FRED T. TAYLOR, JR. v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: April 9, 1999; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-000293-MR
FRED T. TAYLOR, JR.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM McCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE RON DANIELS, JUDGE
INDICTMENT NO. 95-CR-00220
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
* * * * * * * * * *
BEFORE: GUDGEL, Chief Judge; COMBS and GARDNER, Judges.
COMBS, JUDGE.
Fred Taylor (Taylor) appeals from an order of the
McCracken Circuit Court revoking his probation and ordering him
to serve four years in prison.
Finding no error, we affirm.
In October 1995, the McCracken County Grand Jury
indicted Taylor on one felony count of trafficking in a
controlled substance (marijuana) within 1,000 yards of a school
while in possession of a handgun (KRS 218A.1411).
In November
1995, Taylor entered a guilty plea pursuant to a plea agreement
with the Commonwealth to the amended charge of possession of
marijuana while in possession of a handgun.
Under the plea
agreement, the Commonwealth proposed a sentence of four years to
the amended charge — a recommendation adopted by the trial court
in February 1996.
However, the court suspended service of the
sentence and placed Taylor on probation for a period of five
years.
In May 1996, Taylor’s probation officer filed an
affidavit with the court seeking revocation of probation based on
the positive results of a random drug test for the presence of
marijuana.
After conducting a hearing in July 1996, the trial
court found that Taylor had violated the conditions of probation
by using marijuana and revoked his probation.
Upon appeal of the
order, this Court in November 1997 vacated the order revoking
Taylor’s probation because the trial court had erroneously used a
probable cause standard as to the violation.
We remanded the
case for a new hearing, mandating that the "preponderance of the
evidence" standard be utilized in lieu of "probable cause."
Before the second revocation hearing was held, the
Commonwealth filed a notice in January 1998 to raise additional
grounds to support revocation of Taylor’s probation: 1) an
Illinois conviction (entered on July 9, 1997) for unlawful
delivery of a controlled substance; and 2) an assault on another
inmate in December 1997 while he was in the county jail.
On January 16, 1998, the trial court conducted the
second probation revocation hearing.
Taylor and the Commonwealth
stipulated that the factual evidence relating to the positive
drug test of May 20, 1996, would be the same as that which had
been offered at the first revocation hearing.
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While no new
evidence was presented on that issue, the Commonwealth presented
evidence on the two additional grounds.
After this second
hearing, the trial court concluded that Taylor had violated the
terms of probation as evidenced both by the positive drug test of
May 20, 1996 (properly examined at this hearing according to the
preponderance of the evidence standard) and by the Illinois
criminal conviction.
It revoked Taylor’s probation and sentenced
him to serve the four-year suspended sentence.
This appeal
followed.
We have no hesitation in affirming the action of the
trial court based solely upon the positive marijuana test of May
20, 1996.
It is undisputed that Taylor had tested positive for
use of marijuana during his probationary period.
Although the
court erred at the first revocation hearing in utilizing the
probable cause standard, it corrected that error at the second
revocation hearing of January 16, 1998 (at issue here) and
correctly revoked his probation pursuant to the preponderance of
the evidence standard.
This offense alone would suffice to
sustain the revocation of probation.
Directly on point is Messer
v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 754 S.W.2d 872, 873 (1988): "Whether
the trial court revoked upon one violation or three is of no
consequence ... so long as the evidence supports at least one
violation."
However, coupled with this incident is a second ground
equally capable of sustaining the revocation of probation:
Taylor’s conviction of another drug offense in Illinois.
Ignoring the sufficiency of the positive drug test of May 20,
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1996, Taylor premises his appeal upon alleged defects in the
trial court’s treatment of the Illinois conviction.
Taylor notes that the trial judge had correctly
rejected the Commonwealth’s reliance upon his assault of a fellow
inmate in December of 1997 since the incident occurred during his
period of incarceration and not during his time on probation.
He
attempts to expand upon that logic by analogy with respect to his
Illinois conviction, arguing that the conviction occurred on July
9, 1997 (while he was incarcerated) and that, therefore — as in
the assault offense — it cannot serve as the basis of his
probation revocation.
The Commonwealth presented evidence at the revocation
hearing that Taylor had committed the felony offense of unlawful
delivery of a controlled substance in Illinois while free on
probation in May of 1996.
allegation.
Taylor does not dispute this
However, he contends that since the actual
conviction of this offense occurred ten months after he was
incarcerated, that conviction cannot be utilized as a legitimate
basis for the revocation of probation.
We disagree.
The timing
of the conviction is irrelevant; the significant fact serving as
the "triggering event" for purposes of revocation of probation is
that Taylor indeed committed the offence during his period of
probation in accordance with the plain language of KRS
533.030(1):
The court shall provide as an explicit
condition of every sentence of probation or
conditional discharge that the defendant not
commit another offense during the period for
which the sentence remains subject to
revocation. (Emphasis added).
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Thus, the fact of the commission of the Illinois offense —
regardless of the date of the ultimate conviction — alone
suffices to sustain the revocation of his probation.
His
attempted distinction between "date of commission" and "date of
conviction" is merely semantic and not substantive.
In summary, we wholly agree with the conclusion of the
McCracken Circuit Court that either ground would justify
revocation of probation, but that "the two of them together
certainly are enough grounds."
We therefore affirm the judgment of the McCracken
Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Mark Wettle
Louisville, Kentucky
A. B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Gregory C. Fuchs
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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