LAWRENCE ELERY v. JUANITA MARTIN
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RENDERED: October 1, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO. 1998-CA-000878-MR
LAWRENCE ELERY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE JERRY J. BOWLES, JUDGE
CIVIL ACTION NO. 97-FC-01467
v.
JUANITA MARTIN
APPELLEE
OPINION AND ORDER
DISMISSING APPEAL
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUDGEL, Chief Judge; HUDDLESTON and KNOPF, Judges.
HUDDLESTON, Judge:
Lawrence Elery appeals from a Jefferson Family
Court order entered on January 16, 1998, which awarded Juanita
Martin child support arrearages and pregnancy and confinement
expenses pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 406.011.
On January 7, 1996, Martin gave birth out of wedlock to
a baby girl.
On February 20, 1997, Martin filed a verified
petition in Jefferson Family Court against Elery for sole custody
of
their
daughter,
adjudication
of
paternity,
child
support,
pregnancy and confinement expenses and attorney fees.
In his
response to the petition, Elery denied paternity of the child and
requested a blood test.
adjudicate paternity.
In April 1997, Martin filed a motion to
To support her motion, Martin presented a
declaration of paternity signed by Elery and the child’s birth
certificate with Elery named as the father.
On August 22, 1997,
Elery was adjudicated to be the father of the child.
In November 1997, the family court held a hearing on the
issues of child support arrearages, pregnancy and confinement
expenses and attorney fees.
On January 16, 1998, the family court
awarded Martin $1,140.75 for child support arrearages, $2,612.50
for lost leave benefits and $520.00 for medical expenses.
then moved to alter, amend or vacate the judgment.
Elery
After the
family court denied Elery’s motion, he appealed to this Court.
The first issue we must address is whether this Court has
jurisdiction to adjudicate Elery’s appeal, which was filed as a
matter
of
Constitution
right
and
pursuant
Section
115
of
the
Kentucky
22A.020.
KRS
to
Section
115
of
the
Kentucky
Constitution, provides, in pertinent part, that "[i]n all cases,
civil and criminal, there shall be allowed as a matter of right at
least one appeal to another court . . . ."
There is no question
that Elery is guaranteed by our constitution at least one appeal to
a court other than the Jefferson Family Court.
raised,
sua
sponte,
is
the
issue
of
whether
What we have
Elery
properly
exercised his constitutional right to an appeal by proceeding
directly to the Court of Appeals from a judgment rendered by the
Jefferson Family Court.
The Jefferson Family Court Project was established in the
early 1990's after a Task Force, appointed by the Legislative
-2-
Research Commission, recommended to the General Assembly and the
Kentucky Supreme Court that a pilot project be undertaken in order
to examine the feasibility of a Family Court or division of court.
Kuprion v. Fitzgerald, Ky., 888 S.W.2d 679, 681 (1994).
Operation
of the Jefferson Family Court Project precipitated the adoption of
the Uniform Rules of Practice of the Jefferson Family Court (JFRP),
pursuant to the Kentucky Supreme Court’s authority to promulgate
rules of practice.
Ky. Const. § 116.
Our query focuses on the two
rules of practice that relate to appeals, JFRP 108 and 109.
JFRP 108
APPEAL FROM CIRCUIT COURT MATTERS
In Family Court matters over which Circuit Court would
otherwise have jurisdiction, any appeal shall proceed by
the Rules of Civil Procedure to the Court of Appeals,
except
that
all
appeals
from
Domestic
Violence
or
Emergency Protective Orders shall proceed to Circuit
Court.
JFRP 109
APPEAL FROM DISTRICT COURT MATTERS
(A) In Domestic Violence cases and other Family Court
matters over which District Court would otherwise have
jurisdiction, any appeal shall proceed by the Rules of
Civil Procedure (or Criminal Procedure in the event of a
delinquency or status action) to Circuit Court.
(B) In the event of such an appeal, the appeal will be
assigned randomly to one of the thirteen divisions of
Circuit Court that are not involved in the Family Court
Project.
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Applying the rules to the case sub judice, we must (1) identify the
family matter or matters Elery has appealed and (2) determine
whether the circuit court or district court would otherwise have
subject matter jurisdiction.
We begin by analyzing the petition filed by Martin in
family court.
for
sole
Martin’s verified petition asked the family court
custody,
adjudication
of
paternity,
award
of
child
support, award of pregnancy and confinement expenses, attorney’s
fees and costs.
