FRED MCGUFFEY v. BRIAN MCGUFFEY
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RENDERED: July 2, 1999; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1997-CA-003283-MR
FRED MCGUFFEY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM ALLEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM R. HARRIS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-CI-000035
v.
BRIAN MCGUFFEY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUDGEL, CHIEF JUDGE; KNOX, AND McANULTY, JUDGES.
McANULTY, JUDGE.
Fred McGuffey (Fred) brings this appeal from a
judgment of the Allen Circuit Court awarding his father, Brian
McGuffey (Brian), $7,492.35 based on the theory of quantum
meruit.
After reviewing the record, the arguments of counsel and
the applicable law, we affirm.
In the 1970’s, Fred was managing his paternal
grandfather’s farm with some assistance from his father.
During
this period, Brian borrowed several thousand dollars from
Farmer’s National Bank, with Fred acting as a co-signee on a few
of the promissory notes.
In 1979, Fred’s parents were divorced
and Brian moved away.
In the 1980’s Fred executed several new
“renewal” notes covering the debts on the original notes and also
made some payments on the debts.
In 1985, Brian and his sister
inherited the farm property, and Fred purchased his aunt’s
portion of the property.
In 1987, both Brian and Fred co-signed
a renewal note with TransFinancial Bank.
The proceeds from this
note were used to pay off the prior notes, to finance Fred’s
house, and to reimburse Fred’s aunt for transfer of her interest
in the farm realty to Fred.
Brian made several installment
payments on this note.
In approximately 1991, Brian returned to live on the
property inherited from his father that was adjacent to Fred’s
farm.
At that time, Brian began assisting Fred in farming and
cattle operations on his farm.
For several years, Brian
contributed by paying some of the expenses related to the cattle
operation and paying for repairs to a John Deere farm tractor
Fred had purchased in 1984 for $4,900.
In June 1994, the
proceeds from a loan from TransFinancial Bank evidenced by a
joint note co-signed by the parties in the amount of $1,700.00
was used to pay for some of the repairs to the John Deere
tractor.
At some point, the relationship between the parties
deteriorated to the point that Brian filed a lawsuit in February
1996.
In the complaint, Brian alleged that the parties had
entered into a joint venture with respect to the farming and
cattle operations on Fred’s farm.
Brian sought liquidation of
the cattle with an equal division of the proceeds, plus
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reimbursement for farm expenses he had paid in the amount of
$2,168.39.
Fred filed an Answer denying the existence of a joint
venture and affirmatively raising, inter alia, a statute of
limitations defense.1
The trial judge conducted a three-day evidentiary trial
without a jury in November 1996.
Witnesses at the trial included
both parties, the parties’ wives, Fred’s two brothers, the
parties’ former attorney, and Fred’s aunt (Brian’s sister).
Brian testified that the parties had a meeting and Fred had
agreed to conduct a joint venture farming operation.
Brian also
testified that he had paid approximately $16,000.00 for farming
expenses, $4,200.00 on the TransFinancial notes, and $3,300.00 to
repair the John Deere tractor with Fred’s consent.
Fred
testified that the farm and cattle had always belonged to him,
that he never agreed to a joint venture, that he had paid Brian’s
debts from the 1970’s, and that he had paid approximately $7,700
in farm related expenses.
In October 1997, the court entered a judgment that
included several findings of fact and conclusions of law.
First,
the court held that the claims were subject to a five-year
statute of limitations pursuant to KRS 413.120(1) and (6).2
Thus, any rights or liabilities arising prior to February 22,
1
Fred also filed a counterclaim seeking damages for an
alleged assault of his son by Brian. The trial court
subsequently dismissed the counterclaim with prejudice, and
Fred has not appealed the dismissal of the counterclaim.
2
Prior to the 1998 revision, KRS 413.120(1) applied to
actions on express of implied contracts not in writing, and KRS
413.120(6) applied to actions for injury to the rights of the
plaintiff, not arising on contract.
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1991 (the date the original complaint was filed) were barred by
limitations.
Second, the court found that there was no donative
intent by either party to make a gift related to their dealings.
Third, the court held that there was no meeting of the minds
sufficient to give rise to an agreement to enter into a joint
venture with respect to the farming operations.
Fourth, the
court held that Fred was the rightful owner of all the cattle and
the John Deere tractor.
Fifth, the court found that Brian acted
in good faith and was not barred from equitable relief based on
the “unclean hands” doctrine.
Sixth, the court held that under
the equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment or quantum meruit,
Brian was entitled to recover an amount equal to the benefit
conferred on Fred by his actions or payments.
Based on his assessment of the evidence involving
Brian’s payment of farm expenses and debts after February 22,
1991, the trial judge held that Brian should recover $4,192.35
for payments he made on the promissory notes covering farm debt,
and $3,300.00 for payment he made for repairs on the John Deere
tractor.
The court held that because Brian’s expenditures of
$6,954.64 for other farm expenses during the relevant period were
exceeded by the amount he received from the sale of cattle
($7,809.97), Fred received no benefit from these expenditures.
The court also held that Fred was solely responsible for the two
outstanding notes executed jointly by the parties in November
1992 to TransFinancial Bank because the proceeds were used for
the farm assets already found to belong to Fred.
In conclusion,
the court awarded Brian a judgment for $7,492.35 against Fred.
