JOE THOMAS TURNER, JR. v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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June 25, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1997-CA-003213-MR
JOE THOMAS TURNER, JR.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEPHEN P. RYAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-CR-01384
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
HUDDLESTON, JOHNSON AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Joe Thomas Turner (Turner) appeals from the
judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court entered on December 4,
1997, pursuant to a plea of guilty.
Turner was convicted of rape
in the first degree (Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 510.040),
assault in the second degree (KRS 508.020), burglary in the first
degree (KRS 511.020), unlawful imprisonment in the second degree
(KRS 509.030), escape in the second degree (KRS 520.030), and
theft by unlawful taking over $300 (KRS 514.030).
Turner claims
the trial court erred in reinstating his guilty plea after having
allowed him to withdraw it.
We reverse and remand.
Turner was alleged to have committed the offenses of
rape, assault, burglary, and unlawful imprisonment on March 9,
1996, against C.R., with whom Turner had had a sexual
relationship for a period of years.
Turner had apparently found
C.R. actively engaged in a sex act with Carl Payne (Payne) before
committing these offenses against C.R.
Turner was indicted for
these offenses and for the additional offenses of escape and
theft that were alleged to have occurred on January 14, 1996.1
At a pretrial hearing, the trial court ruled that
evidence of Turner’s prior bad acts against C.R. would be
admissible at trial.
These prior bad acts included two prior
convictions for assault in the fourth degree and two other
alleged assaults in January and February 1996.
Subsequent to
this ruling, on August 26, 1996, Turner accepted the
Commonwealth’s offer on a plea of guilty, but, pursuant to
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 8.09, reserved his
right to appeal from this evidentiary ruling.
Turner also
continued to maintain his innocence by entering his guilty plea
pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160,
27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970).
On August 29, 1997, Turner filed a complaint with the
Kentucky Bar Association (KBA) claiming that his attorney (1) had
not “come to see” him in seventeen months; (2) had failed to
attempt to get a charge amended in light of the fact that he had
already served time; and (3) had told him at one time that she
1
It was alleged that Turner escaped from home detention and
took property belonging to the home detention program. Before
trial, the escape and theft charges were severed from the
original charges.
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could win his case only later to recommend he accept the plea
offer because she did not think she could win.
On September 29,
1997, Turner filed in the trial court a pro se motion to withdraw
his guilty plea.
And, on October 9, 1997, Turner, through
counsel, filed an additional motion pursuant to RCr 8.10 to
withdraw his guilty plea.
Both of these motions relied upon
grounds similar to the KBA complaint Turner had filed.
On November 4, 1997, the trial court entered an order
that allowed the guilty plea to be withdrawn and a plea of not
guilty substituted therefor.
On November 14, 1997, the
Commonwealth filed a motion for the trial court to reconsider its
order that had permitted Turner to withdraw his guilty plea.
The
Commonwealth claimed that it would be prejudiced by the
withdrawal of the guilty plea because of the difficulties it
would encounter in securing the attendance of its witnesses for
trial.
In particular, the Commonwealth noted that it had learned
that one of its witnesses, Avery Bartee (Bartee), had died.
It
is not clear from the record when Bartee died, but the
Commonwealth has not alleged that Turner had knowledge of her
death when he moved to withdraw his guilty plea.
The
Commonwealth claimed that while Bartee was not an eyewitness, she
was a material witness in that her testimony would have
corroborated the testimony of both Payne and C.R.
Payne is deaf,
does not work and does not have a permanent address.
The
Commonwealth argued that Payne was an eyewitness to a portion of
the events surrounding the charges, and that Bartee was also
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needed to locate Payne.
The Commonwealth claimed that Payne does
not understand sign language and can barely lip read and that in
the past Bartee had been able to help Payne communicate and
therefore her death would hinder Payne’s ability to testify.
The
Commonwealth claimed that Bartee’s death would place it in the
position of attempting to prove its case without essential
witnesses that had previously been available to testify on the
August 26 trial date.
On December 1, 1997, the trial court
vacated its order of November 4, 1997, that had permitted Turner
to withdraw his guilty plea, and reinstated his plea of guilty.
Turner was sentenced to a total of fifteen years in prison.
This
appeal followed.
The issue before this Court is whether the trial court
had the authority to reconsider its order that allowed Turner to
withdraw his guilty plea.
in Kentucky.
This is an issue of first impression
We begin by noting that the parties agree that
pursuant to RCr 8.10 the trial court was within its discretion to
allow Turner to withdraw his guilty plea.
RCr 8.10 states as
follows:
At any time before judgment the court may
permit the plea of guilty or guilty but
mentally ill, to be withdrawn and a plea of
not guilty substituted.
