TT&M, INC. As Insured by ITT HARTFORD v. ELLERY HERRINGTON; GAP FORK FUELS; ROBERT L. WHITTAKER, Director MARK WEBSTER, Administrative Law Judge; and WORKER'S COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED: September 10, 1999; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO. 1998-CA-000870-WC
TT&M, INC.
As Insured by ITT HARTFORD
v.
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NOS. 96-007021 AND 94-051812
ELLERY HERRINGTON; GAP FORK FUELS;
ROBERT L. WHITTAKER, Director
of SPECIAL FUND;
MARK WEBSTER, Administrative
Law Judge; and
WORKER’S COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GARDNER, HUDDLESTON and JOHNSON, Judges.
HUDDLESTON, Judge:
TT&M, Inc. petitions for review of a decision
of the Workers’ Compensation Board that affirmed an Administrative
Law Judge’s award of benefits to Ellery Herrington for a May 28,
1996, work-related injury.
Upon reviewing TT&M’s arguments, the
record and applicable law, we affirm.
Because the ALJ and the
Board adequately addressed TT&M’s arguments, we shall liberally
quote from their opinions.
Herrington was born on May 6, 1994, and has an eighth
grade education.
Between 1982 and 1994, he worked for at least
four underground coal mines as a roof bolter, scoop operator, shot
firer and mobile drill operator.
On November 23, 1994, Herrington
suffered a back injury while lifting a pump during the course of
his employment with Gap Fork Fuels.
Herrington settled the claim
arising from this injury on October 11, 1995, for $3,000.00 from
Gap Fork and $750.00 from the Special Fund for an occupational
disability of 3.1%.
Drs. Ruben Singayao and Richard Mortara
treated Herrington for the injury.
Herrington began working for TT&M in May 1996.
Because
the company knew about Herrington’s back problems, it assigned him
the job of mobile drill operator which is fairly easy.
On May 29,
1996, Herrington began to experience a worsening of his back pain
while tamping holes, and had to lie down and crawl out of the mine.
Herrington immediately notified the company’s supervisor of the
pain.
At the time of the second injury, Herrington was still
being treated by Dr. Singayao for the first injury.
Herrington
sought treatment from Dr. Singayao on June 6, 1996. The physician
prescribed medication, ordered an MRI, ordered Herrington to not
return to any work, eventually ordered physical therapy, and
referred him to Dr. Mortara. Dr. Singayao also referred Herrington
to Dr. James Templin, who, in turn, referred him to Dr. Robert Lowe
who performed surgery on Herrington on February 19, 1997.
Herrington moved to reopen the claim for his November 23,
1994, injury, and the motion was granted on October 22, 1996.
On
September 23, 1996, Herrington filed an application for adjustment
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of claim for the May 29, 1996, injury.
TT&M alleged that it first
learned of Herrington’s allegation that he had suffered an injury
on September 23, 1996, when Herrington filed the claim.
The ALJ
consolidated both claims.
TT&M asserts that there is not substantial evidence to
support the ALJ’s finding that Herrington suffered a work-related
injury
on
May
Herrington’s
29,
1996.
“inconsistent”
TT&M’s
story
assertion
concerning
is
his
based
May
upon
29,1996,
injury and excerpts from some of Herrington’s medical records.1
The Board, in its opinion affirming the ALJ’s decision,
summarized the medical evidence presented to the ALJ on the issues
of the May 29, 1996, injury and Herrington’s condition following
surgery:
The medical evidence included testimony from Drs.
James Templin, Matt Vuskovich, Robert Goodman, Singayao,
Smith, and Lowe.
1
Dr. Templin found evidence of a grade
spondylolisthesis,
assigned
a
15%
functional
impairment, 3% to the first injury and 12% to the second
injury.
He
was
of
the
1
opinion
that
Herrington’s
TT&M offered, among other excerpts, the following
statement from Dr. Charles Smith, an osteopath, to support this
assertion: “It is difficult to determine how much of this man’s
present problem is a result of his second injury and how much is
a result of the first injury...it would appear that he has had a
worsening of his original injury.” This statement does not
support TT&M’s argument. As to the “inconsistencies” in
Herrington’s statements, the Board noted that Herrington “stated
that while talking to representatives of the employer he
acknowledged he wasn’t sure what was going on and, in response to
a question about whether it related to his old back injury, he
answered in a way that could be considered affirmative.”
