SHIRLEY MORTON, Individually, and as Executrix of the Estate of James Anthony Morton v. BANK OF THE BLUEGRASS AND TRUST COMPANY; STANDARD LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY; INVESTORS LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA; CHARLES H. JETT INSURANCE AGENCY, INC; and SOUTHERN FINANCIAL INSURANCE
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RENDERED:
September 3, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO. 1998-CA-000018-MR
SHIRLEY MORTON, Individually,
and as Executrix of the Estate
of James Anthony Morton
v.
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GARY PAYNE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 95-CI-01527
BANK OF THE BLUEGRASS
AND TRUST COMPANY;
STANDARD LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY;
INVESTORS LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA;
CHARLES H. JETT INSURANCE
AGENCY, INC; and
SOUTHERN FINANCIAL INSURANCE
AND
CROSSAPPELLANTS
CROSS-APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GARY PAYNE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 95-CI-01527
SHIRLEY MORTON, Individually
and as Executrix of the
Estate of James Anthony Morton
AND
APPELLEES
NO. 1998-CA-000120-MR
STANDARD LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY
and INVESTORS LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA
v.
APPELLANT
NO. 1998-CA-000128-MR
CROSSAPPELLEE
BANK OF THE BLUEGRASS
AND TRUST COMPANY;
and CHARLES H. JETT
INSURANCE AGENCY, INC.
CROSSAPPELLANTS
CROSS-APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GARY PAYNE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 95-CI-01527
v.
SHIRLEY MORTON, Individually,
and as Executrix of the
Estate of James Anthony Morton
CROSSAPPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART,
REVERSING IN PART, AND REMANDING
* * * * * * * * * *
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, HUDDLESTON, and KNOPF, Judges.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE.
This case involves an appeal and two cross-
appeals from a judgment and orders of the Fayette Circuit Court
which awarded the appellant/cross-appellee, Shirley Morton
(Shirley), individually and as executrix of the estate of James
Anthony Morton (James), life insurance proceeds but dismissed her
claims against the appellees/cross-appellants, Bank of the
Bluegrass and Trust Co. (the Bank), Standard Life Insurance Co.
(Standard), Investors Life Insurance Co. (Investors), Charles H.
Jett Insurance Agency, Inc. (Jett Insurance), and Southern
Financial Insurance (Southern)1, for misrepresentation, bad
faith, breach of fiduciary duty, and violation of the Kentucky
1
Southern did not file a cross-appeal, but we will
nevertheless refer to all appellees as “appellees/crossappellants” for the sake of simplicity.
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Consumer Protection Act.
After considering the arguments of
counsel and reviewing the record and the applicable law, we
affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
In 1986, Shirley and her husband, James, received a
loan from the Bank which was secured by a mortgage on their home.
The Mortons obtained a group credit life insurance policy issued
by Standard in the amount of the loan from the Bank.2
James was
the insured under the policy, and upon his death, the policy
would pay the Bank the remaining amount due on the mortgage with
any remaining money to go to Shirley.
The mortgage, note, and
insurance certificate were issued for the duration of one year
and were subsequently reestablished each November.3
Southern is the Kentucky general agent for Standard.
Southern recruited the Bank and Jett Insurance to serve as
soliciting agents for Standard.
In 1986, Standard entered into a
contract with the Bank whereby the Bank would sell Standard’s
group credit life insurance to its debtors.
Southern trained
Bank employees, who were also agents of Jett Insurance, to sell
insurance for Standard.
Charles Jett III was the owner and
president of Jett Insurance as well as chairman of the board for
the Bank.
2
Standard was acquired by Investors by merger, and Standard
and Investors are treated as one entity for purposes of this
case.
3
Both the trial court and Shirley state that the insurance
certificate was “renewed” each year, but a new policy was
actually issued each year. The same procedure was used for the
note and mortgage.
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The application which the Bank filled out in order to
become a policyholder of group credit life insurance from
Standard expressly stated that the policy limited its coverage to
insured debtors between the ages of eighteen and sixty-five with
a $40,000 maximum level of coverage.