Elery characterizes this action as a custody
action which would have otherwise been filed in circuit court and
argues that the case was properly appealed to this Court as a
matter of right pursuant to JFRP 108.
Elery’s argument fails for
the following reasons.
First, Elery mistakenly relies on Sumner v. Roark, Ky.
App., 836 S.W.2d 434 (1992).
In Sumner, and later in
Basham v.
Wilkins, Ky. App., 851 S.W.2d 491 (1993), this Court held that the
circuit court was vested with exclusive jurisdiction over custody
issues.
Subsequently, the General Assembly expanded the district
court’s jurisdiction in KRS 406.051(2) to include custody and
visitation issues in certain circumstances.
314, Section 1.
1996 Ky. Acts Chapter
KRS 406.051(2) now provides that "[t]he District
Court may exercise jurisdiction, concurrent with that of the
Circuit Court, to determine matters of child custody and visitation
in cases where paternity is established as set forth in this
chapter."
amendment.
Elery has failed to recognize the effect of the 1996
In the case sub judice, the record reveals that
paternity was established pursuant to KRS Chapter 406. Contrary to
-4-
Elery’s assertion, a district court could have exercised concurrent
jurisdiction with that of the circuit court and adjudicated this
action.
Elery’s argument also fails because it focuses on family
matters which are not on appeal.
As stated earlier, the first part
of our analysis requires us to identify the family matters on
appeal.
Here,
Elery
appealed
the
family
court
order
which
determined child support arrearages and pregnancy and confinement
expenses.
These obligations are set forth in the Uniform Act on
Paternity.
Under the Act, a mother who supports a child born out
of wedlock can bring an action to establish paternity.
406.021(1).
KRS
Once paternity has been established, the mother may
then seek, in the same action, to enforce the liabilities of the
father.
KRS 406.021(3).
The liabilities of a father include the
reasonable expenses of the mother’s pregnancy and confinement and
the education and necessary support of the child.
KRS 406.011.
The next phase of our analysis requires us to look at
traditional subject matter jurisdiction of the circuit court and
district court to determine which court would otherwise have
jurisdiction over the family matters identified on appeal.
The
relevant jurisdictional statute for the family matters identified
as part of the Uniform Act on Paternity is KRS 406.051.
KRS
406.051(1) provides that the district court has jurisdiction of an
action brought under KRS Chapter 406 and that an appeal may be had
to the circuit court.
As for the jurisdiction of circuit court,
KRS 406.051(1), read in pari materia with KRS 24A.020, also stands
-5-
for
the
proposition
that
the
district
court
has
exclusive
jurisdiction over such actions.1
In conclusion, we have identified the family matters on
appeal and determined that all of the matters would otherwise be
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the district court.
JFRP 109
requires that all appeals from district court matters proceed to
circuit court. Elery has improperly appealed the January 16, 1998,
order to this Court.
Finally, we must review our analysis in the context of
the Jefferson Family Court Project.
One of the main impetuses for
the family court project, as evidenced by its mission statement in
JFRP 102, was to provide a more efficient forum to meet the needs
of parties involved in family law disputes.
To function properly,
it was necessary to grant the family court jurisdiction over
matters which would otherwise be found in both circuit court and
district court.
KRS 23A.110(3).
This effectively enhanced the
family court’s ability to meet the goal of "one judge, one staff,
one family."
that
JFRP
JFRP 102(d).
108
and
109
We recognize, through our analysis,
have
essentially
re-introduced
the
traditional jurisdictional framework that often bifurcated family
matters
on
the
jurisdiction.
consistent
basis
of
circuit
court
and
district
court
Separating family matters along such lines is not
with
the
function
or
goals
associated
with
a
jurisdictionally integrated family court. However, until the rules
1
KRS 24A.020 provides that "[w]hen jurisdiction over
any matter is granted to District Court by statute, such
jurisdiction shall be deemed to be exclusive unless the statute
specifically states that the jurisdiction shall be concurrent."
-6-
of practice provide otherwise, we must continue to apply JFRP 108
and 109 to appeals from Jefferson Family Court.
Based on the foregoing, it is ORDERED that this appeal is
DISMISSED.
ALL CONCUR.
ENTERED: October 1, 1999
/s/ Joseph R. Huddleston
JUDGE, COURT OF APPEALS
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
R. Dale Warren
Louisville Kentucky
Katie Marie Brophy
Louisville, Kentucky
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