ROSE MARIE DESANTIS v. DALKON SHIELD CLAIMANTS TRUST
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RENDERED: OCTOBER 22, 1999; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-000928-MR
ROSE MARIE DESANTIS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES M. SHAKE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 82-CI-002387
DALKON SHIELD CLAIMANTS TRUST
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, EMBERTON AND GUIDUGLI, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE: Rose Marie DeSantis (DeSantis) appeals from an
order of the Jefferson Circuit Court entered February 12, 1998,
which enforced the terms of a settlement agreement entered into
between DeSantis and the Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust (the
Trust).
We affirm.
In 1984, DeSantis filed suit against the A.H. Robins
Company, manufacturers of the Dalkon Shield contraceptive device,
alleging that she became sterile after repeated bouts of pelvic
inflammatory disease allegedly caused by the Dalkon Shield.
The
A.H. Robins Company ultimately declared bankruptcy and
established the Trust to handle the mountain of litigation over
the Dalkon Shield.
DeSantis ultimately amended her claim to
substitute the Trust for Robins.
DeSantis was represented by
Attorney James Bryant (Bryant) throughout the course of her
litigation against the Trust.
The relevant facts of this case are undisputed.
On
January 9, 1998, Robert Tucker (Tucker), an attorney for the
Trust, faxed a settlement offer regarding DeSantis’ claim to
Bryant.
The terms of the settlement were set forth as follows:
[T]he Trust review of [DeSantis] medical
records has resulted in a final settlement
offer of $95,999.40. Upon acceptance of this
offer, Ms. DeSantis would be entitled to the
pro rata payment which, as you know, leads to
an additional payment of 85% of the final
settlement offer now, with an anticipated
future payment of 15% of the final settlement
offer. The anticipated payment (with pro
rata) would be $191,998.80.
Bryant telephoned DeSantis early in the morning on
January 10, 1998 and advised her of the Trust’s settlement offer.
DeSantis undeniably told Bryant that she would accept the offer
and Bryant told her that he would inform the Trust of her
acceptance.
Bryant then telephoned Tucker on the same day and
left a voice mail message at 8:50 a.m. stating:
I’m calling in response to your Friday
afternoon fax on Rose Marie DeSantis. I have
talked with Ms. DeSantis and she accepts the
Trust’s revised offer as described in your
fax to me....Ms. DeSantis has accepted the
Trust’s offer.
Bryant left a similar voice mail on the same day with Susan
Wettle, the Trust’s local counsel.
Several hours after her
initial acceptance of the Trust’s settlement offer, DeSantis
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telephoned Bryant and told him that after further consideration
she no longer wished to accept the settlement offer.
The parties appeared before the trial court to discuss
several pre-trial motions on January 12, 1998.
At that time,
counsel for the Trust informed the trial court that a settlement
had been reached over the weekend but that Bryant had just
informed that Trust that DeSantis has changed her mind.
On January 15, 1998, the Trust filed a motion to
enforce the settlement.
Bryant’s response to the Trust’s motion
indicated that the facts as set forth in the Trust’s motion were
correct and that the case law cited by the Trust constituted
controlling authority.
In an order entered January 26, 1998, and
amended February 3, 1998, the trial court granted the Trust’s
motion.
Following entry of the trial court’s amended order,
DeSantis filed a pro se motion to reconsider.
In her motion and
affidavit, DeSantis admitted that: (1) She initially accepted the
offer of settlement; (2) Bryant told her that he would inform the
trust of her acceptance; and (3) she later telephoned Bryant and
told him that she changed her mind.
However, DeSantis raised
numerous arguments as to why the settlement should not be
enforced, namely (1) she did not understand nor did Bryant tell
her that her oral acceptance was irrevocable; (2) she believed
that the settlement would not take effect until reduced to
writing and signed; (3) she suffers from depression, had not
taken her medicine at the time Bryant called her, and acted
“impulsively” in accepting; (4) Bryant did not tell her he would
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immediately notify the Trust of her acceptance; (5) she had not
been informed by Bryant that a trial date had been set for May
12, 1998 and that had she known of the pendency of the trial date
she would not have settled; and (6) Bryant did nothing to
represent her interests in regard to the Trust’s motion to
enforce the settlement.