-3-
occupational problems would be much greater than a 15%
impairment indicated.
Dr.
Vusovich
magnification.
found
evidence
of
symptom
He initially [examined] Herrington in
July 1995 and found no evidence of impairment at that
time.
He examined Herrington on January 10 1997 and
again found numerous nonorganic physical findings.
He
did not assign an impairment rating.
Dr. Goodman saw Herrington in January 1997 and found
evidence
of
impairment
guidelines.
spondylolisthesis.
based
upon
the
DRE
He
assigned
models
in
an
the
8%
AMA
He was of the opinion that half was due to
the injury at Gap Fork and half to the injury at TT&M.
Half of each of these would be attributable to the
arousal of a pre-existing condition.
At the time he saw
Herrington, which was prior to the fusion surgery, he
would assign a 75 pound lifting limitation and recommend
against repetitive bending, stooping, or twisting.
Dr. Singayao treated Herrington after the November
1994 [injury] and returned him to work in March 1995
without any work restrictions.
Dr. Smith was of the opinion Herrington was totally
and permanently disabled after the surgery.
Dr. Lowe first saw Herrington in December 1996
believing that he had significant problems. He performed
a spinal fusion on February 19, 1997.
By May of 1997, he
indicated the fusion had produced a “reasonably good
-4-
result.”
He
did
assign
a
20%
impairment
apportioned equally between the two injuries.
follow-up
revealed
radiculopathy.
that
stiffness
rating
Continued
continued
as
did
He opined that the fusion apparently was
causing more difficulty than would have been anticipated.
He assigned a 25% impairment rating at the time of his
August examination, 15% of which he attributed to the
initial injury. He did not believe Herrington would have
the capability of returning to any of his prior coal
mining work.
Several issues were raised before the ALJ in the
combination new injury and reopening.
Most of those
issues related to the “second” injury which occurred at
TT&M.
The AlJ did evaluate Herrington’s condition as it
related to a reopening and reached the conclusion that
while
Herrington
settled
for
a
3.1%
occupational
disability, his actual disability at that time was 20%.
He further concluded Herrington had sustained an increase
in his occupational disability to the level of 50%.
Neither of these determinations are at issue on appeal.
The ALJ went on to conclude that there was a workrelated injury in May 1996 and that it constituted a new
work-related harmful change in the organism as that is
defined in [Ky. Rev. Stat.] KRS 342.0011 (1).
He noted
that each of the doctors who offered an opinion on the
issue
attributed
a
portion
of
Herrington’s
disability to each of the two injuries.
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ultimate
He further
believed Herrington’s testimony of the onset of severe
low back pain while tamping the hole.
The function of further review in the Court of Appeals is
to correct the board only where the Court perceives the board has
overlooked or misconstrued controlling statutes or precedent, or
committed an error in assessing the evidence so flagrant as to
cause gross injustice. Western Baptist Hospital v. Kelly, Ky., 827
S.W.2d 685, 687 (1992).
The
medical
evidence
causally
related
condition to the May 1996 work-related injury.
Herrington’s
Since substantial
evidence was presented supporting the finding that Herrington
suffered an injury, as defined under the Workers’ Compensation Act,
this Court may not rule otherwise.
Co., Ky., 474 S.W.2d 367 (1971).
Smyzer v. Goodrich Chemical
That Herrington suffered a work-
related injury on May 29, 1996, is a reasonable inference to be
drawn from the evidence which is the sole province of the fact
finder.
Paramount Foods, Inc. v. Burkhardt, Ky., 695 S.W.2d
(1985).
It is not enough for TT&M to show that the record contains
some
evidence
which
would
support
a
reversal
of
the
Board’s
opinion. McCloud v. Beth-Elkhorn Corp., Ky., 514 S.W.2d 46 (1974).
Inasmuch as the Board’s decision, affirming that of the ALJ’s, is
supported by substantial evidence, the remaining evidence does not
compel a different result.
Special Fund v. Francis, Ky,. 708
S.W.2d 641 (1986).
TT&M asserts that even if Herrington suffered a workrelated injury on May 29, 1996, the finding that he gave due and
-6-
timely notice is not supported by substantial evidence.
