ROY MELANSON v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: April 16, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1997-CA-003280-MR
ROY MELANSON
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MEADE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE SAM MONARCH, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 89-CR-00025
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING WITH DIRECTIONS
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: EMBERTON, GUIDUGLI, AND MILLER, JUDGES.
MILLER, JUDGE: Roy Melanson brings this pro se appeal from a July
14, 1997, order of the Meade Circuit Court.
We reverse and
remand with directions.
On January 21, 1991, Melanson was adjudged a firstdegree persistent felony offender (PFO I) (Ky. Rev. Stat. (KRS)
532.080(3)) and sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment.
Melanson pursued a direct appeal of the sentence and, at the same
time, sought to stay execution of same during pendency of the
appeal as authorized under Ky. R. Crim. Proc. (RCr) 12.76(2).
He
was granted the stay and remained in the Meade County Jail.
Melanson was informed that he would “probably” not receive credit
for time served in jail pending the appeal.
Quickly after filing his direct appeal, Melanson,
acting pro se, filed a collateral proceeding under RCr 11.42,
attacking his conviction.
jail time.
He made no complaint about credit for
The circuit court denied relief, and an appeal was
brought to this court, then transferred to the supreme court to
be heard with the direct appeal.
92-SC-226-TG.
Still before his direct appeal was decided, Melanson
filed yet another pro se motion wherein he raised the question of
credit on his sentence then being served in the Meade County
Jail.
The motion was coupled with numerous other complaints.
On
March 23, 1992, all complaints were denied, and Special Judge
Robert M. Short noted that “many of the motions were so vague and
uncertain, and lacking in specificity as to make it difficult to
determine just what relief the petitioner seeks.”
That order was
appealed to, and affirmed by, this Court in Appeal No. 1992-CA000837-MR, rendered December 29, 1993.
Affirming the trial
court's decision, the appellate court made note of Judge Short's
comment concerning the vagueness and uncertainty of Melanson's
claims for relief.
The appellate opinion also noted that it
appeared that Melanson was seeking relief from matters “either
raised or should have been raised on direct appeal.”
On November 19, 1992, the supreme court affirmed the
direct appeal (No. 91-SC-0146-MR) and the RCr 11.42 appeal
transferred from the court of appeals (No. 92-SC-226-TG).
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On July 9, 1997, Melanson, still acting pro se, filed
the subject “Motion for Jail Time Credit.”
In this motion,
Melanson specifically sought credit for the time served in the
Meade County Jail from the date of his sentencing as a PFO I
offender (January 21, 1991) until the date on which the supreme
court affirmed his direct appeal (November 19, 1992).
Melanson
believed he was entitled to 667 days' credit under the authority
of KRS 532.120(3).
The motion was denied on July 14, 1997, thus
precipitating this appeal.
Melanson is proceeding pro se and without proper legal
assistance.
His July 9, 1997 “Motion for Jail Time Credit” and
his appellate brief herein are both inartfully drawn.
Upon
review of the record and relevant legal authorities, we are
inclined to view his “motion” as a request for relief pursuant to
Ky R. Civ. Proc. (CR) 60.02; cf. Wilson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 403
S.W.2d 710 (1966).
Our review will proceed accordingly.
As Melanson had previously raised the issue of jail
time credit in a prior proceeding, the Commonwealth argues that
this issue is barred from consideration by the doctrine of res
judicata.
We disagree.
In his prior Motion for Jail Time
Credit, Melanson proceeded pro se, and the court was not fully
advised upon the law.
We observe that by enactment of CR 60.02,
the writs of coram nobis and coram vobis were abolished.
However, the inherent power of a court to remedy a fundamentally
unjust judgment remains.
Cf. Robinson v. United States, 264 F.
Supp. 146 (W.D. Ky. 1967) (invoking the court's inherent power to
satisfy the ends of justice); People v. Geresewitz, 294 NY 163,
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61 N.E.2d 427, cert. dismissed 326 U.S. 687, 66 S. Ct. 89, 90 L.
Ed. 404 (1945) (recognizing the inherent right of the court to
correct its own judgment to prevent opression); and 18 Am. Jur.
2d Coram Nobis §5 (1985).
We believe the “ends of justice”
require and permit this Court to review the issue of Melanson's
jail time credit under CR 60.02.
We turn now to an examination
of this action upon the merits.
We are of the opinion that Melanson is entitled to
credit upon his sentence for time spent in the Meade County Jail
during pendency of his direct appeal.