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On October 13, 1997, Fred filed a motion to alter, amend or
vacate the judgment pursuant to CR 59.05.
In November 1997, the
trial court summarily denied the CR 59.05 motion, and this appeal
followed.
We begin with the standard of review.
Under CR 52.01,
in an action tried without a jury, a trial court’s findings of
fact shall not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous.
Lawson v. Lord, Ky., 896 S.W.2d 1, 3 (1995); State Board for
Elementary and Secondary Education v. Ball, Ky., 847 S.W.2d 743
(1993).
A factual finding is not clearly erroneous if it is
supported by substantial evidence.
Owens-Corning Fiberglass
Corporation v. Golightly, Ky., 976 S.W.2d 409, 414 (1998); Schott
v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co.,Ky. App., 692 S.W.2d 810,
814 (1985).
“In this jurisdiction, ‘substantial evidence’ means
evidence of substance and relevant consequence having the fitness
to induce conviction in the minds of reasonable men.”
Golightly,
976 S.W.2d at 414.
A reviewing court must give great deference
to the conclusions of the fact-finder on
factual questions if supported by substantial
evidence and the opposite is not compelled.
When considering questions of law, or mixed
questions of law and fact, the reviewing
court has greater latitude to determine
whether the findings below were sustained by
evidence of probative value.
Uninsured Employer’s Fund v. Garland, Ky., 805 S.W.2d 116, 117
(1991)(citations omitted).
Under the principle of quantum
meruit, a court may exercise its equitable power to recognize a
contract implied by law in order to allow recovery to a party for
goods or services provided to another party.
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See Perkins v.
Daughtery, Ky. App., 722 S.W.2d 907 (1987).
Recovery in quantum
meruit or quasi-contract is available where the following three
elements exit: 1) a benefit is conferred upon another party at
the expense of the person seeking recovery; 2) the benefit
results in an appreciation by the recipient; and, 3) it would be
inequitable or unjust to allow the recipient to retain the
benefit without compensating the other party.
See Guarantee
Elec. Co. v. Big Rivers Elec. Corp., 669 F. Supp. 1371, 1380-81
(W.D. Ky. 1987).
In the case sub judice, Fred contends that the trial
court’s judgment results in a double recovery by Brian.
He
argues that Brian should not be allowed to recover the $4,192.35
for payments he made on several joint notes because they were
renewal notes for Brian’s original debt generated in the early
1970’s.
However, the relevant time period for determining the
parties rights and liabilities was limited to a five-year period
prior to the filing date of the complaint.
Fred’s argument
improperly attempts to incorporate liabilities attributable to
Brian prior to the applicable time period that are barred by the
statute of limitations. Fred does not dispute the fact that Brian
made several payments on the notes. Fred assumed liability for
these notes and derived a benefit from Brian’s payments on the
notes.
We cannot say the trial court erred in allowing Brian to
recover the amount he paid on these notes since February 1991.
Fred also challenges the trial court’s decision to
allow Brian to recover $3,300.00 in payments Brian made for
repairs to the John Deere tractor.
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Again, Fred does not dispute
the fact that Brian made payments in this amount for the repairs.
Fred argues, however, that he did not benefit from Brian’s action
because the payments were financed from the sale of two cows the
trial court held belonged to Fred, and from the proceeds of a
promissory note (tractor note) that the trial court had held Fred
solely responsible for paying the remaining balance.
The evidence shows that Brian made $1,050.00 in
payments on the tractor note, and the trial court’s order merely
obligated Fred to pay the remaining balance as of November 1996
of $1,768.10.
The trial court did not require Fred to reimburse
Brian for his payments on the note, in addition to paying Brian
the $3,300.00 for reimbursement for the repairs.
Additionally,
the trial court had already included the amounts Brian received
in selling the two cows in determining that Brian would not be
reimbursed for his payment of the various farm expenses.
Therefore, allowing Brian to receive reimbursement for the
$3,300.00 in payments for the farm tractor repairs that resulted
in an increase in the value of the tractor would not constitute
double recovery.
The evidence amply supports the trial court’s
finding on this issue.
Finally, Fred argues that Brian is limited in any
recovery to $2,168.39, which is the amount stated in the prayer
for relief in the complaint.
This issue was not properly
preserved for appellate review.
Fred’s general denial in his
Answer was not sufficient to preserve this issue.
Fred never
raised this issue specifically before the trial court.
An
appellate court will not review issues not raised in or decided
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by the trial court.
Regional Jail Authority v. Tackett, Ky., 770
S.W.2d 225 (1989); Hibbitts v. Cumberland Valley Nat’l Bank, Ky.
App., 977 S.W.2d 252 (1998); Massie v. Person, Ky. App., 729
S.W.2d 448 (1987), overruled on other grounds, Conner v. George
W. Whitesides Co., Ky., 834 S.W.2d 652 (1992).
The legal issue
of unjust enrichment was raised in the pleadings and formed the
basis of the trial court’s preliminary oral rulings from the
bench at the conclusion of the trial.
Fred did not present the
argument that any recovery was limited by the prayer in the
complaint in his pretrial compliance, at the trial, in his posttrial brief, or in his motion to alter, amend or vacate.
Therefore, he cannot raise it for the first time on appeal.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of
the Allen Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
David Goin
Scottsville, Kentucky
William P. Hagenbuch, Jr.
Scottsville, Kentucky
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