KEITH JONES AND MILLIE JONES v. WILLARD MCKENZIE AND BRENDA MCKENZIE
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RENDERED:
September 3, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-000582-MR
KEITH JONES AND
MILLIE JONES
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM FLOYD CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DANNY P. CAUDILL, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 95-CI-0245
WILLARD MCKENZIE AND
BRENDA MCKENZIE
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JOHNSON, KNOX AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE: Keith Jones and Millie Jones (the Joneses) appeal
from the summary judgment of the Floyd Circuit Court entered on
February 9, 1998, that declared Willard McKenzie and Brenda
McKenzie (the McKenzies)the owners of a parcel of real property.
We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
On January 23, 1976, the McKenzies purchased a tract of
residential property in a subdivision in Floyd County. The
Joneses obtained possession of an adjoining tract of property
from James and Fannie Goble by land contract in 1992 and by deed
in 1994.
The McKenzies and the Joneses maintained their personal
residences on their respective properties.
At some point, the
exact time of which is in dispute, the McKenzies built a fence
along the line that they allege is the correct property boundary.
On September 10, 1993, a lawyer for the Joneses wrote a letter to
the McKenzies claiming that this fence was approximately eight to
ten feet over the boundary line between the two properties and
was located on the Joneses’ property.
The parties are in
agreement that this letter served to interrupt any period of
adverse possession by the McKenzies.
On March 31, 1995, the Joneses filed a complaint in
Floyd Circuit Court claiming that the encroachment on their
property by the McKenzies “constitute[d] a trespass upon the
property of the [Joneses] by the [McKenzies], and such
encroachment interferes with the enjoyment and use by the
[Joneses] of their property.”
In the complaint, the Joneses
asked the trial court to establish the correct boundary line
between the properties.
On September 7, 1995, the McKenzies
answered the complaint by claiming they owned the disputed
property by adverse possession. The Joneses moved the trial court
for a bench trial.
The McKenzies filed an amended answer on July
1, 1996, claiming that the Joneses had trespassed on their
property by damaging a chain link fence, storage building and
garden owned by them, and also claiming, in the alternative to
having ownership of the property by adverse possession, that they
held an easement by prescription.
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On August 28, 1996, the Joneses filed a motion for
summary judgment which was supported by a survey purporting to
show an encroachment by the McKenzies.
The McKenzies responded
on September 3, 1996, with their own motion for summary judgment
claiming adverse possession of the property pursuant to an
affidavit stating that the fence was built in 1977.
On January
7, 1997, the McKenzies filed another motion for summary judgment
claiming that the fence was evidence of their “claim of ownership
to the property and continued use of same” since taking title to
it in 1976.
On January 16, 1998, the Joneses filed a response to
the motion for summary judgment and a counter-motion for summary
judgment.
The Joneses claimed that the fence was not built until
at least 1980, and accordingly, that the requisite 15-year period
for adverse possession could not have run from 1980 to 1993.
In
support of their position, the Joneses filed affidavits from four
people.
On January 29, 1998, the Joneses filed a supplement to
their motion for summary judgment in which they challenged the
deposition testimony of Quentin Castle who constructed the fence.
On February 9, 1998, the trial court entered summary
judgment pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 56 in
favor of the McKenzies, stating, in pertinent part, as follows:
That since January 23, 1976, under a claim of
right and under color of title, the
Defendants, Willard McKenzie and Brenda
McKenzie, his wife, have been in actual,
exclusive, continuous, open and notorious
possession of their real property, which
extends to the location of a chain link fence
erected by Quentin Castle of Castle Fencing
Company.
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This appeal followed.
The Joneses make the following three arguments: (1) “entry
of a summary judgment was not appropriate given the conflicting
evidence presented in the motions and responses”; (2) “the
court’s findings regarding the beginning date of the [McKenzies’]
possession and the description of the boundary are clearly
erroneous and the judgment is not supported by substantial
evidence”; and (3) “the clear weight of the evidence compels that
judgment in favor of [the Joneses] be entered.”
While it is
obvious that the Joneses’ arguments are inconsistent, they are
permitted to argue in the alternative.
It has been noted by our Supreme Court in Commonwealth
v. Thomas Heavy Hauling, Inc., Ky., 889 S.W.2d 807, 808-09
(1994), that “[t]he filings of cross-motions for summary judgment
do not always mean that the parties have consented to a
resolution of the case on the existing record; nor is the trial
court necessarily at liberty to treat the case as if it were
submitted for a final resolution on a stipulated record.”
While
the Supreme Court in Thomas Heavy Hauling, concluded “that the
parties herein consented to a resolution on the existing record,”
in the case sub judice, we cannot so conclude.
Furthermore,
while the trial court in the case sub judice also “made specific
findings of fact and set forth its conclusions of law,” the trial
court clearly stated that its judgment was being entered
“pursuant to Civil Rule 56 of the Kentucky Rules of Civil
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Procedure”.
Thus, we will review this judgment as a summary
judgment, with our standard of review being,
whether the trial court correctly found that
there were no genuine issues as to any
material fact and that the moving party was
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 56.03.
There is no requirement that the appellate
court defer to the trial court since factual
findings are not at issue. Goldsmith v.
Allied Building Components, Inc., Ky., 833
S.W.2d 378, 381 (1992). “The record must be
viewed in a light most favorable to the party
opposing the motion for summary judgment and
all doubts are to be resolved in his favor.”
