LAGRANGE CITY COUNCIL, HARVEY LEE BANNISTER, JAMES BEAUMONT, ANN BROWN, ELSIE CARTER, SAM FINLEY, ROBERT HAMPTON, FORREST HOFFMAN, BEVERLY MCCOMBS, DEBORAH POLLARD, AND NANCY STEELE v. HALL BROTHERS COMPANY OF OLDHAM COUNTY, INC.; FIELDER AND ASSOCIATES, INC.; AND OLDHAM COUNTY PLANNING AND ZONING COMMISSION
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July 23, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
MODIFIED: October 8, 1999; 10:00 a.m.
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-000181-MR
LAGRANGE CITY COUNCIL,
HARVEY LEE BANNISTER, JAMES BEAUMONT,
ANN BROWN, ELSIE CARTER, SAM FINLEY,
ROBERT HAMPTON, FORREST HOFFMAN,
BEVERLY MCCOMBS, DEBORAH POLLARD,
AND NANCY STEELE
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM OLDHAM CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DENNIS A. FRITZ, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 1995-CI-395
v.
HALL BROTHERS COMPANY
OF OLDHAM COUNTY, INC.;
FIELDER AND ASSOCIATES, INC.;
AND OLDHAM COUNTY PLANNING
AND ZONING COMMISSION
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, HUDDLESTON, AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
This is an appeal from Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Orders by the Oldham Circuit Court holding
invalid the vote by the City Council to overturn the
recommendation of the Planning Commission to approve a proposed
map amendment.
Finding no error, we affirm.
The facts of this action are not in dispute.
The
appellees, Hall Brothers Company of Oldham County, Inc. (Hall
Brothers), owned a tract of land on the north side of Jericho
Road in LaGrange, Kentucky (the subject property).
fourth class city located in Oldham County.
LaGrange is a
KRS 81.010(4).
The
subject property was at all relevant times zoned I-1
(Industrial).
In 1995, Hall Brothers submitted to the Oldham
County Planning and Zoning Commission (the Planning Commission)
an application to change the zoning classification of the subject
property to R-4 (Residential).
The Planning Commission held a full hearing on Hall
Brothers’ application on June 27, 1995.
One (1) of the members
of the Planning Commission, Forrest Hoffman, was a member of both
the Planning Commission and the LaGrange City Council (the City
Council).
Although Commissioner Hoffman participated in the
hearing and asked several questions, he abstained from the
Planning Commission’s vote on whether to recommend the zoning
change to the City Council.
Following the hearing, the Planning
Commission voted ten (10) to zero (0) (with one (1) abstention)
to recommend the zoning change.
On August 7, 1995, the matter came before the City
Council.
The City Council is composed of eight (8) members.
At
the conclusion of the City Council’s hearing, council member
Elsie Carter made the motion to override the recommendation of
the Planning Commission.
motion.
Council member Hoffman seconded the
The vote on the motion to overturn the Planning
Commission’s recommendation resulted in a four to four tie.
As a
result of the tie vote, LaGrange Mayor Nancy Steele cast a vote
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to break the tie pursuant to KRS 83A.130(5) voting to override
the Planning Commission’s recommendation.
Hall Brothers filed an appeal of the City Council’s
decision to the Oldham Circuit Court pursuant to KRS 100.347.
The circuit court found that Council Member Hoffman’s
participation as a member of the Planning Commission constituted
a conflict of interest that rendered incompatible his
simultaneous service in both offices.
Because Council Member
Hoffman’s vote was improperly cast, the trial court concluded
that a majority of the entire City Council did not vote to
override the Planning Commission’s recommendation as required by
KRS 100.211(1).
At the request of both parties, the trial court
entered a subsequent order also finding that a mayor’s statutory
authority to vote in case of a tie does not apply to zoning
matters under KRS Chapter 100.
812 S.W.2d 706 (1991).
Citing Hacker v. Baesler, Ky.,
This appeal followed.
There are two (2) issues presented in this appeal: (1)
whether Council Member Hoffman’s membership on both the Planning
Commission and the City Council and his participation in the
proceedings before both bodies violated Hall Brothers’ due
process rights; and (2) whether a mayor in a mayor-council form
of government may cast a deciding vote in case of a tie in
matters involving zoning changes.
for each issue is the same.
However, the underlying basis
KRS 100.211 requires a “majority of
the entire legislative body ... to override the recommendation of
the planning commission.”
(Emphasis added.)
