TIMOTHY JERODE WELLS v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: August 20, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1997-CA-003308-MR
TIMOTHY JERODE WELLS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS B. WINE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CR-392
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, EMBERTON, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
SCHRODER, JUDGE:
This appeal involves the resentencing of a
juvenile transferred to circuit court pursuant to KRS 635.020(4).
The juvenile entered a plea with a recommended sentence and
subsequently requested resentencing upon reaching eighteen years
of age.
The appellant, Timothy Wells, was a seventeen-year-old
juvenile charged with first-degree robbery.
He was transferred
to circuit court and subsequently entered a guilty plea to firstdegree robbery in exchange for a recommended sentence of twelve
years, plus testimony in other actions.
At sentencing on
March 20, 1997, the trial court sentenced the appellant to twelve
years.
On August 28, 1997, the appellant requested resentencing
upon reaching his eighteenth birthday on September 7, 1997.
The
court denied the request for resentencing by order entered
December 18, 1997, on the grounds that “the probation prohibition
under KRS 532.060 is applicable.”
The court also stated,
“[f]urther, even if eligible, the court feels that the nature of
the charged offense, as well as the ‘breaks’ already given to the
Defendant would make probation inappropriate.”
On appeal, the appellant alleges error in not
resentencing upon his reaching his eighteenth birthday, citing
Britt v. Commonwealth, Ky., 965 S.W.2d 147 (1998).
The
Commonwealth counters that Britt does not apply because
resentencing would nullify the recommended sentence and is not
automatic under KRS 635.020(4); and if resentencing does apply,
the December 18, 1997 order amounts to a resentencing.
We
believe Britt does apply and the appellant was entitled to
resentencing upon reaching his eighteenth birthday.
In Britt v. Commonwealth, 965 S.W.2d at 149, the
Supreme Court stated:
[W]e simply hold that KRS 635.020(4) does not
create a new category of adult offender that
precludes children transferred to circuit
court pursuant to it from eligibility for the
ameliorative provisions of KRS 640.040.
The Court further explained:
[T]he purpose of KRS 635.020 and KRS
640.010(2) was to permit the court to impose
the same term of years upon a juvenile for
which an adult would be liable, but to
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otherwise leave the circuit judge discretion
to probate or conditionally discharge the
juvenile, send the child for treatment, or
send the child to the adult correctional
system upon majority.
Id. at 150.
Thus, pursuant to KRS 635.020(4), a juvenile over
the age of 14 who commits a crime using a firearm is to be tried
and sentenced as an adult.
However, that juvenile remains a
“youthful offender” for purposes of KRS Chapter 640 and, at
eighteen, he is entitled to a resentencing hearing pursuant to
KRS 640.030 (Sentencing after conviction or plea of guilty),
which provides:
A youthful offender, if he is convicted of,
or pleads guilty to, a felony offense in
Circuit Court, shall be subject to the same
type of sentencing procedures and duration of
sentence, including probation and conditional
discharge, as an adult convicted of a felony
offense, except that:
. . . .
(2) Except as provided in KRS 640.070, any
sentence imposed upon the youthful offender
shall be served in a youth facility or
program operated by the Department of
Juvenile Justice until the expiration of the
sentence, the youthful offender is paroled,
the youthful offender is probated, or the
youthful offender reaches the age of eighteen
(18), whichever first occurs. If an
individual sentenced as a youthful offender
attains the age of eighteen (18) prior to the
expiration of his sentence, and has not been
probated or released on parole, that
individual shall be returned to the
sentencing court. At that time, the
sentencing court shall make one (1) of the
following determinations:
(a) Whether the youthful offender shall be
placed on probation or conditional discharge;
(b) Whether the youthful offender shall be
returned to the Department of Juvenile
Justice to complete a treatment program,
which treatment program shall not exceed a
period in excess of six (6) months. . . .
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(c) Whether the youthful offender shall be
incarcerated in an institution operated by
the Department of Corrections[.] (Emphasis
added.)
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and remand to the
circuit court for resentencing.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE, CONCURS BY SEPARATE OPINION.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE, CONCURRING.
As KRS 640.030(2)
requires that the “individual shall be returned to the sentencing
court,” I agree with the majority that Wells should have been
returned to the trial court for a hearing.
However, I do not
interpret the statute as requiring or allowing a “resentencing.”
Following the hearing, the trial court is merely required to make
one of the three determinations set forth in the statute.
EMBERTON, JUDGE, CONCURS BY SEPARATE OPINION.
EMBERTON, JUDGE, CONCURRING.
Though one may disagree
with the Britt court’s interpretation of Kentucky Revised Statute
(KRS 635.020(4), its language is clear.
Thus, the panel has no
choice but to remand for the court’s determination under KRS
640.030(2).
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
J. David Niehaus
Frank W. Heft, Jr.
Louisville, Kentucky
A. B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
Vickie L. Wise
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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