MICHAEL N. BALDRIDGE v. JILL LAVERNE BALDRIDGE
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RENDERED: JULY 9, 1999; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-000458-MR
MICHAEL N. BALDRIDGE
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BOYD CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE KELLEY ASBURY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CI-00554
v.
JILL LAVERNE BALDRIDGE
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
EMBERTON, GUIDUGLI, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
SCHRODER, JUDGE:
This is an appeal from those portions of a
decree of dissolution which awarded appellee maintenance and
found appellant to be in arrears in the payment of temporary
maintenance.
Upon reviewing appellant’s arguments in light of
the record herein and the applicable law, we affirm.
Appellant, Michael Baldridge, and appellee, Jill
Baldridge, were married in 1985.
Two children were born of the
marriage, Tyler, who was eleven years old at the time of the
decree, and Christina, who was five years of age at the time.
Michael filed a petition for dissolution on June 5, 1997.
At the
time of the decree, Michael was 42 years of age and earned
approximately $45,000 a year.
Jill was 30 years old and had not
been employed for almost eight years.
During that time, she
stayed home to raise the parties’ children.
education beyond high school.
Jill has no
Prior to staying home with her
children, Jill worked as a surgical assistant to an oral surgeon,
earning between $10.00 and $12.00 an hour.
In the report of the domestic relations commissioner,
which was subsequently adopted by the court, the commissioner
recommended joint custody with Jill being awarded physical
custody of Christina and Michael being awarded physical custody
of Tyler.
The commissioner found that Michael earned $3,719.11
per month and, although she was unemployed, imputed $892.67 per
month (minimum wage) in income to Jill for purposes of
determining child support.
Based on these figures, the
commissioner recommended that Michael pay Jill $355.34 per month
in child support (the difference in what Jill would have to pay
Michael for one child and what Michael would have to pay Jill for
one child).
In addition, the commissioner recommended that Jill
be awarded $500 per month in maintenance for four years.
Finally, the commissioner found that Michael was $2,400 in
arrears on his $600 per month temporary maintenance obligation.
Michael thereafter filed exceptions to the commissioner’s report,
objecting to the amount and duration of maintenance as well as
the amount of maintenance arrearage.
After a hearing on the
exceptions, the court entered its order adopting the
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recommendations of the commissioner and overruling Michael’s
exceptions on January 26, 1998.
This appeal by Michael followed.
Michael first argues that the court’s award of
maintenance to Jill was an abuse of discretion.
Michael contends
that Jill is able to support herself through appropriate
employment, as evidenced by her previous job as a surgical
assistant.
Thus, under KRS 403.200(1), she is not entitled to
maintenance.
Jill counters that her experience as a surgical
assistant was years ago in Lexington (she now resides in Boyd
County).
She claims that because she has no specialized training
and has been out of the work force for so long, she needs time to
obtain training or education so that she can get a job which pays
more than minimum wage.
She further claims that their daughter
was having a difficult time with the divorce and she wanted to
wait until the child began first grade before returning to
school.
The determination of whether maintenance should be
awarded and the amount thereof are matters within the sound
discretion of the trial court.
551 S.W.2d 823 (1977).
Browning v. Browning, Ky. App.,
We cannot say the trial court abused its
discretion in finding that Jill was entitled to maintenance in
this case.
Although she had been employed in the past as a
surgical assistant, that was some time ago in a different city.
She has been home with her children and out of the work force for
eight years.
While the court did impute minimum wage income to
Jill for purposes of child support, we believe that, under the
circumstances, Jill should be given the opportunity for a
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reasonable amount of time to better herself through education or
training in order to obtain more than minimum wage employment.
See Moss v. Moss, Ky. App., 639 S.W.2d 370 (1982).
We believe it
would be difficult for Jill to provide for her and her child’s
reasonable needs with a minimum wage job.
Michael next complains that, given his monthly
expenses, he cannot afford to pay Jill $500 a month in
maintenance.
According to Michael, the court failed to take into
account his ability to meet his own needs while at the same time
meeting the needs of the spouse seeking maintenance, as required
by KRS 403.200(2)(f).
In reviewing the commissioner’s
recommendations, we see that the commissioner specifically took
into account Michael’s expenses of $1,761.54 a month.
Michael
contends that the commissioner should have also considered
expenses such as a $500 a month furniture payment, a $160 per
month loan payment, and a $456 per month car payment.
As to the
$9,000 furniture debt, the commissioner found that Michael “was
under no written obligation to pay this amount.”
As to the car
payment, the commissioner found that Michael incurred this debt
after the separation.
Jill maintains that these debts were
fabricated, overstated or were recently incurred for the sole
purpose of increasing his expenses so as to avoid maintenance.
In our view, the court considered Michael’s reasonable expenses
and, thus, did consider Michael’s ability to meet his own needs
pursuant to KRS 403.200(2)(f).
We would further note that the
sheer fact that a spouse is heavily indebted does not necessarily
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absolve him from the duty to pay maintenance.
Carter v. Carter,
Ky. App., 656 S.W.2d 257 (1983).
Considering the other factors in KRS 403.200(2), we
cannot say that $500 a month maintenance for four years was an
abuse of discretion.
The parties were married for twelve years
and enjoyed a comfortable middle class standard of living.
403.200(2)(c) and (d).
KRS
With regard to the financial resources of
Jill (KRS 403.200(2)(a)), she is presently unemployed and
received no income generating property in the divorce.
As stated
earlier, she will need some amount of time for the education or
training she needs to become integrated back into the workplace.
KRS 403.200(2)(b).
Four years seems to us to be a reasonable
amount of time therefor, given her age and the fact that she is
in good health.
KRS 403.200(2)(e).
Michael’s final argument is that the trial court abused
its discretion when it found him to be $2,400 in arrears on his
temporary maintenance.
The crux of Michael’s argument is that
the court should not have ordered him to pay temporary
maintenance for the month of August 1997 because the temporary
maintenance order was not to be retroactive and was not to
commence until “the date of the court’s order,” according to the
report of the domestic relations commissioner of July 23, 1997.
Michael contends that the order in question was the order entered
on September 17, 1997.
Conversely, Jill maintains that the
intended order was the order of August 29, 1997.
In reviewing
the record, we agree with Jill that order on which the temporary
maintenance was to begin was the order of August 29, 1997.
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The
September order makes no mention of the temporary maintenance
obligation or any arrearages.
The August order states that
Michael “shall catch up on any back payments due under said
Report [the July 23, 1997 report of the domestic relations
commissioner].”
For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the Boyd
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Charles D. Oppenheimer
Ashland, Kentucky
Bruce W. MacDonald
Greenup, Kentucky
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