Both issues raised
by Hall Brothers in this case deal with whether a valid majority
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of the entire City Council voted to overturn the Planning
Commission’s recommendation.
Consequently, a resolution of the first issue
precludes consideration of the second issue.
If Council Member
Forrest Hoffman was ineligible to vote on the matter due to his
membership on the Planning Commission, then a majority of the
entire LaGrange City Council did not vote to overturn the
Planning Commission.
The mayor’s authority to cast a tie-
breaking vote would not be relevant because there was no tie for
the mayor to break.
The City Council first argues that the trial court
erred in finding Council Member Hoffman’s vote invalid due to a
conflict of interest.
The trial court specifically found:
The Court makes the finding that neither KRS
61.080 nor Article 165 of the Kentucky
Constitution makes the positions of County
Planning and Zoning Commissioner and City
Counsel [sic] member incompatible. However,
conflicting concerns do arise and in this
situation Forrest Hoffman, as a member of the
Commission, participated as a counsel [sic]
person in a review of the Commission’s
previous decision and for which he was then
an active member. This Court makes the
Finding that such participation is contrary
to public policy and for a participating
member of the Commission to act as a trier of
fact and as a participating Counsel [sic]
member which ultimately reviewed the previous
decision. The same violates the Petitioner’s
right to due process and decisions by an
unbiased body.
The question thus presented is whether an individual’s
membership on both a local legislative body and a county planning
commission are incompatible as a matter of law.
This is an issue
of first impression in the Courts of this Commonwealth.
As a
preliminary matter, we note our agreement with the analysis in
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the Attorney General Opinions 66-586 and 71-204.
Therein the
Attorney General concluded that KRS Chapter 100 authorizes the
appointment of serving public officials to a planning commission.
KRS 100.133 provides that a planning commission shall consist of
at least five (5) but not more than twenty (20) members.
100.133(2).
KRS
At least two-thirds (b ) of the members must be
“citizen members.”
A “citizen member” is a member who is not an
elected or appointed official or employee of the city or county.
KRS 100.111(4).
The statute would thus seem to permit one-third
(a ) of the planning commission to be public officials.
Indeed,
KRS 100.143 provides that the “term of office of all elected
public officials appointed to a planning commission shall be the
same as their official tenure in office.”
Since the statutes
clearly allow public officials to be appointed to a planning
commission, we find that the statute creating the planning
commission does not prohibit appointment of city council members
to a planning commission.
Nonetheless, the implied statutory authority to appoint
“public officials” to county planning commissions does not end
the inquiry.
The Kentucky Constitution does not permit the same
person to fill two (2) incompatible offices at the same time.
Rash v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer
District, 309 Ky. 442, 217 S.W.2d 232, 236 (1949).
Kentucky
courts have recognized two (2) kinds of incompatibility between
offices.
The first is a constitutional or statutory
incompatibility, which is one so declared by the Constitution or
legislative enactment.
Knuckles v. Board of Education of Bell
County, 272 Ky. 431, 114 S.W.2d 511 (1938).
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Section 165 of the
Kentucky Constitution delineates the scope of constitutional
incompatibility as follows:
No person shall, at the same time, be a state
officer or a deputy officer or member of the
General Assembly, and an officer of any
county, city, town or other municipality, or
an employee thereof; and no person shall, at
the same time, fill two municipal offices,
either in the same or different
municipalities, except as may be otherwise
provided in this Constitution; but a Notary
Public, or an officer of the militia, shall
not be ineligible to hold any other office
mentioned.
In addition, the General Assembly has set forth its
construction of Ky. Const. § 165 in KRS 61.080, declaring which
offices it deems incompatible.
O’Mara v. Town of Mt. Vernon, 299
Ky. 401, 185 S.W.2d 675, 679 (1945).
KRS 61.080 provides as
follows:
1) No person shall, at the same time, be a
state officer, a deputy state officer or a
member of the General Assembly, and an
officer of any county, city or other
municipality, or an employee thereof.
(2) The offices of justice of the peace,
county judge/executive, surveyor, sheriff,
deputy sheriff, coroner, constable, jailer
and clerk or deputy clerk of a court, shall
be incompatible, the one (1) with any of the
others. The office of county judge/executive
and county school superintendent are
incompatible.
(3) No person shall, at the same time, fill
a county office and a municipal office.
(4) No person shall, at the same time, fill
two (2) municipal offices, either in the same
or different municipalities.
