BILLY JOE STACY V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: April 23, 1999; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1997-CA-003268-MR
BILLY JOE STACY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BREATHITT CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LARRY MILLER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 95-CR-20
V.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION AFFIRMING
* * * * * * * *
BEFORE:
GUDGEL, Chief Judge; COMBS and DYCHE, Judges.
GUDGEL, CHIEF JUDGE:
This is an appeal from a judgment entered
by the Breathitt Circuit Court.
Appellant, Billy Joe Stacy, was
convicted of second-degree manslaughter and sentenced to ten
years’ imprisonment.
On appeal appellant contends that the trial
court erred by denying his motion for a continuance, by failing
to disqualify the entire jury panel, and by failing to allow a
certain witness to testify regarding statements made by
appellant.
We disagree with all of appellant’s contentions.
Hence, we affirm.
Appellant was indicted for murder stemming from a May
1995 stabbing death.
At trial the Commonwealth adduced evidence
that in the early morning hours of May 4, 1995, appellant went to
the home of his cousin, Clifford Hollon, and was introduced to
Hollon’s father-in-law, the victim William Shepherd.
After
Hollon and his wife went to sleep in another room, appellant and
Shepherd watched television and drank beer.
Two of Hollon’s
three children testified that they were awake after 5:00 a.m.,
preparing for school, when they observed appellant stabbing
Shepherd with a butcher knife without apparent provocation.
Hollon and his wife each testified that they were awakened by the
children’s screaming and they went into the living room,
whereupon they saw Shepherd wounded in the chest and appellant
holding a bloody knife.
stabbed.
Shepherd died shortly after he was
Appellant left the house through the back door and was
arrested later that morning.
Appellant denied involvement with the murder.
He
testified that he and Shepherd were the only persons awake in the
house at 5:00 a.m. when he went outside to use the bathroom, that
an unknown person pushed him into a creek, and that he then heard
Hollon’s wife shouting that he killed her father.
Appellant
further testified that he then walked away from Hollon’s house.
The jury convicted appellant of second-degree manslaughter and
recommended a sentence of ten years’ imprisonment.
This appeal
followed.
First, appellant contends that the trial court erred by
failing to grant his motion for a continuance which was made on
the morning of the trial.
We disagree.
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A trial court is vested with broad discretion in ruling
on a motion for a continuance.
S.W.2d 335 (1995).
Dishman v. Commonwealth, Ky., 906
Its decision will not be disturbed on appeal
absent a clear showing of an abuse of its discretion.
Commonwealth, Ky., 869 S.W.2d 719 (1994).
Hunter v.
The procedure for
obtaining a continuance due to the absence of a witness is
clearly stated in RCr 9.04:
A motion by the defendant for a postponement
on account of the absence of evidence may be
made only upon affidavit showing the
materiality of the evidence expected to be
obtained, and that due diligence has been
used to obtain it. If the motion is based on
the absence of a witness, the affidavit must
show what facts the affiant believes the
witness will prove, and not merely the effect
of such facts in evidence, and that the
affiant believes them to be true. . . .
Clearly, a trial court does not abuse its discretion by
denying a continuance due to a party’s failure to submit the
affidavit as required by RCr 9.04.
App., 582 S.W.2d 54 (1979).
McIntosh v. Commonwealth, Ky.
Indeed, a party seeking a
continuance based upon the absence of a witness must demonstrate
that reasonable steps were used to secure the witness’s
attendance.
Delacey v. Commonwealth, Ky., 494 S.W.2d 735 (1973).
Moreover, the party requesting a continuance must show that a
subpoena was issued for the witness.
Ky., 717 S.W.2d 831 (1986).
Corbett v. Commonwealth,
Further, once a subpoena is issued,
the party must make diligent efforts to serve the subpoena.
Cornwell v. Commonwealth, Ky., 523 S.W.2d 224 (1975).
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Here, appellant sought a continuance on the day of
trial because one of the three alleged eyewitnesses to the
murder, Jimmy Hollon, did not appear to testify.
Specifically,
appellant requested a continuance based upon his unsupported
allegation that two unidentified persons said that Jimmy Hollon
implicated his father in William Shepherd’s murder.
However,
during a hearing appellant could not identify for the court the
persons to whom Jimmy Hollon implicated his father.
Further, appellant did not file an affidavit as
required by RCr 9.04.
Moreover, the instant action clearly does
not involve a situation where the defendant had inadequate time
to investigate and locate either the missing witness or the two
unidentified persons who allegedly implicated the victim’s
son-in-law.
Indeed, appellant does not suggest otherwise.
More
important, appellant’s trial had been continued twice before, yet
appellant offered no explanation whatever as to the reason for
waiting until the day of trial to request a continuance.
Nor did
appellant make any assurances that either Jimmy Hollon or the two
unidentified persons could be located if the trial was continued.
See Farris v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 836 S.W.2d 451 (1992).
