CLARK J. GROSS v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: October 1, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-000462-MR
CLARK J. GROSS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN R. ADAMS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 91-CR-0789
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, COMBS and McANULTY, JUDGES.
McANULTY, JUDGE: This is an appeal from the trial court’s order
denying Appellant’s second motion for shock probation.
The
Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, on the ground
that the motion for shock probation was not timely filed.
Said
motion was passed to the panel for a decision upon the merits.
On appeal, the Commonwealth further asserts that Appellant is
entitled to file only one motion for shock probation and his
failure to appeal the denial of the first motion is fatal.
We
find that Appellant’s motion for shock probation was timely filed
and that KRS 439.265 entitles Appellant to file successive
motions.
We further find that under the current state of the
law, Appellant is permitted to be considered for shock probation
and that the trial court erred in concluding otherwise.
The procedural history in this case is extensive and
must be discussed in order to assess the timeliness of
Appellant’s motion for shock probation.
Appellant Clark Gross
(“Gross”) was convicted by a jury of First Degree Rape and Second
Degree Burglary and sentenced to a total of thirteen years by a
Judgment entered March 9, 1992.
Gross appealed on March 13, 1992
and his conviction was affirmed by a panel of this Court in a
decision made final on December 15, 1993.
The Supreme Court
denied discretionary review.
During the pendency of the direct appeal, Gross moved
for modification of sentence.
The trial court denied the motion
on April 22, 1992, refusing to invade the province of the jury.
Once the Supreme Court denied discretionary review of the direct
appeal, Gross again moved for modification of sentence on
December 22, 1993, raising for the first time that the trial
court failed to consider him as a candidate for probation when he
was sentenced in 1992.
In support of his motion, Gross pointed
to a discrepancy between two separate reports prepared by the
Department of Probation and Parole.
The first presentence
investigation report, dated February 26, 1992, indicated that
First Degree Rape was not a probatable offense.
However, the
updated presentence/postsentence investigation report stated that
Gross was eligible for probation under KRS 532.045.
Gross
asserted that the latter analysis of the law was correct and that
he should have been considered for probation when originally
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sentenced.
The trial court agreed and entered an order modifying
the original sentence and granting probation conditioned, among
other things, that Gross serve six months in the Fayette County
Detention Center.
The Commonwealth appealed the modification and grant of
probation, asserting the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction to
amend the sentence under CR 59.05.
A panel of this Court
affirmed the trial court, finding that the trial court had
jurisdiction pursuant to CR 60.02(a) to correct a mistake of law
regarding Gross’s eligibility for probation.
The opinion further
concluded that the rape charge for which Gross was convicted was
a probatable offense in that it did not involve a minor.
The Supreme Court held that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction and reversed the judgment of this Court and remanded
the matter to the Fayette Circuit Court for entry of order
reinstating the original judgment.
Commonwealth v. Gross, Ky.,
936 S.W.2d 85 (1996), r’hg denied January 30, 1997.
The Supreme
Court did not address the question of Gross’s eligibility for
probation.
Thereafter, on February 3, 1997, the trial court
ordered Gross to report to the Fayette County Detention Center on
February 7, 1997, “to begin service of the previously imposed
sentence.”
Meanwhile, because Gross had complied with the
conditions of his probation and had served six months in the
county detention center before the Supreme Court held that the
court lacked jurisdiction to amend the judgment, the court
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credited Gross with 180 days of jail time served in an order
dated February 6, 1997.
On March 20, 1997, Gross filed a motion for shock
probation.
The trial court summarily denied the motion in an
order dated July 29, 1997.
On August 1, 1997, Gross filed a
motion styled as a Renewed Motion for Shock Probation.
Once
again, the trial court denied the motion without discussion in an
order dated October 30, 1997.
As a result, Gross subsequently
moved for findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the
trial court’s denial of shock probation.
In an opinion and order dated February 11, 1998, the
trial court considered Gross’s eligibility for shock probation
and concluded that he was not eligible.
The trial court noted
that because Gross was convicted of rape, he is classified as a
“violent offender” under KRS 439.3401(1).