The group certificate
issued to James from 1986 to 1992 and to Shirley in 1993 included
the following language:
“ELIGIBILITY:
eligible debtors of the Creditor who:
Coverage is limited to
(1) request the insurance;
(2) pay the required premium; and (3) are within the age and
amount limits shown in the Policy.”
Neither the policy nor the
group certificate excluded persons with preexisting health
conditions, but the group certificate provided for the following
condition (the policy contained a similar provision):
DEATH RESULTING FROM PRE-EXISTING CONDITION-If You or the Joint Insured Debtor die within
6 months (12 months on contracts of more than
3 years) of the Effective Date shown above as
a result of a pre-existing illness, disease,
or physical condition for which You or the
Joint Insured Debtor received medical advice,
consultation or treatment during the 12 month
period immediately preceding the Effective
Date of Your coverage. Our liability shall
be limited to the premiums paid for the
coverage.
Standard alleged that it had a rule, communicated through
Southern to the Bank and Jett Insurance, that policies should
only be issued to debtors who “appeared to be of sound health.”
The only written documentation of this rule was in the agency
agreement between Standard and Jett which stated that “[t]he
Agent shall solicit Life Insurance from debtors appearing to be
in sound health . . . .”
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During the spring of 1993, James Morton was diagnosed
with cancer.
When a new note and mortgage were put in place in
November of that year, the Bank refused to issue another group
credit life insurance certificate in James’s name due to his
illness.
Rather, the Bank issued the certificate in Shirley’s
name after the Mortons paid the premium.
James died in June
1994, approximately seven months after the certificate was
issued, and no death benefits were paid by Standard.
Shirley
thereafter filed suit individually and as executrix of the estate
of James, and the complaint and amended complaint alleged
misrepresentation, bad faith, breach of fiduciary duty, violation
of the Kentucky Consumer Protection Act, and violation of the
Kentucky Insurance Fraud Act, by the Bank, Standard, Investors,
Jett Insurance, and Southern.
Summary judgment motions were filed by all parties, and
the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Shirley
based on “the Plaintiff’s [Morton’s] lack of notice that ill
health was a ground for denying issuance of the policy.”
The
trial court issued a second order which reformed, on equitable
grounds, the group life insurance certificate to name James as
the insured debtor.
The order directed that the insurance
proceeds be paid to the Bank to the extent necessary to pay the
balance of the Mortons’ note, with any remaining funds to be paid
to Shirley.
The trial court’s orders also dismissed Shirley’s
claims of misrepresentation, bad faith, breach of fiduciary duty,
violation of the Kentucky Consumer Protection Act, and violation
of the Kentucky Insurance Fraud Act.
-5-
After all orders and
judgments became final and appealable, Shirley appealed and the
Bank, Jett Insurance, and Standard cross-appealed.
The parties disagree concerning which subtitle of the
Kentucky Insurance Code (KRS Chapter 304) governs the group
credit life insurance policy issued by Standard to the Bank in
this case.
Shirley contends that both Subtitle 16 and Subtitle
19 apply, and the appellees/cross-appellants contend that only
Subtitle 19 is applicable.
Subtitle 16 relates to group life
insurance, whereas Subtitle 19 relates to credit life insurance
and credit health insurance.
It is clear that Subtitle 19
applies, as KRS 304.19-010 provides that “[a]ll life insurance
and all health insurance in connection with loans or other credit
transactions shall be subject to the provisions of this subtitle
. . . .”
Since Subtitle 19 clearly applies to this case,
Standard, Jett Insurance, and the Bank rely upon KRS 304.19080(3)(b)(2) which states that credit life insurance “shall be
offered” to debtors who meet the applicable age limits “provided
that each company’s right to underwrite risks on an individual
basis shall not be restricted by this subparagraph.”
Thus, they
argue that they were not required to issue James a policy because
of their right to underwrite risks on an individual basis.
Shirley agrees that Subtitle 19 is applicable to the
policy.
However, she asserts that Subtitle 16 (Group Life
Insurance) is also applicable.
KRS 304.16-040 provides in
relevant part that
[t]he lives of a group of individuals may be
insured under a policy issued to a creditor,
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. . . which creditors . . . shall be deemed
the policyholder[s], to insure debtors of the
creditor subject to the following
requirements:
(1) The debtors eligible for insurance under
the policy shall be all of the debtors
of the creditor or creditors whose
indebtedness is repayable either (a) in
installments or (b) in one (1) sum at
the end of a period not in excess of
eighteen (18) months from the initial
date of death . . . .”
