RICKY DEAN COX v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: August 27, 1999; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-001069-MR
RICKY DEAN COX
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MARION CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DOUGLAS M. GEORGE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CR-0042
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUDGEL, CHIEF JUDGE, KNOX, and McANULTY, JUDGES.
McANULTY, JUDGE: This is an appeal from a conviction of wanton
endangerment in the first degree, being a persistent felony
offender in the first degree, and violating a domestic violence
order, and from an order denying a motion for new trial.
Appellant Ricky Dean Cox (“Cox”) claims that the trial court’s
failure to comply with KRS 29A.150 and Admin Proc. Part II § 17
in jury selection deprived him of his right to a fair trial.
Appellee Commonwealth of Kentucky (“Commonwealth”) asserts that
the trial court substantially complied with the statutes and
rules pertaining to jury selection and the court did not abuse
its discretion by denying the motion.
We affirm the judgment of
conviction and the trial court’s denial of the motion for a new
trial.
The trial date for Cox was scheduled for March 9, 1998.
In a February 2, 1998 order, the trial judge directed his clerk
to summons 52 jurors for the trial.
jurors showed up.
absent jurors.
However, only 48 prospective
The judge had not excused any of the four
Counsel for Cox objected, arguing that there were
less jurors than the number required by the February order, and
moved for a continuance.
The trial court denied the motion.
On March 9, 1998, Cox was convicted of wanton
endangerment in the first degree, being a persistent felony
offender in the first degree, and violating a domestic violence
order.
Cox moved for a new trial on March 12th.
One allegation
was that the failure to obtain a total panel, due to the absent
jurors, deprived Cox of a fair trial.
The trial court denied
this motion and sentenced Cox to twelve years imprisonment and a
$500.00 fine.
This appeal followed.
Appellant argues that the trial court erred by not
complying with KRS 29A.150 and the comparable rule under Admin.
Proc. Part II § 17.
KRS 29A.150 states in relevant part, as
follows:
(1) A person summoned for jury service who
fails to appear as directed shall be ordered
by the court to appear forthwith and show
cause for his failure to comply with the
summons....
See also Admin. Proc. Part II § 17.
Appellant contends that
strict compliance is required since this is a statute pertaining
to jury selection.
Appellee counters that substantial not strict
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compliance with jury selection is required.
We agree with the
Commonwealth.
In Commonwealth v. Nelson, Ky., 841 S.W.2d 628, 630
(1992), the Kentucky Supreme Court held that statutes and
regulations pertaining to jury empaneling are not mandatory.
There must be a substantial deviation by the trial court in order
to warrant a reversal.
Id.
Therefore, the issue before this
Court is whether failure by the trial court to order the absent
jurors to appear and show cause constitutes a substantial
deviation from the statutes and rules of jury empaneling.
Under KRS 29A.050, prospective jurors are randomly
selected from a master list compiled from driver’s license and
voter registration lists.
See also Admin Proc. Part II § 5.
From this jury panel, KRS 29A.060(1) provides that:
[e]ach Circuit or District Judge shall inform
the Chief Circuit Judge or his designee of
his needs for qualified jurors.
See also Admin. Proc. Part II § 4.
Neither the statute nor
administrative rule states a specific number of jurors that must
be summoned.
It is within the discretion of the trial judge.
However, there should be enough summoned jurors to accommodate
the sixteen peremptory challenges, any possible challenges for
cause, and the thirteen jurors who will serve in the criminal
trial.
RCr 9.40.
See also RCr 9.36.
Appellant does not claim any error concerning the
selection of the prospective jurors for the jury panel.
All of
the jurors were randomly selected and thus satisfied Appellant’s
right to a jury selected from a fair cross-section of the
-3-
community.
(1983).
See Partee v. Commonwealth, Ky., 652 S.W.2d 89
There was strict compliance with KRS 29A.050.
As to the number of jurors for panel, the trial court
ordered 52 jurors to be summoned for the Cox trial.
Since it was
within the court’s discretion to summon 52 jurors, it was also
within the court’s discretion to proceed with the 48 jurors on
the jury panel.
voir dire.
In fact, only 30 of the jurors were called for
Both the Commonwealth and Appellant were able to
exercise their peremptory challenges, even after two jurors were
excused by the trial court.
The Appellant was not prejudiced by
a panel of 48 prospective jurors.
The trial court’s failure to
order the absent jurors to appear was not a substantial deviation
from the statutes and regulations pertaining to jury selection.
For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the judgment
of conviction and the trial court’s denial of the motion for a
new trial.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Danny Butler
Greensburg, KY
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Paul D. Gilbert
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
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