The Board
addressed this issue, as follows:
The ALJ further concluded that due and timely notice
had been given under the circumstances . . . .
The ALJ
acknowledged, and we agree, that the information relayed
to the employer immediately after the May 29, 1996 injury
was
somewhat
indefinite.
However,
the
ALJ
further
concluded that at the very latest the employer knew
Herrington was claiming a work-related injury for notice
purposes at the time of the filing of the application for
adjustment of claim.
Due to the complex circumstances
surrounding Herrington’s low back injury, it was not
unreasonable for the ALJ to conclude pursuant to KRS
342.200 that there existed a reasonable excuse for the
delay. The ALJ upon petition for reconsideration by TT&M
addressed this situation in some detail.
Herrington was
candid in his testimony and very credibly testified that
at the time of the onset of the severe low back pain in
May of 1996 he was unsure whether a new injury had
occurred or whether the pain was a mere continuation of
his original problem.
We believe this is just such a
circumstance in which KRS 342.200 should be applied.
It
was not until some time in July of 1996 when he was
advised by a physician that there had [been] a “new”
injury
that
he
became
fully
notification must be given.
aware
that
appropriate
The ALJ concluded that by
the filing of his application the requirements of the
-7-
statute had been met.
This, of course, is a mixed
question of law and fact but we do not believe that it is
appropriate under these circumstances for us to conclude
that as a matter of law due and timely notice had not
been
given.
It
is,
in
our
opinion,
a
reasonable
inference to be drawn from the record that Herrington
himself was unsure as the cause of his condition and
whether it constituted a “new” injury until so apprised
by a physician.
KRS 342.185 provides that “no proceeding under this
chapter for compensation for an injury . . . shall be maintained
unless a notice of the accident shall have been given to the
employer as soon as practicable . . . .”
accident
or
injury
is
given
to
the
Whether notice of
employer
“as
soon
as
practicable” depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case.
Marc Blackburn Brick Co. v. Yates, Ky., 424 S.W.2d 814 (1968).
Further, the notice provision of this section “should be construed
liberally in favor of the employee in order to effectuate the
beneficent purposes of the workers’ compensation law.” Lewallen v.
Peabody Coal Co., Ky., 306 S.W.2d 262 (1957) (the Court stated that
the “three months’ interim between knowledge of the claimant and
his notice to the Company was reasonable notice and ‘as soon as
practicable’ within the spirit of the [Workers’] Compensation
Act”).
Thus, under the circumstances, we perceive no error on the
Board’s part in finding that Herrington gave timely and due notice.
TT&M asserts that it is not liable for more than 25
percent of Herrington’s disability award because Herrington had a
-8-
pre-existing disability which should be excluded from any award
granted;
the
ALJ’s
finding
that
unreasonable
and
unnecessary
surgery totally disabled Herrington; and there is no evidence of
substance to support the Board’s application of Campbell v. Sextet
Mining
Co.,
Ky.,
912
S.W.2d
25
(1990).
The
ALJ
determined
Herrington to be totally disabled. TT&M explains that it should be
responsible for the percentage of disability which would have
resulted from the latter injury or occupational disease had there
been no pre-existing disability, pursuant to KRS 342.120. Pursuant
to the ALJ’s finding that Herrington was rendered totally disabled
as a direct consequence of the surgery Dr. Lowe performed on
February 19, 1997, he apportioned the award as follows:
Pursuant to my finding concerning the existence of
a 1996 injury and the apportionment based on Dr. Lowe, I
find that of the 100% total disability 50% is for the
1994 injury and 50% is for the 1996 injury. As indicated
above, there was already 20% occupational disability for
the first injury.
This means there has been an increase
of 30%. The 30% award against Gap Fork creates a dilemma
of should the award then be limited to the number of
weeks remaining [for] the 425 week period in the earlier
settlement or should this be a lifetime award since
Herrington is now totally disabled and Gap Fork Fuels is
responsible for half of his occupational disability. But
for the latter injury this would not a total [disability]
and it seems unfair to enhance the disability for the
prior award by the disability from the latter award.
