JOSEPH W. CHAUDOIN v. TERESA LYNNE CHAUDOIN
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RENDERED: April 16, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-000241-MR
JOSEPH W. CHAUDOIN
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE MARY M. L. COREY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 1997-FC-008110
TERESA LYNNE CHAUDOIN
(NOW SANTAMASSINO)
APPELLEE
OPINION AND ORDER
AFFIRMING IN PART - DISMISSING IN PART
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, HUDDLESTON AND MCANULTY, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE.
This is an appeal from an order of the
Jefferson Family Court entered on November 19, 1997, reserving
the issue of whether the parties’ prior agreement was
unconscionable and denying the award of child support to the
appellant for payments that accrued prior to the date the
appellant filed his motion to modify child support.
After
reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm in part
and dismiss in part.
The parties to this appeal entered into a separation
agreement on April 19, 1982, which was incorporated into their
divorce decree dated April 27, 1982.
Custody of the parties’ two
minor children, ages two and one-half and seven months, had been
awarded by the court to the appellee.
Thereafter, on November 1,
1982, the parties entered into a written agreement giving custody
of the children to the appellant and waiving any future child
support obligation of the appellee.
This separate agreement was
filed with the court but never incorporated into the divorce
decree.
On October 31, 1997, the appellant filed a motion in
the Jefferson Family Court for entry of an order declaring the
November 1, 1982, agreement unconscionable and for judgment for
child support for the 15 years preceding the filing of the motion
in an amount not less than $500.00 per month.
The appellant also
sought an award of child support running prospectively from the
date of the motion.
At the hearing of this motion on November
17, 1997, the trial court reserved on the issue of
unconscionability, denied the award of retroactive child support
and referred the issue of prospective child support to the
Commissioner.
The appellant filed a notice of appeal with regard
to the issues of unconscionability and retroactive child support
on January 8, 1998.
The unconscionability portion of this appeal must be
dismissed because this Court lacks jurisdiction.
This Court’s
appellate jurisdiction applies only to final orders and judgments
of the circuit court.
See, e.g., Webster County Soil
Conservation Dist. v. Shelton, Ky., 437 S.W.2d 934 (1969); Stice
v. Leonard, Ky., 420 S.W.2d 672 (1967); Lebus v. Lebus, Ky., 382
S.W.2d 873 (1964).
Civil Rule 54.01 defines a final or
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appealable judgment as a “final order adjudicating all the rights
of the parties in an action or proceeding....”
The trial court’s reservation on the issue of whether
the November 1,1982, agreement is unconscionable clearly is not
final and appealable.
It does not terminate the action, give
relief or divest any part of a right.
Stewart v. Lawson, Ky.,
689 S.W.2d 21 (1985); Tube Turns Div. v. Logsdon, Ky. App., 677
Sw 897 (1984); Wagoner v. Mill, Ky. App., 56 S.W.2d 159 (1977).
Therefore, this Court does not have jurisdiction over the issue.
The trial court’s decision with regard to child support
will not be disturbed unless there was a clear abuse of
discretion.
Bradley v. Bradley, Ky. App., 473 S.W.2d 117 (1971);
Stice v. Stice, Ky. App., 436 S.W.2d 62 (1969).
The appellant
contends that he is entitled to child support payments that
accrued prior to October 31, 1997, the date on which he filed his
motion.
He argues that there is “no black line rule in the
Commonwealth against retroactive orders of support.”
In support
of this contention, the appellant cites KRS 406.030 (dealing with
support in paternity cases) and KRS 403.211(5)(dealing with
orders of child support).
However, the Commonwealth does have a “black line rule”
against retroactive orders of child support contained in KRS
403.213, which states that “any decree respecting child support
may be modified only as to installments accruing subsequent to
the filing of the motion for modification....”
(Emphasis added).
This statute clearly and unambiguously prohibits retroactive
child support and has been upheld by this Court.
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See, Giacalone
v. Giacalone, Ky. App., 867 S.W.2d 616 (1994).
The trial court’s
denial of retroactive child support was correct and was not an
abuse of discretion.
For the foregoing reasons, the appeal in this case is
affirmed in part and dismissed in part.
ALL CONCUR.
/s/ Daniel T. Guidugli
JUDGE, COURT OF APPEALS
ENTERED:
April 16, 1999
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT PRO SE:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Joseph W. Chaudoin
Louisville, KY
Michael J. O’Connell
Louisville, KY
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