LORNA A. BUNDY v. DON R. BUNDY
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RENDERED: December 10, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
NO.
1997-CA-003260-MR AND
1997-CA-003294-MR(CROSS)
LORNA A. BUNDY
APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN R. ADAMS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 95-CI-03237
v.
DON R. BUNDY
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART;
VACATING IN PART; AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, EMBERTON, AND GUIDUGLI, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE.
This is an appeal by Lorna A. Bundy (Lorna)
from dissolution of marriage proceedings in the Fayette Circuit
Court.
Lorna appeals the division of marital property and debt,
as well as the court’s classification of certain property as the
appellee’s non-marital property.
There is also a cross-appeal by
Don R. Bundy (Don) challenging the trial court’s valuation of
Blue Grass Manufacturing, Inc. (Blue Grass Manufacturing), the
parties’ most valuable marital asset; the valuation of his
nonmarital interest in a townhouse; and the trial court’s
assigning of “final decision-making power” regarding the parties’
child to Lorna, even though Don was awarded joint-custody of the
child.
The parties were married on December 2, 1979 and
separated in October 1995.
1997.
Divorce was granted on November 20,
The parties have one child, Laura, born April 10, 1981.
A contested trial was held on June 3 and 4, 1997.
On
September 10, 1997, the trial court entered its order granting
decision making authority of Laura to Lorna; establishing
visitation guidelines; awarding Lorna child support pursuant to
the guidelines based upon Don’s actual income of $84,000.00 per
year and Lorna’s imputed income of $22,000.00 per year; awarding
Lorna maintenance of $750.00 per month for twenty-four months;
assigning debts; and distributing marital and non-marital
property.
A supplemental order entered on September 11, 1997,
required Don to pay $4,000.00 of Lorna’s attorney fees.
Lorna filed a “motion to reconsider” and Don filed a
motion to alter, vacate, or amend.
On November 20, 1997, the
trial court entered an order altering and amending its
September 10, 1997 order.
The amendments primarily concerned the
assignment of debts and the distribution of property.
Following
this, both sides filed appeals to this court.
Lorna argues that the trial court abused its discretion
by awarding Don a two-thirds interest in Blue Grass
Manufacturing.
The parties’ most valuable marital asset is Blue
Grass Manufacturing.
Don’s expert valued Blue Grass
Manufacturing at -$433,555.00, while Lorna’s expert valued the
business at $393,750.00.
The trial court accepted Lorna’s
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evaluation.
In its property distribution, the trial court
awarded Blue Grass Manufacturing two-thirds to Don and one-third
to Lorna “because Mr. Bundy has been the primary moving force
behind this business[.]”
Lorna contends that Blue Grass
Manufacturing should have been divided equally between the
parties.
KRS 403.190(1) requires the trial court to
divide the marital property . . . in just
proportions considering all relevant factors
including:
(a) Contribution of each spouse to
acquisition of the marital property,
including contribution of a spouse as
homemaker;
(b) Value of the property set apart to each
spouse;
(c) Duration of the marriage; and
(d) Economic circumstances of each spouse
when the division of property is to become
effective, including the desirability of
awarding the family home or the right to live
therein for reasonable periods to the spouse
having custody of any children.
With certain exceptions, “‘marital property’ means all property
acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage[.]”
KRS
403.190(2).
There is no statutory basis requiring that property be
divided equally.
Wood v. Wood, Ky. App., 720 S.W.2d 934, 935
(1986) (award of $1,024,525 to husband and $512,000, including
$300,000 cash, to wife upheld).
“This court cannot disturb the
findings of a trial court in a case involving dissolution of
marriage unless those findings are clearly erroneous.”
Cochran
v. Cochran, Ky. App., 746 S.W.2d 568, 569-570 (1988);
Johnson v.
Johnson, Ky. App., 564 S.W.2d 221 (1978).
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The division and
valuation of property is within the sound discretion of the trial
court. Cochran at 570.
Lorna’s argument regarding the distribution of Blue
Grass Manufacturing is unpersuasive because it fails to take into
consideration the over-all property distribution.
The trial
court’s task is to distribute the marital property in just
proportions.
This does not preclude the trial court, within its
sound discretion, from awarding one particular item of marital
property in a greater proportion to one spouse as long as the
over-all distribution is in just proportions.
Hence, we may not
overturn the trial court’s distribution on the sole basis that it
did not award Lorna a fifty percent share of Blue Grass
Manufacturing.
Lorna does not provide us with a complete property
distribution analysis; however, it is clear that the trial court
did not award Don two-thirds of the business and split all other
property fifty-fifty.
For instance, Lorna received, exclusively,
the 533 Laketower 131 townhouse which had an equity value of
approximately $58,000.00.1
Don also points out that Lorna
received $31,875.00 in personalty to his $1,000.00.
Lorna also
received, net of the non-marital portion, the exclusive award of
the parties’ jewelry business valued at $14,777.00.