If the court rejects the plea agreement,
the court shall, on the record, inform the
parties of this fact, advise the defendant
personally in open court or, on a showing of
good cause, in camera, that the court is not
bound by the plea agreement, afford the
defendant the opportunity to then withdraw
his plea, and advise the defendant that if he
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persists in his guilty plea the disposition
of the case may be less favorable to the
defendant than that contemplated by the plea
agreement.
The court can defer accepting or rejecting
the plea agreement until there has been an
opportunity to consider the presentence
report.
Turner relies on Haight v. Commonwealth, Ky., 938
S.W.2d 243 (1996), and Haight v. Williamson, Ky., 833 S.W.2d 821
(1992), for the proposition that once the trial court entered the
order permitting him to withdraw his guilty plea, the status quo
was restored and the Commonwealth and he were both entitled to
proceed to trial.
While Haight v. Commonwealth and Haight v.
Williamson do not specifically address the issue in the case sub
judice, i.e., whether the trial court erred in reconsidering its
ruling after having allowed Turner to withdraw his guilty plea,
the Supreme Court in Haight v. Williamson, supra, at 824, did
state that its previous opinion ordering the withdrawal of the
guilty plea “returned [Haight] to the place he was in before the
plea agreement was entered.”
We find this language to be
persuasive in holding that Turner was restored all his
constitutional rights as a defendant who had pleaded not guilty.
The Commonwealth also argues that the trial court’s
reconsideration of the withdrawal of the guilty plea was merely
an action taken by the trial court to correct a previous error.
The Commonwealth cites Potter v. Eli Lilly and Company, Ky., 926
S.W.2d 449 (1996), for the principle that the court had the
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inherent power to correct this error.
The Supreme Court in
Potter stated:
We are persuaded that there are certain
implied powers which are inherent in any
Court of Justice in this state which arise
from the very nature of their institution.
Such authority is required because they are
necessary to proper exercise of all other
judicial authority. As such, these powers
are governed not by statute or rule, but by
the control vested in the court to manage its
own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and
expeditious, accurate and truthful
disposition of causes and cases. . . . In
Kentucky, such authority is vested in the
sound discretion of the court in question
subject to appropriate appellate review. All
such authority must be exercised with great
caution even though it is necessarily
incidental to the function of all courts.
Cf. Ex parte Burr, 9 Wheat 529, 6 L.Ed. 152
(1824).
It is obvious that along with the inherent
power to set aside or correct the judgment
after the time permitted by rule has expired,
is the inherent power to conduct an
independent investigation when there is a
reasonable basis to believe that there is a
possible lack of accuracy or truth in the
original judgment. The Federal courts have
also recognized this right of investigation
so as to determine whether a judgment was
obtained by fraud. Universal Oil Co. v. Root
Refining Co., 328 U.S. 575, 66 S.Ct. 1176, 90
L.Ed. 1447 (1946).
. . . .
The inherent authority of the court goes
beyond actual fraud. It encompasses bad
faith conduct, abuse of judicial process, any
deception of the court and lack of candor to
the court.
Id. at 453-454.
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Potter recognizes that a trial judge can set aside or
correct a judgment when there is a “lack of accuracy or truth in
the original judgment”, “actual fraud”, “bad faith conduct”,
“abuse of judicial process”, or any “deception” or “lack of
candor” with the trial court.
The Commonwealth argues that there
was a “lack of accuracy or truth” in the original order allowing
withdrawal of the guilty plea, because the trial judge was
unaware of Bartee’s death at the time he made the ruling.
However, the Commonwealth does not contend that Turner had
knowledge of Bartee’s death at the time he filed his motion to
withdraw his guilty plea.
Thus, we do not believe that this
circumstance constituted a “lack of accuracy or truth” as
contemplated in Potter.
In deciding the issue of the trial court’s authority to
reconsider its ruling allowing the withdrawal of a guilty plea,
we find guidance from other jurisdictions in the cases of State
v. Beechum, 23 Kan.App.2d, 519, 934 P.2d 151 (1997), People v.
McGee, 232 Cal.App.3d 620, 283 Cal.Rptr. 528 (1991), and People
v. Franco, 557 N.Y.S.2d 7, 158 A.D.2d 33 (1990).
In McGee, supra, the Court held that the trial court
could not reinstate a guilty plea without the defendant’s
acquiescence.
After the trial court properly allowed the
defendant to withdraw his guilty plea based on the trial judge’s
finding that it had not been voluntarily entered, the People
moved the trial court to reconsider that ruling.
