BRIDGESTONE/FIRESTONE d/b/a FIRESTONE INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS COMPANY v. JAMYE McQUEEN
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RENDERED: July 23, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-001111-MR
BRIDGESTONE/FIRESTONE d/b/a
FIRESTONE INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS COMPANY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WHITLEY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JERRY WINCHESTER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CI-00613
v.
JAMYE McQUEEN
APPELLEE
OPINION AND ORDER
DISMISSING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, EMBERTON, and McANULTY, Judges.
COMBS, JUDGE:
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. d/b/a Firestone
Industrial Products Company ("Firestone") has filed this appeal
from an order of the Whitley Circuit Court refusing to stay
litigation and denying a motion to compel arbitration.
After
careful review and consideration, we grant the appellee's motion
to dismiss the appeal.
This action was initiated by Jamye McQueen, the
appellee, claiming that she had been wrongfully discharged from
her employment with Firestone.
Firestone answered McQueen's
complaint on November 10, 1997.
The company denied McQueen's
allegations and otherwise defended against the action.
Thereafter, both parties proceeded with discovery.
On January 10, 1998, Firestone moved to amend its
answer to include as an additional affirmative defense, the
existence of an agreement to arbitrate claims found in its
"Employee Dispute Resolution Plan."
By agreed order, the motion
was granted and the amended answer was filed on February 2, 1998.
On March 30, 1998, Firestone filed a motion to stay the
litigation and to compel mediation and arbitration.1
McQueen
filed a verified response, in which she denied that she had ever
agreed to the terms of the "Employee Dispute Resolution Plan."
On April 9, 1998, the trial court denied the motion and ruled
that the "Plan" amounted to a contract of adhesion supported by
inadequate consideration.
Firestone's notice of appeal pursuant
to Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 73.02 followed.
On appeal, Firestone argues that the trial court erred
by failing to compel McQueen to honor her agreement to pursue any
claim against the company through arbitration.
In her brief to
this court, McQueen counters that the alleged agreement to
arbitrate is unenforceable against her for a myriad of reasons
and consequently has filed a motion to dismiss the appeal.
In her motion, McQueen notes that this appeal arises
from an interlocutory order of the trial court.
She maintains
that no applicable rule or statutory provision entitles Firestone
1
This was the first assertion that the cause should be
submitted for arbitration. Considerable discovery had already
been completed.
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to immediate review in this court.
Firestone, on the other hand,
contends that provisions of both the Uniform Arbitration Act (KRS
417.220(1)(a)) and the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. ยง16)
permit an immediate appeal of an order refusing a stay of the
proceedings or a denial of a petition to order arbitration.
In 1984, the Commonwealth of Kentucky adopted the
Uniform Arbitration Act set forth at KRS Chapter 417.
As
Firestone notes, the Act expressly provides for appeals from an
order denying an application to compel arbitration โ even though
such an order is not final under CR 54.01.
KRS 417.220(1)(a).
However, the Act also specifically excludes from its provisions
arbitration agreements between employers and employees.
As a
result, McQueen argues, the appeal of this interlocutory order is
not governed by the Act.
We agree.2
In cases involving agreements pre-dating the Act, the
Kentucky Supreme Court has permitted litigants to seek appellate
review of interlocutory orders denying arbitration.
Kodak Mining
Co. v. Carrs Fork Corp., Ky., 669 S.W.2d 917 (1984).
By availing
themselves of the extraordinary provisions of CR 65.07, litigants
have avoided the general rule that only a final decision may be
taken on appeal.
Upon a showing of the abrogation of a concrete
personal right and of irreparable harm as defined in CR 65.04, CR
65.07 allows for a streamlined and expedited disposition of
certain matters appropriate for injunctive relief โ followed by
2
The provisions of the federal Act do not preempt Kentucky's
procedure for obtaining an immediate review of an order denying
the application for arbitration.
-3-
an opportunity for immediate review by the Kentucky Supreme Court
under CR 65.09.
This type of appellate mechanism is particularly
appropriate in a case involving denial of an application to
compel arbitration.
The relevance of arbitration and the right
to invoke it would be rendered essentially meaningless or moot if
a party were required to go first through the time and expense of
litigation being then entitled to appellate review โ which may or
may not determine that arbitration should indeed have been
granted in lieu of litigation.
In reviewing appeals from the
denial of a motion to stay proceedings and to compel arbitration,
federal courts and other state courts treat them as analogous to
appeals from the denial of an injunction.
See J & K Cement
Const., Inc. v. Montalbano Builders, Inc., 456 N.E.2d 889 (Ill.
App. 1983); Kansas Gas and Elec. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
861 F.2d 420 (4th Cir. 1988).3
Through the expansion of CR 65.07, Kentucky has
established a mechanism through which an immediate appeal of an
order refusing a stay of litigation pending arbitration or an
order denying a motion to compel arbitration may be taken.
Except for that extraordinary provision, we are unaware of any
rule or statute which would suspend the general rule that only a
final decision may be taken on appeal.
Since the method employed
by Firestone to invoke the jurisdiction of this court with
3
We are bound to interpret the Act so as to make it
consistent with the law of other states which have enacted it.
KRS 417.240; Valley Const. v. Perry Host Management, Ky., 796
S.W.2d 365 (1990).
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respect to an interlocutory order does not meet the limited
criteria specifically authorized by our Supreme Court, we are
compelled to dismiss this appeal.
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The appeal is hereby ORDERED dismissed.
/s/ Sara Combs
Judge, Kentucky Court of Appeals
ENTERED:
July 23, 1999
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Bradford L. Breeding
Corbin, KY
Marcia A. Smith
David O. Smith
Corbin, KY
John T. Lovett
David L. Hoskins
Louisville, KY
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