Shirley then relies on KRS 304.16-150 which provides “[t]here
shall be a provision setting forth the conditions, if any, under
which the insurer reserves the right to require a person eligible
for insurance to furnish evidence of individual insurability
satisfactory to the insurer as a condition to part or all of his
coverage.”
See also KRS 304.16-110.
It is undisputed that
neither the application for insurance made available by the Bank
to its eligible debtors nor the group credit life insurance
policy itself contained a provision specifying that insurance
could be denied for medical reasons.
Therefore, Shirley argues
that under KRS 304.16-150, the Bank had no right to deny James
the insurance.
The trial court found that Subtitle 16 was not
applicable to the policy.
The basis of the trial court’s holding
was its belief that Subtitle 19 applied as it “specifically
relates to credit life insurance, and the Court is obligated to
rely on the specific rather than the general.”
We conclude that
both Subtitle 16 and Subtitle 19 apply in this case by virtue of
KRS 304.5-010, a statute which was not mentioned by either the
parties or the trial court, which provides as follows:
-7-
It is intended that certain insurance
coverages may come within the definitions of
two (2) or more kinds of insurance as defined
in this chapter, and the inclusion of such
coverage within one (1) definition shall not
exclude it as to any other kind of insurance
within the definition of which such coverage
is likewise reasonably includable.
“Credit life insurance” is defined in KRS 304.19-020(1)
as “insurance on the life of a debtor pursuant to or in
connection with a specific loan or other credit transaction[.]”
Obviously, the insurance in the case sub judice falls within this
definition.
However, the insurance is also “reasonably
includable” within the aforementioned definition of debtor group
life insurance found in KRS 304.16-040.
The appellees/cross-appellants argue that the trial
court was correct in concluding that Subtitle 19 and not Subtitle
16 was applicable based on its determination that “the specific
rather than the general” controls.
The appellees/cross-
appellants rely on KRS 304.1-130 which states that “[p]rovisions
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of this code relative to a particular kind of insurance or a
particular type of insurer or to a particular matter shall
prevail over provisions relating to insurance in general or
insurers in general or to such matter in general.”
Having
examined and compared the provisions of Subtitle 19 and Subtitle
16, we see no ambiguity.
Subtitle 19 provides that an insurer
issuing credit life insurance to debtors may underwrite risks on
an individual basis.
KRS 304.19-080(3)(b)(2).
Subtitle 16
provides that an insurer issuing group life insurance to debtors
may likewise underwrite risks on an individual basis if the
insurer reserves that right by setting forth the conditions in
the policy.
KRS 304.16-150.
In fact, the provisions of Subtitle
16 appear to be more specific than those of Subtitle 19.
Therefore, we conclude that James was wrongfully denied
coverage, as both Subtitle 19 and Subtitle 16 were applicable and
as there was no provision in either the insurance policy or the
application which indicated that insurance could be denied for
medical reasons.
The cross-appeals are without merit, and the
trial court is affirmed on this issue.4
Although Shirley received the insurance proceeds as
compensatory damages, she contends that the trial court erred in
granting summary judgment to the appellees/cross-appellants and
in dismissing her additional causes of action of
4
The trial court reformed the insurance group certificate
to list James as an insured on equitable grounds. However,
because this issue can be resolved on legal grounds, equitable
principles are inapplicable as equity follows the law. See e.g.
Kaufman v. Kaufman’s Adm’r, 292 Ky. 351, 166 S.W.2d 860, 867
(1942).
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misrepresentation, bad faith, breach of fiduciary duty, and
violation of the Kentucky Consumer Protection Act.5
The standard
for summary judgment is as follows:
A movant should not succeed in a motion for
summary judgment unless the right to judgment
is shown with such clarity that there is no
room left for controversy and it appears
impossible for a nonmoving party to produce
evidence at trial warranting judgment in his
favor. . . . The motion for summary
judgment must convince the circuit court from
evidence in the record of the nonexistence of
a genuine issue of material fact.
Hubble v. Johnson, Ky., 841 S.W.2d 169, 171 (1992).
