DAVID TRAYNER V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: OCTOBER 8, 1999; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-001032-MR
DAVID TRAYNER
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS B. WINE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CR-2352
V.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION AFFIRMING
* * * * * * * *
BEFORE:
GUDGEL, Chief Judge; HUDDLESTON and KNOPF, Judges.
GUDGEL, CHIEF JUDGE:
This is an appeal from a judgment entered
by the Jefferson Circuit Court.
Appellant, David Trayner, was
convicted of two counts of assault in the fourth degree, two
counts of criminal mischief in the third degree, and one count of
disorderly conduct.
He was sentenced to thirty days in the
county jail and fined $1,100.
On appeal, appellant contends that
the court erred by ordering him to submit to a blood test to
determine if he was positive for the human immunodeficiency virus
(HIV) and by requiring him to pay the fees for the test.
disagree.
Hence, we affirm.
We
On August 5, 1997, intoxicated with drugs and alcohol,
appellant struggled with two police officers and bit one of the
officers during the altercation.
On September 25, 1997,
appellant was charged with two counts of assault in the third
degree, two counts of criminal mischief in the third degree, and
one count of disorderly conduct.
Prior to trial the Commonwealth filed a motion pursuant
to KRS 438.250 to compel appellant to undergo an HIV blood test.
The court entered an order after a pretrial hearing directing
that appellant submit to the test at his expense and that the
results thereof be disclosed only to the court.
Further, the
court directed that the “[t]est results shall not be used for any
other purpose.
KRS 438.250(2).”
After a jury trial, appellant
was found guilty of two counts of assault in the fourth degree,
two counts of criminal mischief in the third degree, and one
count of disorderly conduct.
He was sentenced to thirty days in
the county jail and fined $1,100.
This appeal followed.
Appellant first contends that the court erred by
ordering him to submit to an HIV blood test and to pay the cost
of the test.
We disagree.
Most of the arguments advanced on appeal regarding this
issue were not presented to the trial court and consequently were
not preserved for appellate review.
Further, appellant failed at
the trial level to notify the attorney general that he was
challenging the constitutionality of KRS 438.250; therefore, any
contentions in that vein are also not preserved for review.
-2-
See
Jacobs v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 947 S.W.2d 416 (1997).
However, appellant did preserve for review an issue as to whether
the Commonwealth’s attorney lacked standing to seek a blood test.
Hence, we will address that issue.
KRS 438.250(1) directs that a person charged with a
crime or convicted of a crime “shall be ordered to submit to
testing of the blood for human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)” upon
a crime victim’s or public servant’s exposure to that person’s
blood or body fluids.1
KRS 438.250(3) states that a circuit or
district judge “shall compel the criminal defendant, inmate,
parolee, or probationer to undergo the testing required herein if
he fails or refuses to do so.”
Subsection(4) of the statute
states that
[t]he costs of the testing shall be borne by
the criminal defendant, inmate, parolee, or
probationer unless he is determined unable to
pay for the test by a court of competent
jurisdiction for criminal defendants and
probationers and by the Department of
Corrections pursuant to their indigency
standards for inmates and parolees, in which
case the Commonwealth shall pay for the
testing.
At the outset, we note that it is clear under the
statute that mandatory blood testing can occur only within the
context of a criminal prosecution.
The Commonwealth’s attorney
is responsible for the prosecution of all crimes and violations
of criminal and penal laws falling within the circuit court’s
1
This statute was amended in 1998 to add hepatitis A, B, and
C and tuberculosis as diseases or conditions subject to the
mandatory testing. 1998 Ky. Acts, ch. 606, § 122.
-3-
jurisdiction.
319 (1992).
KRS 15.725; Commonwealth v. Corey, Ky., 826 S.W.2d
Indeed, only “the Commonwealth has a judicially
recognizable interest in the prosecution of criminal cases.”
Schroering v. McKinney, Ky., 906 S.W.2d 349, 350-51 (1995).
In
fact, a crime victim cannot participate as a party in the
proceeding.
Id.
Here, appellant had not undergone a blood test for HIV
at the time the Commonwealth made its motion.