Our ratiocination revolves
around the proper interpretation of KRS 532.120(3) and that
statute's effect upon RCr 12.76(2).
The supreme court promulgated RCr 12.76(2), which
became effective January 1, 1963, and which currently states as
follows:
Imprisonment. The execution of a sentence
of imprisonment shall be stayed if an appeal
is taken and the defendant elects not to
commence service of the sentence or is
admitted to bail.
Upon adoption, RCr 12.76(2)'s intent was clear: A defendant who
elected not to commence service of sentence and to remain in jail
would not receive credit for such time served.
Commonwealth, Ky., 690 S.W.2d 128 (1985).
See Blanton v.
Thereafter, in 1974,
our legislature enacted KRS 532.120(3), which currently provides
as follows:
Time spent in custody prior to the
commencement of a sentence as a result of the
charge that culminated in the sentence shall
be credited by the court imposing sentence
toward service of the maximum term of
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imprisonment. If the sentence is to an
indeterminate term of imprisonment, the time
spent in custody prior to the commencement of
the sentence shall be considered for all
purposes as time served in prison. [Emphases
added.]
The statute's unambiguous language requires that all time spent
in custody prior to the commencement of sentence be credited
toward the maximum term of imprisonment.
KRS 532.120(1) provides
that a sentence commences “when the prisoner is received in an
institution under the jurisdiction of the Department of
Corrections.”
KRS 532.120(3)'s effect is clear.
By enactment of the
statute, the legislature of this Commonwealth clearly signaled a
shift in policy and mandated that any time spent in custody,
prior to commencement of sentence, be credited.
This, we
believe, necessarily includes time spent in custody for whatever
reason, including time spent while an appeal is pending.
We
recognize that such interpretation of KRS 532.120(3) will have
the practical consequence of nullifying the underlying intent of
RCr 12.76(2).
Nevertheless, we firmly believe the result is
mandated and justified.
We are fortified in our opinion by reference to the
historical progression of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
38(a)(2), a counterpart of RCr 12.76(2):
. . . Until 1966 Rule 38(a)(2) provided that
a defendant might elect not to commence
service of his sentence. [Footnote omitted.]
If he did so, he could not be confined in a
penitentiary [footnote omitted] and his
sentence was considered stayed. He was,
however, in custody. . . .
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Unless the defendant affirmatively
elected not to commence service of his
sentence, the sentence began to run
automatically. [Footnote omitted.] This was
an improvement over the former Criminal
Appeals Rule, which had provided for an
automatic stay unless the defendant made an
affirmative election to enter upon the
service of the sentence. [Footnote omitted.]
The importance of all this is that, as the
law stood until recently, a prisoner did not
receive credit for time served against his
sentence unless he was serving the sentence.
Merely being in custody in a jail entitled
him to no credit. . . . Two developments in
1966 cured what had been an undesirable
situation. Rule 38(a)(2) was amended by
eliminating the election not to commence
service. [Footnote omitted.] Thus if a
defendant is not released, on bail or
otherwise, there is no stay and the sentence
begins to run automatically. . . .
Nine days before the 1966 amendment of
Rule 38(a)(2) took effect, Congress adopted a
statute, effective ninety days later, that
made a more sweeping revision. As a part of
the Bail Reform Act of 1966, Congress amended
the statute on computation of time under
sentences to require that credit be given for
any days spent in custody in connection with
the offense or acts for which sentence was
imposed. [Citation omitted.] This . . .
make[s] it clear that a prisoner in custody
pending appeal receives credit for that time
no matter where it is served. [Emphases
added.]
3 Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure, Rule 38, § 632 (2d ed.
1982).
We construe the Bail Reform Act of 1966 as substantially
similar in purpose and effect to KRS 532.120(3).
We see no
reason why they should not be given a concomitant interpretation
relative to jail time credit.
Upon the foregoing, we are of the opinion that Melanson
is entitled to relief under CR 60.02(e) and/or (f).
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We therefore
hold that Melanson is due credit for time served in the Meade
County Jail from the date of his sentencing (January 21, 1991)
until the date his direct appeal was affirmed by the supreme
court (November 19, 1992).
We invite the supreme court's
further examination of this vexing issue.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Meade
Circuit Court is reversed.
This cause is remanded with
directions that an amended judgment of sentence be entered giving
Melanson appropriate credit for time served in the Meade County
Jail during pendency of his direct appeal.
ALL CONCUR.
PRO SE BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Roy Melanson
Burgin, KY
A. B. Chandler III
Attorney General
and
Todd D. Ferguson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
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