Lorna has
focused on one asset, albeit the largest marital asset, and has
failed to fully take into consideration the trial court’s
distributions which operated in her favor.
1
In summary,
See, however, pg. 10, infra, regarding Don’s
nonmarital interest in this property.
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Lorna
has failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion in
its overall distribution of the parties’ marital property.
Lorna’s second argument is that the trial court abused
its discretion by awarding her only one-third of Blue Grass
Manufacturing but awarding her one-half the marital debt. A trial
court should divide the couple's marital debts in light of its
distribution of the marital assets, and its assignment of debt is
within its discretion.
24, 26 (1994).
Russell v. Russell, Ky. App., 878 S.W.2d
As with her first argument, Lorna again has
mistakenly focused on the trial court’s treatment of Blue Grass
Manufacturing as opposed to the overall distribution of marital
property.
It was not, per se, an abuse of discretion for the
trial court to award her only one-third of Blue Grass
Manufacturing and at the same time award her one-half of the
marital debt.
Lorna’s third argument is that Don did not properly
trace the $20,000.00 non-marital investment in Blue Grass
Manufacturing assigned to him by the trial court.
All property
acquired by either spouse in the course of the marriage is
presumed to be marital property.
KRS 403.190(3).
However, this
presumption may be overcome by showing that the property was
acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or descent.
Alternatively, a
party may overcome the presumption by showing through “tracing”
that the property was acquired in exchange for property acquired
by gift, bequest, devise, or descent.
KRS 403.190(2); Chenault
v. Chenault, Ky., 799 S.W.2d 575 (1990);
App., 562 S.W.2d 665 (1978);
Turley v. Turley, Ky.
Brunson v. Brunson, Ky. App., 569
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S.W.2d 173 (1978);
(1979);
Allen v. Allen, Ky. App., 584 S.W.2d 599
Daniels v. Daniels, Ky. App., 726 S.W.2d 705 (1986);
Sharp v. Sharp, Ky., 516 S.W.2d 875 (1974).
While the earlier
cases prescribed somewhat rigid tracing requirements, including a
documentation requirement, Chenault “relax[ed] some of the
draconian requirements heretofore laid down . . . .
in part, in
reliance upon the trial courts of Kentucky to detect deception
and exaggeration or to require additional proof when such is
suspected.”
Chenault at 579.
The $20,000.00 non-marital interest found in Blue Grass
Manufacturing relates to a $20,000 loan received from Don’s
mother.
Upon the mother’s death, the estate forgave the loan.
The mother died in July 1981 and Blue Grass Manufacturing was
purchased in December 1981.
There was testimony that Don
received an additional $43,000.00 in distributions from his
mother’s estate prior to closing on Blue Grass Manufacturing.
Don, in fact, testified that these amounts went toward the
purchase of Blue Grass Manufacturing and that his actual
nonmarital contribution toward acquiring the business was
$63,000.00.
There is conflicting testimony regarding this issue.
We agree with Lorna that Don has not thoroughly documented the
flow of monies received from his mother into the purchase of Blue
Grass Manufacturing, and under pre-Chenault tracing requirements
Don has probably failed to meet his tracing burden.
However,
Chenault relaxed those requirements and left it to the trial
courts to detect deception and exaggeration and require
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additional proof when necessary.
Don largely bases his tracing
upon the testimony of himself and his brother.
Lorna disputes
that testimony and claims that the $20,000.00 went into the
purchase of a house.
We must give due regard to the opportunity
of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.
52.01.
CR
We cannot say that the trial court’s finding that Don
possessed a $20,000.00 interest in Blue Grass Manufacturing was
clearly erroneous.
Having traced this nonmarital property into
the purchase of Blue Grass Manufacturing, Don was entitled to a
set-off for it.
KRS 403.190.
Lorna’s final argument is that the trial court erred in
determining that Don had a $12,500.00 non-marital interest in the
parties’ business Jewelry & Etc.
The origin of the $12,500.00
non-marital interest was Don’s share of the proceeds from the
sale of the mother’s home.
As we understand her argument, Lorna concedes that Don
had at least a $12,500.00 non-marital interest in the jewelry
business.
Inasmuch as Lorna concedes the point, the trial court
did not err in finding that Don had a $12,500.00 nonmarital
interest in the jewelry business and awarding him a set-off for
that interest.
In his cross-appeal,
Don argues that the trial court
abused its discretion when it failed to deduct the shareholder
debt to Blue Grass Manufacturing, Inc. in determining its
valuation.
Don contends that the debt as of the operative date
of valuation of Bluegrass Manufacturing, December 31, 1996, was
$129,000.00.
Similarly,
Don argues that the trial court abused
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its discretion when it valued Blue Grass Manufacturing at
$393,750.00.
A trial court's valuation in a divorce action will not
be disturbed on appeal unless it is clearly contrary to the
weight of the evidence,
Heller v. Heller, Ky.