-9-
Nevertheless, as I understand Campbell v. Sextet Mining
Co., Ky., 912 S.W.2d 25 (1995), a model of judicial
clarity, I cannot take away the lifetime aspect of
Herrington’s award although I can carve out that part of
the
award
which
would
have
been
[Gap
Fork’s]
responsibility.
I therefore find that Herrington has proved an
increase of occupational disability from 20% (not the bad
deal for 3.1%) to 50%.
As of the date of the second
injury Herrington is totally disabled.
I will make a
permanent partial award against Gap Fork and a lifetime
award against TT&M.
The Board, in affirming the ALJ’s award and in response
to TT&M’s petition for reconsideration on this issue, stated that:
The final issue is whether the ALJ should have
reduced TT&M’s liability based upon a pre-existing 50%
active disability.
The ALJ in attempting to apply
Campbell v. Sextet Mining Co., Ky., 912 S.W.2d 25 (1996)
reduced TT&M’s liability on a monetary basis rather than
a percentage basis.
When questioned about this by
petition for reconsideration, the ALJ further clarified
his opinion.
Therein he stated that Herrington’s total
occupational disability ultimately resulted from the
surgery performed by Dr. Lowe which naturally flowed from
the second injury.
He therefore concluded that the
second injury by itself, even without regard to the first
injury,
was
totally
-10-
occupationally
disabling.
International Harvester v. Poff, Ky., 331 S.W.2d 712
(1959); and Schneider v. Putnam, Ky., 579 S.W.2d 370
(1970.
Therefore, in applying the whole man doctrine,
the ALJ concluded it was inappropriate to reduce the
amount of Herrington’s ultimate occupational disability
by a percentage.
The [Kentucky] Supreme Court has now modified its
holding in Campbell v. Sextet Mining Co. in the claim of
Fleming v. Windchy, Ky., 953 S.W.2d 604 (1997).
In
modifying Campbell, however, the court concluded that in
claims such as the one before us, the employee should
receive the totality of his occupational disability.
When Fleming is considered in light of the ALJ’s conclusion that the latter injury totally disabled Herrington
by itself, we are of the opinion that the ALJ appropriately gave only a monetary credit to the obligation to
pay by TT&M rather than a percentage of disability
offset.
We agree with the Board’s construction of the case law relevant to
this issue.
TT&M argues in conclusion that the ALJ and the Board
misconstrued the holding of Derr Construction Co. v. Bennett, Ky.,
873 S.W.2d 824 (1994), in imposing liability for medical expenses
on TT&M.
Again, we adopt the Board’s response to that argument:
Finally, contrary to TT&M’s urging, we believe that
Derr Construction Co. v. Bennett, Ky., 873 S.W.2d 824
(1994), supports the ALJ’s determination that all medical
-11-
bills after the May 1996 incident, which he deemed
compensable, were the obligation of TT&M.
Although Derr
was a claim involving repetitive trauma, its principal
[sic] is far more reaching. If the subsequent injury, as
here,
is
sufficient
disability,
then
it
to
create
certainly
a
is
total
occupational
sufficient
to
be
considered a superseding and intervening cause giving
rise to the necessity to pay all subsequent medical
bills. The ALJ, in our opinion, based upon what would be
considered substantive and probative evidence, concluded
that the second injury which led to Herrington undergoing
a fusion was the causative element for his ongoing
medical
treatment.
Those
circumstances
create
the
liability for the payment of medical expenses pursuant to
KRS 342.020 and place that liability upon TT&M.
The principle that medical treatment naturally flowing
from a work-related injury is compensable under the Workers’
Compensation
Act
is
followed
in
Kentucky.
In
Elizabethtown
Sportswear v. Stice, Ky. App., 720 S.W.2d 732 (1986), this Court
held that a claim for workers’ compensation benefits can be brought
by the employee to recover for additional disability resulting from
treatment which aggravates a work-related injury.
The Board’s decision is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
-12-
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
ELLERY HERRINGTON:
Kimberly Van Der Heiden
CLARK, WARD & CAVE
Lexington, Kentucky
Robert G. Miller, Jr.
PERRY, PRESTON AND MILLER
Paintsville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE
GAP FORK FUELS:
Jeffrey D. Damron
RILEY, WALTERS & DAMRON, P.S.C.
Prestonsburg, Kentucky
-13-
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