An appellate
court’s task when a trial court has granted summary judgment is
to determine “whether the trial court correctly found that there
were no genuine issues as to any material fact and that the
moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Scifres v. Kraft, Ky. App., 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (1996).
As
factual findings are not at issue, the trial court’s ruling is
entitled to no deference.
Id.
The basis of the trial court’s orders granting summary
judgment in favor of the appellees/cross-appellants on Shirley’s
claims for damages for misrepresentation, bad faith, breach of
fiduciary duty, and violation of the Kentucky Consumer Protection
Act was the trial court’s opinion that the “insurers are
permitted under KRS 304.19-080(3)(b)(2) to underwrite on an
individual basis” and, therefore, that the insurers were acting
legally in refusing to issue a group life insurance certificate
5
As Shirley’s brief does not raise the issue of the trial
court’s dismissal of her claim of violation of the Kentucky
Insurance Fraud Act, we assume that she does not appeal from that
portion of the trial court’s orders.
-10-
to James, even though a judgment for the proceeds was granted on
equitable grounds.
As this relates to Shirley’s claim of
misrepresentation, the trial court stated that it “does not
believe that any facts exist indicating a misrepresentation by
any of the Defendants.”
However, as we have stated above, the
appellees/cross-appellants had no legal right to deny James
coverage under the policy due to the applicability of the
provisions of KRS 304.16-150.
Shirley’s complaint alleged negligent or intentional
misrepresentation (i.e., fraud) for which she claims entitlement
to both compensatory and punitive damages.
To the extent that
the complaint asserts a cause of action for negligent
misrepresentation, summary judgment in favor of the
appellees/cross-appellants was appropriate, as only compensatory
damages are allowed for this claim.6
See KRS 411.184 (permitting
punitive damages to be awarded only for intentional actions such
as fraud, oppression, or malice).
We conclude, however, that the trial court erred in
dismissing Shirley’s intentional misrepresentation (fraud) claim.
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Shirley, there
is evidence of the following:
(1) that James was eligible for
and entitled to coverage under the group credit life insurance
policy; (2) that the loan officer, on behalf of Standard, Jett
Insurance, and the Bank, represented to James and Shirley that
James was no longer eligible under the policy; (3) that this
6
Shirley’s judgment for the insurance proceeds constitutes
an award of compensatory damages.
-11-
representation was false and was known to be false by Standard,
Jett Insurance, and the Bank;7 (4) that the misrepresentation was
made for the purpose of inducing James and Shirley to forego
coverage for James; (5) that James and Shirley acted in reliance
on the misrepresentation; and (6) that the misrepresentation
caused James and Shirley to suffer damages by not having death
benefit coverage for James in effect at his death.
See Investors
Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Colson, Ky. App., 717 S.W.2d 840, 842
(1986), for a recitation of the factors necessary to sustain a
fraud action.
In short, the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment on Shirley’s intentional misrepresentation claim
against Standard, Jett Insurance, and the Bank, as there were
genuine issues of material fact and the appellees/crossappellants were not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.8
We likewise conclude that the trial court erred in
granting summary judgment to the Bank on Shirley’s claim of
7
The appellees/cross-appellants contend that they were
allowed to underwrite on an individual basis pursuant to
KRS 304.19-080(3)(b)(2), but we have previously herein rejected
that argument. The appellees/cross-appellants also claim that
they were acting pursuant to company underwriting rules, but
there is no written evidence of any such rules. There is a fact
issue as to whether such rules existed. Even if such rules
existed, they were contrary to law because the policy did not
contain a provision whereby the insurer was reserving the right
to require evidence of individual insurability. KRS 304.16-150.
There is a fact issue as to whether the appellees/crossappellants knew that such rules, if they existed, were contrary
to law and whether the appellees/cross-appellants nevertheless
made representations to the Mortons which they knew were false.
8
As the undisputed evidence was that Southern merely
followed the directions of Standard in advising the Bank and Jett
Insurance relative to underwriting on an individual basis based
on health, we conclude that Southern was entitled to summary
judgment on Shirley’s intentional misrepresentation claim.
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breach of fiduciary duty.
