CHESTER HOWARD v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: July 23, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-000541-MR
CHESTER HOWARD
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM OHIO CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE RONNIE C. DORTCH, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CR-00149
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUDGEL, CHIEF JUDGE; KNOX, AND MCANULTY, JUDGES.
KNOX, JUDGE:
of the
Chester Howard (Howard) brings this direct appeal
Ohio Circuit Court’s judgment sentencing him to serve
three years after being convicted of wanton endangerment in the
first degree.
After reviewing the record and the arguments of
counsel, we affirm.
On November 26, 1997, Howard was involved in an
altercation with Bradley Hall.
During the incident, Howard shot
at Hall with a handgun but failed to hit him.
incident, Howard was a 15-year-old juvenile.
At the time of the
Subsequently,
Howard was transferred from district court to circuit court for
prosecution as an adult.
See KRS 635.020.
In December 1997, the
Ohio County Grand Jury indicted Howard on one felony count of
wanton endangerment in the first degree (KRS 508.060).
Following
a one-day trial on February 18, 1998, a jury convicted Howard of
the charge and recommended a sentence of three years.
At that
time, the trial court found Howard guilty of wanton endangerment
in the first degree and postponed sentencing pending the
preparation of a Presentence Investigation Report (PSI).
On February 27, 1998, the trial court conducted a
sentencing hearing.
The court allowed Howard to challenge the
information contained in the PSI, and asked him if he had
anything to say before sentence was rendered.
The trial judge
also asked the prosecuting attorney for his recommendation on
sentencing, to which the Commonwealth’s Attorney responded that
he opposed probation.
The judge then stated that he was denying
probation, and ordered Howard to serve a three-year sentence for
wanton endangerment in the first degree.
At the hearing, the
judge informed Howard that if he was still serving his sentence
at the time he turned 18 years old, the court would conduct
another hearing to consider whether to probate him or order his
transfer to an adult prison facility for continued service of his
sentence.
Howard has appealed the trial court’s sentencing
order.
Howard argues the trial court erred by allegedly
holding that he was ineligible for probation.
He points to the
trial court’s formal sentencing order, which states that the
court found Howard “not eligible for probation.”
Howard suggests
that the trial judge may have believed Howard was not eligible
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for probation based on this Court’s en banc decision in Britt v.
Commonwealth, which was decided prior to Howard’s sentencing and
was subsequently reversed by the Kentucky Supreme Court after
Howard was sentenced.
147 (1998).
See Britt v. Commonwealth, Ky., 965 S.W.2d
Howard maintains that the trial court erroneously
denied him an opportunity to be considered for probation as
provided by statute.
See KRS 533.010.
Howard admits that he
failed to raise this issue before the trial court; and, therefore
asks us to review the trial court’s action under RCr 10.26, the
substantial or palpable error rule.
Based on a review of the record, we believe that
Howard’s position is without merit.
At the end of the trial, the
judge told Howard that he was required to consider probation.
He
said that generally he treated persons convicted of offenses
involving a firearm very strictly and that he had never
previously probated a defendant convicted of such an offense.
The judge, however, stated that he had not prejudged Howard on
the issue of probation, and that he would fully consider that
issue at the sentencing hearing.
In addition, at the sentencing
hearing the court provided Howard an opportunity to review and
controvert the information in the PSI.
After Howard challenged
one statement in the PSI, the court asked the prosecutor for his
sentencing recommendation.
The prosecutor opposed probation.
The trial judge then stated:
Mr. Howard is not going to be probated.
Mr. Howard was found guilty by a jury of
having fired a gun at another individual, and
if you fire guns or use guns in Ohio County
and a jury convicts you, you are not going to
be probated, Mr. Howard. It is that simple,
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neither you nor anyone else.
hereby denied.
So probation is
The actions and statements of the trial judge at both
the trial and the sentencing hearing clearly show that he
believed Howard could have been probated.
Neither the trial
judge, nor the parties, ever stated that Howard was statutorily
ineligible for probation.
The judge’s comments indicate that he
had reviewed the PSI and denied probation because of the
seriousness of the offense, rather than an erroneous belief that
Howard was ineligible for probation as a matter of law.
See KRS
533.010(2).
RCr 10.26 requires the complainant to demonstrate “a
palpable error which affects the substantial rights of a party
... and appropriate relief may be granted upon a determination
that manifest injustice has resulted from the error.”
A palpable
error involves an error that seriously affects the fairness,
integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.
Brock v. Commonwealth, Ky., 947 S.W.2d 24, 28 (1997).
See
Given the
fact that the record demonstrates that the trial judge did
consider Howard for probation, he has failed to demonstrate any
error affecting his substantial rights.
Finally, we note that Howard’s reliance on Britt v.
Commonwealth, supra, is misplaced.
In Britt, the Kentucky
Supreme Court held that a juvenile defendant may take advantage
of the ameliorative provisions of the Juvenile Code, KRS 640.040
et seq., including exemption from the limitations on probation,
even though he is tried as an adult on a felony offense in
circuit court.
The Court held that Britt was eligible for
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probation upon conviction for robbery under KRS 365.020(4), even
though KRS 533.060(1) prohibited probation for adult offenders
convicted of robbery involving a firearm.
In our situation, Howard was convicted of wanton
endangerment in the first degree, a Class D felony, and KRS
533.060(1) does not prohibit probation upon conviction of this
offense, even for adult offenders.
Thus, Howard’s speculative
argument that the trial court may have thought the Court of
Appeals’ decision in Britt dictated that Howard be considered
ineligible for probation is based on an erroneous reading of
Britt.
Secondly, as the Supreme Court noted in its opinion in
Britt, the Juvenile Code was amended in 1996 to make every
juvenile transferred to circuit court pursuant to KRS 635.020(4)
(involving firearm offenses) after July 15, 1997, subject to the
exemption on the limitations on probation.
Britt is
distinguishable from the present situation in that Howard would
have been eligible for probation under either KRS 533.060(1) or
the 1996 amendments to the Juvenile Code.
Howard has presented no clear evidence that the trial
court ever believed the Court of Appeals’ opinion in Britt
affected or influenced his decision on probation.
On the
contrary, as discussed above, the record indicates that the trial
judge believed Howard was subject to consideration for probation
and denied probation on the merits.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment and
sentence of the Ohio Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Mark Wettle
Louisville, Kentucky
A. B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Gregory C. Fuchs
Asst. Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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