The court further
observed that a violent offender shall not be released on parole
until he has served at least eighty-five percent (85%) of the
sentence imposed.
KRS 439.3401(3).
In addition, the court
stated that it had previously concluded that because the statute
did not mention probation, that probation was not precluded.
The
court mentioned that this Court had agreed that Gross was
eligible for probation but that the Supreme Court had not ruled
on this issue, reversing based on the lack of jurisdiction.
In
light of the absence of an express ruling by the Supreme Court,
the trial court declined to find that Gross is eligible for shock
probation
This appeal followed.
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In order to succeed on appeal, Gross has several
hurdles to overcome.
Firstly, he must show that his motion for
shock probation was timely filed.
Secondly, he must establish
that the statute permits the filing of successive motions.
Thirdly, he must demonstrate that he is eligible, as a violent
offender, for shock probation.
As previously mentioned, the Commonwealth has filed a
motion to dismiss this appeal which was passed to a decision on
the merits.
The crux of the Commonwealth’s argument in the
motion to dismiss is that because Gross had served and was
credited with 180 days jail time before he filed either motion
for shock probation, his motions were untimely and he is
precluded from appealing.
KRS 439.265 establishes the availability of shock
probation to those serving time on a felony conviction.
statute provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
(1) Subject to the provisions of KRS Chapter
439 and Chapters 500 to 534, any Circuit
Court may, upon motion of the defendant made
not earlier than thirty (30) days nor later
than one hundred eighty (180) days after the
defendant has been incarcerated in a county
jail following his conviction and sentencing
pending delivery to the institution to which
he has been sentenced, or delivered to the
keeper of the institution to which he has
been sentenced, suspend the further execution
of the sentence and place the defendant on
probation upon terms the court determines.
Time spent on any form of release following
conviction shall not count toward time
required under this section.
(2) The court shall consider any motion
filed in accordance with subsection (1) of
this section within sixty (60) days of the
filing date of that motion, and shall enter
its ruling within ten (10) days after
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That
considering the motion. The defendant may,
in the discretion of the trial court, have
the right to a hearing on any motion he may
file, or have filed for him, that would
suspend further execution of sentence. Any
court order granting or denying a motion to
suspend further execution of sentence is not
reviewable.1
In essence, this statute creates a narrow window of opportunity
in which a defendant may file for shock probation, after 30 days
served but before 180 days served.
This window of opportunity
has been strictly enforced by the courts.
Commonwealth ex rel.
Mulloy v. Meade, Ky. App. 554 S.W.2d 399, 401 (1977);
Commonwealth ex rel. Hancock v. Melton, Ky., 510 S.W.2d 250, 252
(1974).
However, this is not a simple case of the Defendant
being sentenced, starting to serve his time and then merely
resting on his laurels and failing to timely file the motion.
Rather, this case has gone through two appeals processes and the
defendant served his 180 days pursuant to a sentence which was
valid and in effect until the Supreme Court held otherwise.
As
the Commonwealth had appealed the amended sentence which was
favorable to the defendant, he had no impetus to move for shock
probation.
Although not precisely on point, the reasoning in
Terhune v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 907 S.W.2d 779 (1995) is
1
The provision that any court order granting or denying a
motion for shock probation is not reviewable refers only to a
review on the merits and does not deprive the appellate court of
its authority to determine whether an order was within the
jurisdiction of the circuit court. Terhune v. Commonwealth,
Ky.App., 907 S.W.2d 779, 782 (1995), citing Commonwealth ex rel.
Hancock v. Melton, Ky., 510 S.W.2d 250, 252 (1974).
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instructive.
In Terhune, the defendant was sentenced under one
indictment to 13 years and was then sentenced under another
indictment to 10 years, to be served consecutively with the 13
year sentence.
The defendant timely filed a motion for shock
probation on his 13-year sentence.
motion.
The trial court denied the
The defendant then moved for shock probation on his 10-
year sentence.
The trial court denied the motion as untimely,
relying on the fact that defendant had not begun to serve the ten
year sentence because it was to be served after the 13-year
sentence ended.