A fiduciary relationship “is one
founded on trust or confidence reposed by one person in the
integrity and fidelity of another and which also necessarily
involves an undertaking in which a duty is created in one person
to act primarily for another’s benefit in matters connected with
such undertaking.”
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Ctr.,
Inc., Ky., 807 S.W.2d 476, 485 (1991).
Although a bank is not
traditionally held to be in a fiduciary relationship with its
depositors, “services to borrowers and pledgors may support a
finding that a bank, in taking a borrower’s note and collateral,
falls under a fiduciary duty to disclose material facts affecting
the loan transaction.”
Id.
We hold that (1) the bank’s loan officer, who was also
an employee of Jett Insurance, had a fiduciary duty to disclose
“material facts affecting the loan transaction” such as
eligibility for credit life insurance to the Mortons; and (2)
that genuine issues of material fact exist relative to whether
the loan officer breached that fiduciary duty in advising the
Mortons concerning James’s eligibility for coverage.
While
summary judgment in favor of Southern, Jett Insurance, and
Standard was appropriate on Shirley’s breach of fiduciary duty
claim, it was not appropriate as to the Bank.
Shirley also asserts that the trial court erred in
granting summary judgment against her on her bad faith claim.
This court set forth the elements of a bad faith claim in Empire
Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Simpsonville Wrecker Service, Inc., Ky.
App., 880 S.W.2d 886 (1994), as follows:
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In order to maintain a private cause of
action for tortious misconduct justifying a
claim of bad faith, an insured must prove (1)
that the insurer was obligated to pay, (2)
that the insurer lacked “a reasonable basis
in law or fact for denying the claim,” and
(3) that the “insurer either knew there was
no reasonable basis for denying the claim or
acted with reckless disregard for whether
such a basis existed.”
Id. at 888, quoting Wittmer v. Jones, Ky., 864 S.W.2d 885, 890
(1993).
Shirley’s allegation of bad faith is a result of James
being denied insurance and not a result of the denial of a claim.
We thus conclude that the trial court correctly granted summary
judgment on this issue.
Shirley next asserts that the trial court erred in
dismissing her claim for violation of the Kentucky Consumer
Protection Act.
KRS 367.220(1) provides that a person may bring
an action for violation of the Kentucky Consumer Protection Act
if the person “purchases or leases goods or services primarily
for personal, family or household purposes . . . .”
It has been
held that purchasing an insurance policy is a service within the
meaning of the Act.
Stevens v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., Ky., 759
S.W.2d 819, 820 (1988) (holding that “[t]he Kentucky Consumer
Protection Act . . . does provide a homeowner with a remedy for
the conduct of their own insurance company in denying such a
claim because the act has provided a ‘statutory’ bad faith cause
of action”).
As the Kentucky Consumer Protection Act “has the
broadest application in order to give Kentucky consumers the
broadest possible protection for allegedly illegal acts[,]” and
as “KRS 446.080 requires that the statutes of this Commonwealth
-14-
are to be liberally construed[,]” id. at 821, we hold that the
Act is applicable to the case sub judice.
Furthermore, there are
fact issues regarding whether the appellees/cross-appellants
committed false, misleading, or deceptive acts in violation of
KRS 367.170(1) in representing to the Mortons that James was not
eligible for or entitled to coverage.
The trial court erred in
dismissing this cause of action.9
Shirley next contends that the trial court erred in not
imposing sanctions on Southern for destroying documents on the
day of a deposition in which those documents were requested and
which were subsequently ordered to be produced.
Sanctions of
this type are governed by Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (CR)
37.02 and are within the trial court’s discretion.
See e.g.
M.P.S. v. Cabinet for Human Resources, Ky. App., 979 S.W.2d 114,
118 (1998).
The trial court was in the best position to
determine if Southern’s conduct warranted the imposition of
sanctions.
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in not sanctioning Southern and affirm the trial court
on this issue.
Shirley also argues that the trial court erred in not
allowing Shirley to depose Standard’s current in-house general
counsel and its former assistant in-house counsel.
Standard
objected to the taking of the depositions of those attorneys on
the ground of the attorney-client privilege of Kentucky Rule of
Evidence (KRE) 503, and the trial court entered a protective
9
Summary judgment in favor of Southern was appropriate as
to this cause of action but was not appropriate as to Standard,
Jett Insurance, and the Bank.