(5) The following offices shall be
incompatible with any other public office:
(a) Member of the Public Service Commission
of Kentucky;
(b) Member of the Workmen's Compensation
Board;
(c) Commissioner of the fiscal court in
counties containing a city of the first
class;
(d) County indexer;
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(e) Member of the legislative body of cities
of the first class;
(f) Mayor and member of the legislative body
in cities of the second class; and
(g) Mayor and member of council in cities of
the fourth class.
(6) No office in the Kentucky active militia
shall be incompatible with any civil office
in the Commonwealth, either state, county,
district or city.
The constitutional and statutory enumerations of
incompatible offices are not the exclusive instances of
incompatibility.
Knuckles, 114 S.W.2d at 511.
The second type
of incompatibility between offices is a common-law or functional
incompatibility, which is declared by courts without the aid of
specific constitutional or statutory prohibition when the two
offices are inherently inconsistent or repugnant, or when the
occupancy of the two offices is detrimental to the public
interest.
Polley v. Fortenberry, 268 Ky. 369, 105 S.W.2d 143,
144-45 (1937);
(1933).
Barkley v. Stockdell, 252 Ky. 1, 66 S.W.2d 43, 44
Functional incompatibility depends on the character and
relation of the offices and not on the matter of physical
inability to discharge the duties of both of them.
The question
is whether one office is subordinated to the other, or whether
the functions of the two are inherently inconsistent or
repugnant, or whether the occupancy of both offices is
detrimental to the public interest.
Id.
The policy behind both types of incompatibility of
offices recognizes that it is the duty of a public officer or
servant to discharge his or her duties uninfluenced by the duties
and obligations of another office.
Rash, 217 S.W.2d at 236-37.
In the present case, Hoffman’s membership on both the City
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Council and the Planning Commission appears to violate KRS
61.080(5)(g).
Furthermore, we agree with the trial court that
his concurrent occupancy of both positions is improper because
the positions are functionally incompatible.
Two (2) offices or positions are incompatible whenever
one has the power of appointment to or removal from the other and
whenever there are any potential conflicts of interest between
the two (2), such as salary negotiations, supervision and control
of duties, and obligations to the public to exercise independent
judgment.1
The functions of county planning commissions and
local legislative bodies are inherently related with respect to
zoning matters.
Applications for zoning map amendments are made
1
This is consistent with the common-law rule which makes
offices incompatible where one is subordinate to the other, and
subject in some degree to the supervisory power of its incumbent,
or where the incumbent of one office has the power to remove the
incumbent of the other or to audit the accounts of the other.
Recent examples of the application of this rule in other
jurisdictions include: McComb County Prosecutor v. Murphy, 233
Mich. App. 372, 380, 592 N.W.2d 745, 748 (1999)(Concurrent
service as township trustee and county delinquent property tax
coordinator held incompatible); City of Sturgis v. Koch, 583
N.W.2d 170 (S.D. 1998)(Simultaneous service as city council
member, reserve police chief and assistant fire chief held
incompatible); Thompson v. Roberts, 333 Ark. 544, 970 S.W.2d 239
(1998) (Dual service as mayor and city bookkeeper held
incompatible); People ex rel. Deputy Sheriff’s Association of
Santa Clara County, Inc. v. County of Santa Clara, 49 Cal. App.
4th 1471, 57 Cal. Rptr. 322 (1996)(Positions of chief probation
officer and director of department of corrections held
incompatible); Dupras v. County of Clinton, 213 A.D.2d 952, 624
N.Y.S. 2d 309 (N.Y. App. Div. 3 1995)(Positions of senior clerk
in county board of elections and member of county legislature
held incompatible); Shepherd v. Platt, 177 Ariz. 63, 865 P.2d 107
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1993)(Simultaneous service as member of Indian
tribal council and county board of supervisors held not
incompatible); Scannapieco v. Abate, 258 N.J. Super. 506, 610
A.2d 432 (1992)(Dual membership on planning board and regional
utility authority held incompatible); and State ex rel. Vana v.
Maple Heights City Council, 54 Ohio St. 91, 561 N.E.2d 909
(1990)(Election to city council held incompatible with other
municipal employment).
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directly to the planning commission.
The planning commission
shall then hold at least one (1) public hearing on the
application, and make findings of fact and a recommendation
whether to approve the proposed map amendment.
KRS 100.211(1).
The local legislative body (the City Council in this case)
possesses the ultimate authority to approve or deny the map
amendment.2
Although the City Council’s relationship to the
Planning Commission is not directly supervisory, the City
Council’s authority to review recommendations made by the
Planning Commission is directly related to the functioning of the
Planning Commission.