DeSantis also represented herself at the
hearing on her motion to reconsider.
At the hearing she once
again admitted that she initially accepted that Trust’s offer but
later changed her mind.
In an order entered March 12, 1998, the
trial court dismissed DeSantis’ case with prejudice.
This appeal
followed.
DeSantis first contends that Bryant lacked authority to
settle her claims against the Trust.
She maintains that a lawyer
has no authority to settle absent express authority do so from
the client, and that a client cannot give express authority to
settle unless the attorney explains the matter sufficiently
enough to allow the client to make an informed decision in regard
to settlement.
DeSantis argues that her initial acceptance of
the settlement offer was not an “informed decision” because
Bryant never told her that a verbal consent was binding or of the
pendency of a trial date.
DeSantis is correct in her assertion that an attorney
lacks authority to settle a claim without the consent of the
client.
In Clark v. Burden, Ky., 917 S.W.2d 574 (1996), the
Kentucky Supreme Court put to rest any doubt that express
authority to settle is required, and held that the apparent
authority arising arising from the principal/agent aspect of the
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attorney/client relationship does not in and of itself give the
attorney power to bind a client to a settlement agreement in the
absence of the client’s consent to be so bound.
S.W.2d at 576.
Clark, 917
If there is a question regarding whether express
authority was given, the trial court is given the authority to
“summarily decide the fact.”
Id. at 577.
We will not disturb a
trial court’s finding that express authority to settle was given
as long as that decision is supported by substantial evidence and
no abuse of discretion on behalf of the trial court has occurred.
General Motors Corporation v. Herald, Ky., 833 S.W.2d 804, 806,
(1992).
In this case, the record leaves no doubt that DeSantis
clearly gave Bryant express authority to settle on the day he
informed her of the Trust’s offer.
Upon her acceptance of the
offer, it became binding and enforceable.
DeSantis’ arguments that her acceptance of the
settlement offer should be negated because Bryant allegedly
failed to explain the ramifications of an oral consent to settle
and to inform her of the pendency of a trial date are
unpersuasive.
While DeSantis is correct that SCR 3.130(1.4)(b)
requires an attorney to “explain a matter to the extent
reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed
decisions,”
his alleged failure to do so has no effect on the
validity of her acceptance.
Any relief for an alleged failure on
Bryant’s part to conform to the mandates of SCR 3.130(1.4)(b)
must come from a cause of action against Bryant, not in the
rescinding of the settlement between DeSantis and the Trust.
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DeSantis also argues that the Trust failed to meet its
burden of proving that Bryant had her express authority to settle
and that there was no meeting of the minds between herself and
Bryant as to his authority to settle.
In light of the fact that
DeSantis has admitted to initially accepting the Trust’s
settlement offer, these arguments are without merit.
Finally, DeSantis argues that she never agreed to
settle her claims against the Trust for $191,998.80.
DeSantis
alleges that when Bryant called her on January 10, 1998 to tell
her of the Trust’s settlement offer, he told her that the offer
was for $199,000.
DeSantis argues that because there was no
meeting of the minds regarding the amount of the settlement, her
acceptance should be negated.
In reviewing the record on appeal, we note that this
issue was never raised before the trial court.
In general, this
Court is not permitted to review issues that were not argued
before the trial court.
Regional Jail Authority v. Tackett, Ky.,
770 S.W.2d 225, 228 (1989).
Because DeSantis failed to raise
this issue below, it would not be proper for us to rule on it
now.
Even if this issue was properly before us, we do not
believe that it should affect the validity of DeSantis’
acceptance.
If Bryant did, in fact, fail to properly advise
DeSantis of the true amount of the Trust’s settlement offer,
recovery should be directly against Bryant and not against the
Trust.
Having considered the parties’ arguments on appeal, the
order of the Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed.
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ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Susan Jackson Balliet
Louisville, KY
Susan S. Wettle
Louisville, KY
Robert C. Tucker
Cleveland, OH
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