-15-
order prohibiting the taking of depositions.
Shirley asserts
that she sought to take the depositions in question to further
her fraud claim.
Citing Cummings v. Commonwealth, 221 Ky. 301, 298 S.W.
943 (1927), the Kentucky Supreme Court held in Steelvest, supra,
that “[t]he [attorney-client] privilege is generally considered
to be absolute as to communications made by or to a person
advising with an attorney as to past transactions and offenses.
[Citation Omitted.]
However, the rule does not apply to future
transactions when the person seeking the advice is contemplating
the committing of a crime or the perpetration of a fraud.”
Steelvest, supra, at 487.
As “[t]he privilege of the [attorney-
client] relationship is an obstacle to the fact finding process
and is to be strictly confined within the narrowest possible
limits consistent with the logic of its principle[,]” see Futrell
v. Shadoan, Ky., 828 S.W.2d 649, 651 (1992), we conclude that the
trial court erred in denying Shirley the right to depose the
attorneys for Standard.
She has the right to depose the
attorneys concerning their knowledge as to any underwriting rule,
their knowledge of any plan by Standard to perpetrate a fraud on
the Mortons, and any other similar and relevant matter not
subject to the attorney-client privilege.
Shirley next asserts that the trial court erred in
denying her motion to file a second amended complaint to allow
additional theories of liability, including tortious interference
with prospective contractual relations.
This motion to file a
second amended complaint was filed over two years after the
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original complaint was filed and over one year after the amended
complaint was filed.
The trial court had previously entered an
order denying Shirley’s motion to file a second amended complaint
asserting a cause of action for spoliation of evidence, but there
is no indication that the trial court ever ruled on Shirley’s
motion to amend her complaint to assert a cause of action based
upon tortious interference with contractual relations.
Thus,
this court is without the authority to rule on this issue.
Regional Jail Auth. v. Tackett, Ky., 770 S.W.2d 225, 228 (1989).
Finally, Shirley argues that the trial court improperly
resolved her request for prejudgment interest.
The trial court
awarded her “the amount of interest paid by . . . [Shirley] to
the Bank of the Bluegrass on the mortgage note secured by the
Linwall Road residence from June 10, 1997 [sic], the date of the
death of Mr. James Anthony Morton, to the date of entry of this
judgment.”
She contends that the trial court improperly awarded
her interest at eight percent per annum rather than the twelve
percent rate found in 806 KAR 12:092, § 3(4).
However, as noted
by Standard, Shirley may not utilize that regulation as its “sole
purpose . . . is to provide guidance to the commissioner [of the
Kentucky Department of Insurance] and his designees in their
investigations, examinations, and administrative adjudications
and appeals therefrom.”
806 KAR 12:092, § 2(2).
Furthermore,
that regulation is meant to provide a penalty for insurers who
deny a good faith attempt to settle a claim.
In the case sub judice, no claim for insurance was
filed.
Also, Shirley’s reliance on KRS 304.12-235 is misplaced,
-17-
as that statute also deals only with payment of claims.
In
short, Shirley cites no authority which would entitle her to
prejudgment interest at the higher rate.
The judgment and orders of the Fayette Circuit Court
are affirmed in part and are reversed in part and remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
-18-
BRIEFS FOR SHIRLEY MORTON:
BRIEF FOR BANK OF THE
BLUEGRASS AND
CHARLES JETT INSURANCE:
M. Austin Mehr
Edward A. Baylous II
Lexington, KY
Michael R. Moloney
Lexington, KY
ORAL ARGUMENTS FOR
SHIRLEY MORTON:
ORAL ARGUMENTS FOR
BANK OF THE BLUEGRASS AND
CHARLES JETT INSURANCE:
M. Austin Mehr
Lexington, KY
BRIEF FOR SOUTHERN FINANCIAL:
John G. Rice
Lexington, KY
Palmer G. Vance, II
Todd S. Page
Lexington, KY
BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENTS
FOR STANDARD LIFE INS.
AND INVESTORS LIFE INS.:
ORAL ARGUMENTS FOR
SOUTHERN FINANCIAL:
John G. Irvin, Jr.
Lexington, KY
Palmer G. Vance, II
Lexington, KY
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