GEORGE A. LYTTLE V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: AUGUST 20, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-000622-MR
GEORGE A. LYTTLE
V.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM KNOX CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LEWIS B. HOPPER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CR-59
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION AFFIRMING
* * * * * * * *
BEFORE:
GUDGEL, Chief Judge; BUCKINGHAM and EMBERTON, Judges.
GUDGEL, CHIEF JUDGE:
This is an appeal from a judgment entered
by the Knox Circuit Court.
Appellant pled guilty to the offenses
of first- and fourth-degree assault.
On appeal, appellant
contends that the court erred by denying his motion for
permission to withdraw his guilty plea.
We disagree.
Hence, we
affirm.
In August 1997 appellant was indicted for the offenses
of first-degree assault, criminal attempt to commit murder,
fourth-degree assault, two counts of first-degree wanton
endangerment and as a persistent felony offender in the second
degree.
The charges stem from an incident on July 15, 1997,
during which appellant assaulted his former wife by repeatedly
striking her with a tobacco knife.
appellant also pushed his daughter.
During the same episode
Pursuant to a plea agreement
with the Commonwealth, appellant filed a motion seeking
permission to enter a plea of guilty but mentally ill to the
charges of first-degree assault and fourth-degree assault.
The
Commonwealth in turn agreed to recommend that appellant receive
concurrent sentences of fourteen years on the first-degree
assault charge, twelve months on the fourth-degree charge and
that the remaining four counts of the indictment be dismissed.
On January 30, 1998, the trial court conducted a
hearing pursuant to Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct.
1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969).
During the hearing, the court first
informed appellant of the penalty ranges for convictions of
first-degree assault and fourth-degree assault.
It then
summarized the plea agreement and informed appellant that if it
elected to reject the Commonwealth’s recommendations, he could
withdraw his guilty plea.
Appellant stated that he understood
the charges and admitted committing the acts underlying the
charges.
The court further explained to appellant the
constitutional rights that he was waiving by pleading guilty.
Appellant equivocated when the court inquired whether
the guilty plea was the result of any threats, promises, or
coercion.
At that point the court commented upon appellant’s
“apparent hesitation,” and again explained to appellant that he
had a right to a trial and a right not to testify against
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himself.
Additionally, the court stated that it was “not a
problem” to reject the plea and to hold a trial.
Appellant then stated that he had been advised by his
attorneys that he could not win at trial.
The trial court
explained to appellant that his attorneys had a duty to represent
him, which duty included an assessment of the outcome of a trial.
The discussion between the trial court, appellant, and his
attorneys continued, with the court reiterating to appellant that
he had the right to have a jury decide his case.
The court also
inquired as to whether it was his choice to plead guilty.
After
a thorough discussion, appellant confirmed for the court that he
wanted to plead guilty.
Thereupon, the court accepted
appellant’s guilty plea.
At his sentencing hearing on February 11, 1998,
appellant orally requested the court to permit him to withdraw
his guilty plea because the underlying facts only gave rise to a
second-degree assault charge.
After the court replayed the
videotape of the earlier Boykin hearing, appellant informed the
court that he “lied” when he stated that he chose to plead
guilty.
The trial court, however, denied appellant’s request to
withdraw his guilty plea and subsequently the Commonwealth made a
motion to sentence appellant as a violent offender.
After
appellant’s former wife, the victim of the first-degree assault,
testified with regard to her injuries, the court sentenced him as
a violent offender.
This appeal followed.
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Appellant contends that the trial court abused its
discretion by denying his request to withdraw his guilty plea
because it was not voluntarily entered.
We disagree.
In cases where the court does not reject the plea
agreement, the decision as to whether to permit a guilty plea to
be withdrawn rests within the sound discretion of the trial
court.
RCr 8.10; Haight v. Commonwealth, Ky., 938 S.W.2d 243
(1996), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 110, 139 L.Ed.2d 63
(1997).
The validity of a guilty plea is determined from a
consideration of the totality of circumstances.
Commonwealth, Ky., 565 S.W.2d 445 (1978).
Kotas v.
Clearly, the trial
court is in the best position to determine whether the guilty
plea is entered intelligently and voluntarily.
Centers v.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 799 S.W.2d 51 (1990).
Moreover, while the trial court must inform a defendant
of the maximum aggregate sentences he or she faces, the court has
no duty to inform a defendant as to his or her parole eligibility
or other sentencing consequences.