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center,
Ky., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (1991). Summary
“judgment is only proper where the movant
shows that the adverse party could not
prevail under any circumstances.” Steelvest,
807 S.W.2d at 480, citing Paintsville
Hospital Co. v. Rose, Ky., 683 S.W.2d 255
(1985). Consequently, summary judgment must
be granted “[o]nly when it appears impossible
for the nonmoving party to produce evidence
at trial warranting a judgment in his favor
...” Huddleston v. Hughes, Ky.App., 843
S.W.2d 901, 903 (1992), citing Steelvest,
supra, (citations omitted).
Scifres v. Kraft, Ky.App., 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (1996).
The case sub judice is similar to Watts v. Carrs Fork
Coal Co., Ky., 275 S.W.2d 431, 432 (1955).
The McKenzies “not
only failed to sustain the burden of establishing that there was
no genuine issue as to any material facts, but [their] denial of
[the Joneses’] statements . . . created a material factual
issue.”
Id.
Furthermore, even “[u]ndisputed facts will not
support a summary judgment if contrary inferences may be drawn
therefrom.”
Roberts v. Davis, Ky., 422 S.W.2d 890, 894
(1967)(citation omitted).
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We will now review the essential factual findings to
determine whether there is a genuine issue as to any material
fact.
The trial court, in its findings of fact, stated as
follows: “That since January 23, 1976, under a claim of right and
under color of title, [the McKenzies], have been in actual,
exclusive, and continuous, open and notorious possession of their
real property, which extends to the location of a chain link
fence erected by Quentin Castle of the Castle Fencing Company.”
We have found no facts in the record to support this finding, and
the McKenzies in their brief have not directed us to where any
such facts can be found in the record.
We believe the above-
quoted “finding” in actuality is a conclusion of law, or at a
minimum a mixed finding of fact and conclusion of law.
Had there
been unrefuted evidence of actual, exclusive, and continuous,
open and notorious possession of the property since January 23,
1976, then summary judgment would have been proper.
However, we
find nothing in the record to support this “finding”, and instead
find many material facts that are in dispute.
If the period of adverse possession ended on September
10, 1993, which was the date of the letter from the Joneses’
attorney to the McKenzies, then to encompass the required 15
years the possession had to begin prior to September 10, 1978.
Thus, the critical time period that we must review is between
January 23, 1976, (the date the McKenzies took possession of the
property) and September 10, 1978, (the date of the letter from
the Joneses’ attorney to the McKenzies).
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The McKenzies presented the following evidence
concerning their possession of the property:
(1) An affidavit from Paris Goble
(Goble), the prior owner of the Joneses’
property, wherein Goble stated that the
location of the fence was determined by “mere
guess”, and that the parties agreed that if
it was ever found to be an encroachment on
one party by the other, the fence would be
moved. Goble also stated that the reason the
fence was constructed was because his greatgranddaughter Jennifer Lilly (Lilly) had been
injured on a lawn mower at the McKenzies’
house and the fence was built to separate the
properties. Goble stated that he had not
given any of his property to any member of
his family, nor had he conveyed the disputed
property by deed to the McKenzies. Rather, he
stated that he merely had allowed family
members who lived around him to use his
property for gardens, raising cattle and
“ever day [sic] use”.1
(2) An affidavit and deposition from
Quentin Castle (Castle) wherein he stated
that he had built the fence in 1977. A
deposition of Castle wherein he testified
that he remembered building the fence in
question in 1977 because he had gone through
a “bitter divorce” in 1976, and that he had
met Brenda McKenzie through a “lady friend”
that he met after his divorce.
On the other hand, the Joneses’ presented evidence to
support their claim of possession as follows:
(1) A survey report that purportedly
showed that the McKenzies were encroaching on
the Joneses’ property by ten feet.
(2) Affidavits from four people who
claimed that the fence in question was not
constructed until at least 1980 or 1981.
1
The Goble affidavit was somewhat confusing and
inconsistent. In fact, the Joneses also relied in part upon this
same affidavit.
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(3) A copy of Castle’s divorce decree
entered on August 4, 1978, to support their
argument that if Castle had built the fence
the year after his divorce, then it would
have been built in 1979, not 1977, as Castle
had claimed.
(4) While the McKenzies had admitted
that the precipitating event for the erection
of the fence was the injury to Lilly by a
lawnmower, they argued that the injury
occurred in 1977. The Joneses, on the other
hand, introduced a medical record from
Highlands Regional Medical Center showing
treatment of Lilly for a then “ten day” old
“lawn mower accident” on June 23, 1979.
In their pleadings, the McKenzies’ have consistently
claimed to possess the property in question since taking title in
1976.
In a pro se answer that Brenda McKenzie filed with the
trial court in April 1995, she stated that the fence was erected
on “the line established when we built our house through
[Farmer’s Home Administration].”
In a memorandum, the McKenzies
argued that they and their grantors identified the boundary line
when the conveyance was made to them in 1976, and that the fence
was erected one year later.
Castle, in his deposition, stated
that he erected the fence “running along where that there was
small survey stakes a running.”
However, Castle failed to
identify when and by whom the stakes were put in place.
These
references by the McKenzies to the boundary line being
established on the date they originally took possession of the
property in 1976 are not supported by any testimony and are
refuted by the Joneses, and thus, at issue.
The date of the construction of the fence is material
if the fence is determined to be the initial manifestation of
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adverse possession; and as set out above, there is a genuine
issue of material fact as to when the fence was constructed.
Accordingly, since there are genuine issues of material fact, we
reverse the judgment of the Floyd Circuit Court and remand this
matter for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Hon. C. Thomas Anderson
Prestonburg, KY
Hon. Larry Brown
Prestonburg, KY
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