Finally, we note there is nothing in the record to establish that
appellant even requested that a subpoena be issued for the
missing witness prior to trial.
Given the obvious deficiencies
and circumstances confronting the trial court, it is clear that
it did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s motion for
a continuance.
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Next, appellant contends that the trial court erred by
failing to disqualify the entire jury panel on the ground that
the spouse of a potential witness was on the panel.
We disagree.
A criminal defendant “is entitled to be tried by a fair
and impartial jury composed of members who are disinterested and
free from bias and prejudice, actual or implied or reasonably
inferred.”
(1960).
Tayloe v. Commonwealth, Ky., 335 S.W.2d 556, 558
Bias on behalf of a potential juror may be implied from
a close relationship with a party, counsel, victim, or witness
resulting from familial, financial, or situational ties.
Commonwealth, Ky., 695 S.W.2d 404 (1985).
Ward v.
In Hellard v.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 829 S.W.2d 427, 429 (1992), this court
held that a “‘close relationship’ of the situational type” was
established where the complaining witness was a member of the
jury panel, had served with four other members of the jury panel,
and “had numerous opportunities to meet the other members” of the
panel.”
Nevertheless, the mere fact that one member of the jury
panel may have some type of relationship with a party, counsel,
victim or witness does not require disqualification of the entire
jury panel.
Indeed, disqualification is warranted only where the
prospective jurors’ knowledge precludes impartiality.
Bowling v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 942 S.W.2d 293 (1997), cert. denied, ____ U.S.
____, 118 S.Ct. 451, 139 L.Ed.2d 387 (1997).
Our supreme court
recently held in Scholler v. Commonwealth, Ky., 969 S.W.2d 706
(1998), that bias was not implied where a prospective juror and
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the prosecutor were both members of large card club and knew each
other through mutual friends.
Further, bias is not implied from
a mere acquaintanceship with the defendant.
Ky. App., 840 S.W.2d 827 (1992).
Key v. Commonwealth,
Likewise, bias is not implied
on behalf of a former patient of a defendant doctor in a medical
malpractice case.
Altman v. Allen, Ky., 850 S.W.2d 44 (1992).
Here, appellant argues that the entire jury panel
should have been excused because Brenda Deaton, the wife of one
of the Commonwealth’s witnesses, was a member of the jury panel.
John Deaton testified for the Commonwealth that he lived
approximately one-half mile from Clifford Hollon, that around
6:00 a.m. the day of the murder appellant was in his yard, and
that appellant said to him “I didn’t kill that fellow over
there,” but thereafter stated, “Yeah, I did -- I shoved a knife
plumb through him.”
However, appellant’s assertion on appeal that “the
jurors had served together and had tried cases together” is not
supported by the record.
Indeed, the record shows that half of
the jury panel had been serving for a few months while the other
half of the panel had been recently empaneled.
Further, the
record does not demonstrate whether Ms. Deaton had previously
served with other members of the jury panel, and as noted by the
trial court, no showing was made as to whether the other members
of the jury panel would recognize that Ms. Deaton was the wife of
one of the witnesses.
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Appellant urges that Hellard, supra, controls this
case.
Clearly, however, Hellard is inapposite.
Here, unlike in
Hellard, 829 S.W.2d at 429, the record simply fails to establish
that a “‘close relationship’ of the situational type” had
developed between Ms. Deaton and other prospective jurors.
Rather, the record shows that during the thorough voir dire
examination, the trial court carefully considered the answers of
the prospective jurors and eliminated possible prejudice to
appellant.
Ms. Deaton was stricken for cause, as were other
prospective jurors whose impartiality was subject to question.
In last analysis, given the record before us, we simply cannot
say that the trial court abused its considerable discretion by
denying appellant’s motion to strike the entire jury panel
because a witness’s spouse was a member of the panel.
Finally, appellant contends that the trial court erred
by excluding certain testimony regarding statements allegedly
made by him subsequent to the murder.
However, we agree with the
Commonwealth that this issue was not properly preserved for
review.
The excluded testimony which was submitted by avowal
consisted of a school bus driver’s testimony that a man flagged
down his bus and told him, “[S]omebody stabbed his buddy.”
At
trial, appellant argued that this testimony should be admitted
for the purpose of impeaching the testimony of another witness.
On appeal, however, he urges that the testimony should have been
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admitted under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay
rule.
Appellant cannot present one theory to the trial court
and another theory to the appellate court.
Duke, Ky., 750 S.W.2d 432 (1988).
preserved for review.
See Commonwealth v.
Hence, this issue was not
More important, there is no merit in the
contention in any event.
To qualify an otherwise inadmissible
hearsay statement under the excited utterance exception, the
proponent must adduce evidence that the “declarant was under the
stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.”
803(2).
KRE
the rule.
Here, appellant did not comply with this requirement of
Thus, no reversible error in this vein occurred.
The court’s judgment is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Kim Brooks
Covington, KY
A.B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Courtney A. Jones
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
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