Indeed, in Turner v.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 647 S.W.2d 500, 500-501 (1982), we held
as follows:
Boykin does not mandate that a defendant must
be informed of a “right” to parole. This is
especially true since, unlike the right
specified in Boykin, parole is not a
constitutional right. U.S. v. Timmereck, 441
U.S. 780, 99 S.Ct. 2085, 60 L.Ed.2d 634
(1979). Boykin does require a knowing,
voluntary and intelligent waiver of all
important constitutional rights. However, a
knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver
does not necessarily include a requirement
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that the defendant be informed of every
possible consequence and aspect of the guilty
plea. A guilty plea that is brought about by
a person’s own free will is not less valid
because he did not know all possible
consequences of the plea and all possible
alternative courses of action. To require
such would lead to the absurd result that a
person pleading guilty would need a course in
criminal law and penology.
See also Jewell v. Commonwealth, Ky., 725 S.W.2d 593 (1987).
Further, it is well settled that a guilty plea need only
represent a voluntary and intelligent choice among the
alternatives available to the defendant.
North Carolina v.
Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970).
Here, the record clearly shows that appellant’s guilty
plea was a voluntary and intelligent choice among the
alternatives available to him.
Indeed, in his signed motion for
permission to enter a guilty plea, appellant acknowledged, inter
alia, that he understood the charges against him, that he was
waiving his constitutional rights, and that no one had forced or
threatened him to plead guilty.
Moreover, the trial court
conducted a lengthy hearing prior to accepting appellant’s guilty
plea.
At the point that appellant stated that he was advised
that he could not win at trial, the court again further explained
to him that he had the right to a fair trial and that a jury
could decide his case.
After appellant was provided with ample
opportunity to not enter a guilty plea at the hearing, the court
found that the guilty plea was voluntary and intelligent.
Further, although appellant claims on appeal that his documented
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mental illnesses substantiate his claim that his guilty plea was
not voluntary, no question was raised before the trial court
regarding appellant’s competency to enter his guilty plea.
In
any event, the record creates no issue of fact as to appellant’s
competency at the time he entered his guilty plea.
On the
contrary, in our view the record clearly demonstrates that
appellant understood the charges and the consequences of pleading
guilty.
Hence, we conclude that the court did not abuse its
discretion by denying appellant’s request to withdraw his guilty
plea.
Next, appellant contends that the sentence imposed
varied from his plea agreement.
We disagree.
The definition of a “violent offender” in KRS
439.3401(1) includes a person who has pled guilty to a Class B
felony involving serious physical injury to the victim.
Prior to
its amendment effective July 15, 1998, KRS 439.3401(3) stated
that a violent offender must serve at least fifty percent of the
sentence before he or she is eligible for parole.
However, KRS
439.3401 affects only a defendant’s parole eligibility, not the
sentence imposed by the court.
Here, there is no allegation that discussion of
appellant’s parole eligibility was part of the plea agreement
with the Commonwealth.
Moreover, the record establishes that
appellant’s parole eligibility was not taken into account during
plea negotiations.
Moreover, the application of the provisions
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of KRS 439.3401 does not alter the Commonwealth’s recommended
sentence of fourteen years’ imprisonment in any event.
Finally, appellant contends that the sentence imposed
varied from the plea agreement because the indictment and the
plea agreement failed to reflect that the victim suffered serious
physical injury.
We disagree.
True enough, the indictment did not explicitly state
that the victim of the first-degree assault suffered serious
physical injury.
Nevertheless, any issue in this vein was waived
by appellant’s entry of a guilty plea.
See Quarles v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 456 S.W.2d 693 (1970).
Moreover, the
indictment alleged that appellant committed the offense of
first-degree assault by striking the victim with a tobacco knife.
Further, appellant pled guilty to the offense of first-degree
assault which is defined by KRS 508.010(1) as follows:
(a) He intentionally causes serious
physical injury to another person by means of
a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument; or
(b) Under circumstances manifesting
extreme indifference to the value of human
life he wantonly engages in conduct which
creates a grave risk of death to another and
thereby causes serious physical injury to
another person. (Emphasis added.)
By definition, a first-degree assault causes serious physical
injury to the victim.
Thus, appellant obviously knew that the
offense to which he was pleading guilty involved serious physical
injury.
Thus, there is no basis for concluding that the sentence
imposed varied from the plea agreement.
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The court’s judgment is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Kim Brooks
Covington, KY
A.B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Christopher M. Brown
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
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