945, 947 (1984); Underwood v. Underwood, Ky.
439, 444 (1992).
App., 672 S.W.2d
App., 836 S.W.2d
“[T]he trial court's judgment and valuations in
an action for divorce will not be disturbed on appeal unless it
was clearly contrary to the weight of evidence.”
Ky. App., 782 S.W.2d 56, 58 (1990).
Clark v. Clark,
In this case we cannot
conclude that the trial court was clearly erroneous in its
conclusion to assign no deduction for shareholder debt or in
setting the value of Blue Grass Manufacturing at $393,750.00.
Roberts v. Roberts, Ky.
App., 587 S.W.2d 281, 283 (1979).
The trial court heard conflicting evidence and
determined that the valuation testimony presented by Lorna’s
expert was the more credible and accordingly valued Blue Grass
Manufacturing at $393,750.00, a valuation which took into
consideration the assets and debts of the company, including
shareholder debt.
The parties each presented expert testimony
regarding the value of Blue Grass Manufacturing, and, in this
battle of the experts, the trial court chose to accept the
valuation proposed by Lorna’s expert. “Under CR 52.01, the
Appellate Court's review of the trial court's decision is limited
to reversing only clearly erroneous findings, keeping in mind
that the trial court had opportunity to hear evidence and observe
witnesses so as to judge credibility.” Chalupa v. Chalupa, Ky.
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App., 830 S.W.2d 391, 393 (1992); Bealert v. Mitchell, Ky.
585 S.W.2d 412 (1979).
App.,
Disagreeing with a finding is not
sufficient to rule the finding as clearly erroneous.
Hence we
must affirm the trial court’s valuation of Bluegrass
manufacturing.
Don’s third argument is that the trial court erred by
failing to determine that he had a $16,240.00 non-marital
interest in a townhouse located at 543 Laketower #131.
Don
contends that he purchased the townhouse in June 1979, six months
prior to the parties’ marriage, and made a down payment of
$7,200.00.
The value of the condominium was stipulated by the
parties as $105,000.00, and the outstanding mortgage was
$47,000.00, for an equity balance of $58,000.00.
Don contends
that after application of the formula set forth in Brandenburg v.
Brandenburg, Ky. App. 617 S.W.2d 871 (1981), that his non-marital
interest in the townhouse is $16,240.00.
Don’s trial exhibit 7 is a closing statement dated
June, 22, 1979, for property located at 542 Laketower Drive,
Lexington.
From all appearances the statement refers to 543
Laketower #131, the property awarded exclusively to Lorna.
settlement statement shows that Don
The
paid cash at closing of
$9,987.44, and that his closing costs were $2,707.44, for a net
equity down payment on the townhouse of $7,280.00.
Don claims
nonmarital improvements of $1,706.00, and, after application of
the Brandenburg formula to the stipulated value of $105,000.00,
Don claims a nonmarital interest in the home of $16,240.00.
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In its November 20, 1997, order, in addressing this
issue following Don’s motion to modify or amend, the trial court
stated, “[t]his Court hereby finds that there is not sufficient
evidence of record to establish any other nonmarital interest of
[Don] other than the $20,000.00 nonmarital interest in Blue Grass
Manufacturing and the $12,500.00 nonmarital interest in Jewelry &
Etc.[.]”
The closing statement dated six month’s prior to the
parties’ marriage is sufficient to establish Don’s claim to a
non-marital interest in the townhouse.
We believe the trial
court was clearly erroneous in its determination that Don did not
have a nonmarital interest in the townhouse.
We therefore vacate
that portion of the trial court’s order and remand for a
determination of Don’s nonmarital interest in the townhouse under
Brandenburg.
We note, however, that in its September 10, 1997,
order the trial court stated, “Lorna Bundy is awarded [533
Laketower 131]. . . .[t]his Court has reviewed the Brandenburg
calculations submitted by [Don], but finds that in order to
equalize the final distribution of property that the appropriate
way to resolve this particular issue is as set forth above.”
This would indicate that the trial court based its original
property distribution upon the premise that Lorna would receive
the full equity value in the townhouse.
If, upon remand, after
Don is awarded his nonmarital interest in the townhouse, the
trial court determines that the distribution is not then in just
proportions, the trial court should make any additional
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adjustments to the overall property distribution to ensure that
the property is distributed in just proportions.
Don’s final argument is that the trial court erred when
it awarded Lorna final decision making-authority regarding Laura
despite the fact that Don has joint custody of Laura.
Laura was born on April 10, 1981.
1999, and is now emancipated.
Laura turned 18 on April 10,
This issue is moot, and we will
therefore not address it.
For the foregoing reasons, the orders of the Fayette
Circuit Court are affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in
part.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT/CROSSAPPELLEE:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE/CROSSAPPELLANT:
Sandra Mendez-Dawahare
Kathleen Campbell Deskins
Lexington, Kentucky
Anita M. Britton
Susan B. Jones
Lexington, Kentucky
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