A panel of this Court held that the defendant’s
motion in the 10-year sentence was timely filed, as he filed the
motion more than 30 days but less than 180 days after he had been
“delivered to the keeper of the institution to which he had been
sentenced.”
In so holding, this Court stated that “[t]he
legislature has chosen not to deny a defendant consideration of
shock probation on a second or consecutive sentence” and that the
statute “places no qualifications on whether the sentence was a
subsequent sentence.”
Terhune at 782.
In the case sub judice, the defendant served time under
a sentence which was later invalidated by the Supreme Court after
the Commonwealth appealed.
We believe that the order of the
trial court reinstating the original sentence was, for the
purposes of KRS 439.265, a new sentence.
Therefore, Gross had to
file a motion for shock probation anywhere from 30 to 180 days
following February 7, 1997.
filed.
As such, both motions were timely
To hold otherwise would, in effect, allow the
Commonwealth to thwart a defendant’s right to so move by
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successfully appealing a sentence which is favorable to the
defendant.
Having so determined and Gross having cleared the first
hurdle, we move to the next hurdle.
We must address the question
of whether KRS 439.265 entitles a defendant to file more than one
motion for shock probation.
impression.
This appears to be a case of first
We conclude that the language of the statute, in
providing a particular time period for the purposes of filing the
motion and in neglecting to expressly limit the number of
motions, allows a defendant to file successive motions as long as
they are timely.
In arguing that Gross was not entitled to appeal from a
second motion for shock probation when he did not appeal from the
denial of the first motion, the Commonwealth cites Lycans v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 511 S.W.2d 233 (1974).
Lycans involved an
inmate who filed an RCr 11.42 motion, which was denied and the
inmate attempted to appeal but failed to properly file a notice
of appeal and the appeal was dismissed.
The inmate then filed a
second 11.42 motion which was likewise denied.
The inmate
correctly filed the notice of appeal from the second motion but
the court affirmed the trial court.
In so doing the court held
that “when a prisoner fails to appeal from an order overruling
his motion to vacate judgment or when his appeal is not perfected
or is dismissed, he should not be permitted to file a subsequent
motion to vacate”, reasoning that “[i]f such a procedure were
allowed there would be no end to the successive applications for
post-conviction relief.”
Lycans at 233.
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We are of the opinion that the same reasoning does not
apply to motions for shock probation.
An inmate is specifically
limited to one RCr 11.42 motion by subsection (3) of that rule.
There is no such limitation stated in KRS 439.265.
Rather, we believe that by creating the window of
opportunity in which a defendant is permitted to file a motion
for shock probation the legislature intended to allow multiple
motions.
It is reasonable to assume that the sentencing court
may not consider a defendant a good candidate for shock probation
after only serving 30 days of his sentence but the same defendant
may prove to be a better candidate after serving additional time.
Being able to entertain successive motions for shock probation
during the period prescribed by the statute affords the court
this needed flexibility.
Having determined that Gross was permitted to file a
second motion for shock probation and therefore appeal from the
denial of the motion, we now turn to the question of whether
Gross, as a violent offender, is eligible for shock probation.
At the time that the trial court entered its ruling, on February
11, 1998, it stated that this issue had not been addressed by the
Supreme Court.
Therefore, the court expressly declined to
consider Gross as a candidate.
However, the trial court
overlooked the opinion of this court which ruled that the violent
offender statute, which limits the parole by the executive
branch, does not similarly limit the judicial branch’s
consideration of probation.
Mullins v. Commonwealth, Ky. App.,
956 S.W.2d 222, 223 (1997).
It is therefore clear that the trial
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court erred in determining that it was not permitted to consider
Gross for shock probation.
Accordingly, the decision of the trial court is vacated
and remanded for consideration of Gross as a candidate for shock
probation.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
William E. Johnson
Frankfort, KY
A.B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Anita M. Britton
Lexington, KY
David A. Smith
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLANT:
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE:
William E. Johnson
Frankfort, KY
David A. Smith
Frankfort, KY
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