say the trial court erred
in finding the prosecutor provided a sufficient race-neutral
explanation for using a peremptory challenge to strike Ms. Mink
from the jury panel.
Williams also challenges his conviction based on the
Commonwealth’s failure to preserve his pants or provide in
discovery the results of forensic tests performed on the pants.
First, we note that this issue was not properly preserved by a
contemporaneous objection at trial, and therefore generally is
not subject to appellate review.
See, e.g., Tucker v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 916 S.W.2d 181 (1996); West v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 780 S.W.2d 600 (1989).
Williams maintains, however, that
his inability to perform independent tests on the pants or to
review the Commonwealth’s test reports prejudiced the outcome of
the trial and violated his right to due process.
Generally, the
Commonwealth is required to provide only material exculpatory
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evidence in discovery.
See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.
Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d
215 (1963); Wilson v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
836 S.W.2d 872 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1034, 113 S. Ct.
1857, 123 L. Ed. 2d 479 (1993).
In order to establish a due
process violation based on the prosecution’s failure to preserve
even potentially exculpatory evidence, the defendant must show
that the prosecution acted in bad faith.
See, e.g., Collins v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 951 S.W.2d 569 (1997); Perdue v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 916 S.W.2d 148, 159 (1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 855, 117
S. Ct. 151, 136 L. Ed. 2d 96 (1996).
Williams has not demonstrated that the Commonwealth’s
failure to preserve the pants resulted from bad faith.
Moreover,
Williams has not shown how he was prejudiced by a lack of access
to the pants or the test report.
Officer Brown testified on
cross-examination that the test results were negative for cocaine
residue in the pants pockets.
Any independent testing by
Williams could not have provided any more favorable information
than that already disclosed by Officer Brown.
Williams’s final issue involves the trial court’s
denial of his motion for a directed verdict.
In Commonwealth v.
Benham, Ky., 816 S.W.2d 186 (1991), the Kentucky Supreme Court
delineated the approach for handling a criminal defendant’s
motion for directed verdict as follows:
On motion for directed verdict, the
trial court must draw all fair and reasonable
inferences from the evidence in favor of the
Commonwealth. If the evidence is sufficient
to induce a reasonable juror to believe
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
is guilty, a directed verdict should not be
given. For the purpose of ruling on the
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motion, the trial court must assume that the
evidence for the Commonwealth is true, but
reserving to the jury questions as to the
credibility and weight to be given to such
testimony.
816 S.W.2d at 187 (citing Commonwealth v. Sawhill, Ky., 660
S.W.2d 3 (1983)).
See also Commonwealth v. Collins, Ky., 933
S.W.2d 811, 815 (1996).
The standard for appellate review of a
denial of a motion for directed verdict alleging insufficient
evidence dictates that if, under the evidence as a whole, it
would not be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find the
defendant guilty, he is not entitled to a directed verdict of
acquittal.
Benham, 816 S.W.2d at 187; Baker v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 973 S.W.2d 54, 55 (1998).
In the case sub judice, Officers Brown and Richardson
testified that they saw Williams throw away two plastic baggies
while he was being chased.
Officer Brown retrieved the two
baggies and some loose pieces of an off-white hard substance.
Three police officers testified that Williams made a statement to
them that the substances retrieved by the police belonged to him.
The Kentucky State Laboratory forensic drug chemist who performed
several tests on the substances recovered by Officer Brown
testified that the two samples contained a total of 100.2 grams
of cocaine, worth approximately $8,000 to $9,000.
Williams
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the chemist’s
failure to indicate that he had tested all of the material
contained in the two baggies.
He contends that the jury could
have harbored a reasonable doubt that the entire amount of the
physical evidence recovered was crack cocaine.
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In the recent case of Taylor v. Commonwealth, Ky. App.,
984 S.W.2d 482 (1998), the defendant was convicted of trafficking
in more than eight ounces of marijuana.
During a search, the
police found 98 plants they believed to be marijuana.
The
sheriff sent samples from only six of the plants to the forensic
laboratory for testing.
The forensic chemist testified that the
samples tested positive for marijuana and weighed a total of .5
grams.
The court in Taylor held that the state is not required
to test samples from all individual portions of a controlled
substance, even when an offense involves a specified amount of a
controlled substance.
In determining whether the prosecution
presented sufficient reliable evidence to hold a defendant
responsible for the full quantity of a substance, the court
stated that it must look to the following factors:
[1] a proper random selection procedure was
employed; [2] the tested and untested
substances were contemporaneously seized at
the search scene; [3] the tested and untested
substances were sufficiently similar in
physical appearance; [4] the scientific
testing method conformed with an accepted
methodology; [5] all of the samples subjected
to scientific analysis tested positive for
the same substance; and [6] the absence of
evidence that the untested substance was
different from the tested substance.
Id. at 485.
Applying these factors in the present instance, the
Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to attribute the
entire 100.2 grams of cocaine to Williams.
Given the other
evidence linking Williams to the tested cocaine, and taking all
the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, we
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believe there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to
believe that Williams was guilty of trafficking in cocaine.
See,
e.g., Dawson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 756 S.W.2d 935 (1988); Brown
v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 914 S.W.2d 355 (1996).
Thus, the
trial court did not err in denying Williams’s motion for a
directed verdict.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of
the Monroe Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Suzanne A. Hopf
New Salisbury, Indiana
A. B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Courtney A. Jones
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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