Moreover,
appellant’s biting of the police officer falls within the scope
of KRS 438.250(1) and thus, a blood test for HIV was required.
Given the foregoing, it is clear that the Commonwealth’s attorney
had standing to make such a motion.
To argue otherwise is
specious.
Next, appellant contends that the court abused its
discretion by assessing a $40 public defender user fee and a $750
public defender recoupment fee.
Again, we disagree.
An indigent person under suspicion of or charged with a
serious crime is entitled to be represented by a public defender.
KRS 31.110.
(1)
KRS 31.120 states in pertinent part as follows:
The determination of whether a person
covered by KRS 31.110 is a needy person
shall be deferred no later than his
first appearance in court or in a suit
for payment or reimbursement under KRS
31.150, whichever occurs earlier.
Thereafter, the court concerned shall
determine, with respect to each step in
the proceedings, whether he is a needy
person. However, nothing herein shall
prevent appointment of counsel at the
earliest necessary proceeding at which
the person is entitled to counsel, upon
-4-
declaration by the person that he is
needy under the terms of this chapter.
In that event, the person involved shall
be required to make reimbursement for
the representation involved if he later
is determined not a needy person under
the terms of this chapter. At
arraignment, the court shall conduct a
nonadversarial hearing to determine
whether a person who has requested a
public defender is able to pay a partial
fee.
(2)
. . . In each case, the person . . .
subject to the penalties for perjury,
shall certify by affidavit of indigency
which shall be compiled by the pretrial
release officer, as provided under KRS
Chapter 431 and Supreme Court Rules or
order promulgated pursuant thereto, the
material factors relating to his ability
to pay in the form the Supreme Court
prescribes.
. . . .
(4)
To the extent that a person covered by
KRS 31.110 . . . is able to provide for
an attorney, the other necessary
services and facilities of
representation, and court costs, the
court shall order payment in an amount
determined by the court and may order
that the payment be made in a lump sum
or by installment payments. The
determination shall be made at each
stage of the proceedings.
A nonadversarial hearing is required only at
arraignment “to determine whether a person who has requested a
public defender is able to pay a partial fee.”
KRS 31.120(1).
Subsequent to arraignment, KRS 31.120(4) states that the court
shall determine “at each stage of the proceedings” whether a
person represented by a public defender is able to provide for an
attorney.
Hence, a court’s finding that a defendant is entitled
-5-
to a public defender is subject to modification throughout the
proceedings depending upon a defendant’s financial ability to
provide for an attorney.
The statute clearly recognizes that a
defendant’s ability to provide for an attorney may change during
the criminal proceeding depending upon his or her financial
circumstances and employment opportunities at that time.
Here, the record simply fails to support appellant’s
contention that the court acted arbitrarily by assessing the
disputed fees.
Indeed, appellant was represented by a
privately-retained attorney at his arraignment on October 6,
1997.
Thus, the court clearly was not required to conduct a KRS
31.120(1) nonadversarial hearing at arraignment.
This attorney
subsequently filed a motion in February 1998 seeking permission
to withdraw as appellant’s counsel because he “has failed to
cooperate . . . and has failed to meet his financial obligations
in this matter.”
At that point, even though no affidavit of
indigency was filed in the record, a public defender was
appointed to represent appellant.
Moreover, appellant has never
filed an affidavit of indigency as required by KRS 31.120.
Further, although it is true that the court did not
conduct a separate hearing, appellant was given the opportunity
to adduce evidence as to his financial condition.
He indicated
that although he lacked the ability to pay any fees at that time,
he was planning to work in his parent’s business while seeking
other employment.
In response, the court gave appellant 120 days
from the date of judgment in which to remit the fines and public
-6-
defender fees assessed.
Therefore, appellant has failed to
demonstrate that the court’s assessment of a $40 public defender
user fee and a $750 public defender recoupment fee was arbitrary
in any respect.
The court’s judgment is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Daniel T. Goyette
Jefferson District
Public Defender
A.B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Christopher M. Brown
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
Bruce P. Hackett
Deputy Appellate Jefferson
District Public Defender
Louisville, KY
-7-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.