Furthermore, in rezoning cases, both the Planning
Commission and the City Council function in an adjudicatory role
and each must act in accordance with the basic principles of due
process which are applicable generally.
City of Louisville v.
McDonald, Ky., 470 S.W.2d 173, 177-78 (1971).
The assignment of
investigatory and adjudicatory authority to a single agency does
not violate fundamental fairness or due process.
Withrow v.
Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 48-52, 95 S. Ct. 1456, 1465-1467, 43 L. Ed.
2d 712, 724-26 (1975); Board of Education of Pulaski County v.
Burkett, Ky., 525 S.W.2d 747 (1975).
However, we believe that
fundamental fairness does not permit the same person to exercise
decision-making authority in one capacity and then review the
2
However, the General Assembly has specifically limited the
power of local legislative bodies to override a planning
commission’s recommendation. Thus, if the legislative body fails
take valid action within ninety (90) days, the planning
commission’s recommendation shall be deemed to have passed by
operation of law. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Society,
Inc. v. Albert Oil Co., Inc., Ky., 969 S.W.2d 691, 693 (1998).
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same matter in another capacity.
Therefore, we agree with the
trial court that both due process and public policy prohibit
Council Member Hoffman from serving simultaneously as a member of
the City Council and as a member of the Planning Commission.
In addition, abstaining from any official actions does
not remedy a conflict between offices.
See McComb County
Prosecutor v. Murphy, 233 Mich. App. 372, 380, 592 N.W.2d 745,
748 (1999).
Hoffman’s decision to abstain from the Planning
Commission vote further demonstrates the inherent incompatibility
of the two (2) offices.
If Hoffman, as a member of the Planning
Commission, must abstain from any proceedings which will be
forwarded to the City Council, then his membership on the City
Council substantially interferes with the performance of his
duties as a member of the Planning Commission.
If, on the other
hand, Hoffman is not required to abstain from voting in matters
before the Planning Commission which will be forwarded to the
City Council, then his subsequent participation and vote on the
same matter before the City Council violates the due process
rights of zoning applicants.
Consequently we think it is clear
that the two offices are functionally incompatible, in that the
occupancy of both offices by the same person is detrimental to
the public interest.
Adams v. Com. ex rel. Buckman, Ky., 268
S.W.2d 930, 932 (1954).
By our ruling on this issue, we in no way intend to
cast aspersions on Hoffman’s integrity in his conduct either as a
member of the Planning Commission or of the City Council.
There
is absolutely no evidence in the record to indicate that Hoffman
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has any personal or financial interest in the outcome of the vote
of the proposed zoning map amendment.
Furthermore, Hoffman’s
decision to abstain from the vote before the Planning Commission
demonstrates a desire to avoid any appearance of impropriety.
We
merely hold that public policy mandates that Hoffman cannot
simultaneously hold positions as a member of the City Council and
of the Planning Commission.
Hoffman abstained from the vote before the Planning
Commission.
Moreover, the Planning Commission unanimously
approved the motion to recommend the proposed map amendment.
Therefore, Hoffman’s participation as a member of the Planning
Commission cannot be held to have affected Hall Brothers’ due
process rights before that body.
However, as a member of the
City Council, Hoffman voted to overturn the Planning Commission’s
recommendation, which directly affects Hall Brothers’ due process
rights.
Consequently, we find that Hoffman was disqualified from
voting on the matter before the City Council, and his vote on the
matter shall not be counted.
In the absence of Hoffman’s vote,
the motion to overrule the Planning Commission’s recommendation
failed by a margin of 3-4, and the Planning Commission’s
recommendation is deemed enacted as a matter of law.
100.211(1).
KRS
Since our ruling on this issue is determinative of
the question of whether a tie existed, we need not consider the
second question of whether the mayor was eligible to cast a tiebreaking vote.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Oldham Circuit Court
is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT
LAGRANGE CITY COUNCIL, ET AL:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEES HALL BROTHERS CO.
OF OLDHAM COUNTY, INC., ET AL:
R. Kent Westberry
Melanie Straw-Boone
Landrum & Shouse
Louisville, Kentucky
William P. Croley
Croley, Moore & Snell, PSC
LaGrange, Kentucky
Robert Watson
Louisville, Kentucky
Fonda McClellan
LaGrange City Attorney
LaGrange, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLANT:
Melanie Straw-Boone
Louisville, Kentucky
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