The People
claimed that the delay caused by waiting for a trial would
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severely prejudice it because of the nine-year-old victim’s
inability to recall the details of the offense and because the
defendant had failed to demonstrate good cause for the withdrawal
as required by a state statute regarding withdrawal of pleas.
The trial court concluded that its decision allowing the
defendant to withdraw his guilty plea was not supported by
substantial evidence and reinstated the guilty plea.
The trial
court did so based on California Code of Civil Procedure section
657, subdivision (6) which provided for a new trial upon a
finding that there was insufficient evidence to support the
verdict.
The Court in McGee held that there was nothing in the
California statute authorizing guilty pleas that permitted the
trial court, upon application by the prosecution, to reconsider
its original order to allow the withdrawal of the guilty plea.
Similarly, in the case sub judice, the Commonwealth claimed that
it would be prejudiced by a withdrawal of the guilty plea and
that it would have difficulty securing its witnesses after the
passage of time.
However, our rules of criminal procedure that
authorize a guilty plea and its withdrawal do not contain
language that permits the trial court to reconsider its original
order allowing withdrawal of a guilty plea.
See RCr 8.08, 8.09,
and 8.10; cf. Mingey v. Cline Leasing Service, Inc., Ky.App., 707
S.W.2d 794, 796 (1986); and Cloverleaf Dairy v. Michels, Ky.
App., 636 S.W.2d 894, 896 (1982) (no authority in rules to ask
for reconsideration of order which rules on motion to reconsider
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judgment).
Also, like the California statute, RCr 8.08 and 8.09
permit only the defendant to enter a guilty plea, and do not
allow the Commonwealth to move the trial court to reinstate a
guilty plea after it is withdrawn, or the trial court to do so on
its own motion.
As in the case sub judice, the prosecution in
McGee argued that the trial court had the inherent power to
reconsider and correct its judgment, but the Court rejected this
argument stating as follows:
“It is not open to question that a court
has the inherent power to correct clerical
errors in its records so as to make these
records reflect the true facts. . . . The
power exists independently of statute and may
be exercised in criminal as well as in civil
cases. . . . The court may correct such
errors on its own motion or upon the
application of the parties.” . . . Clerical
error must be distinguished from judicial
error, which cannot be corrected once final.
. . . “Generally, a clerical error is one
inadvertently made, while a judicial error is
one made advertently in the exercise of
judgment or discretion.” . . . The asserted
error here—the court’s determination that
defendant showed good cause to withdraw his
guilty plea—is a judicial error and the trial
court did not have the inherent power to
reexamine its original ruling. This is
especially so absent the presentation of new
evidence.
McGee at 232, Cal.App.3d at 626, 283 Cal.Rptr. at 530-531
(citations omitted).
In the case sub judice, we believe the trial judge’s
determination that Turner could withdraw his plea, if it could be
called an error at all, was a judicial error because it was made
within the trial court’s discretion in light of the facts
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presented at that time.
See RCr 8.10, and Anderson v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 507 S.W.2d 187, 188 (1974).
In State v. Beechum, supra, the Court held that the
trial court did not have the authority to reconsider an earlier
ruling that had allowed withdrawal of a guilty plea.
In that
case, the trial judge, in his discretion, had allowed the
defendant to withdraw his guilty plea after which the State moved
the trial court to reconsider its ruling.
On appeal, the State
argued that the trial court had the authority to rescind a
previous order allowing the withdrawal of a guilty plea.
The
State cited no direct authority for its argument, but, relied on
various statutes which would permit the trial court to modify or
vacate a prior order in other situations.
Likewise, in the case sub judice, the Commonwealth
argues on appeal, but not at the trial level, that, pursuant to
CR 59.052 and CR 60.023, the trial court had the authority to
2
CR 59.05 states as follows: “A motion to alter or amend a
judgment, or to vacate a judgment and enter a new one, shall be
served not later than 10 days after entry of the final judgment.”
3
CR 60.02 states as follows:
On motion a court may, upon such terms as are
just, relieve a party or his legal
representative from its final judgment,
order, or proceeding upon the following
grounds: (a) mistake, inadvertence, surprise
or excusable neglect; (b) newly discovered
evidence which by due diligence could not
have been discovered in time to move for a
new trial under Rule 59.02; (c) perjury or
falsified evidence; (d) fraud affecting the
proceedings, other than perjury or falsified
(continued...)
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reconsider its order allowing the withdrawal of the guilty plea.
We fail to see how either CR 59.05 or CR 60.02 gives the trial
court any authority to reconsider a prior order allowing a guilty
plea to be withdrawn and to reinstate the previously vacated
order accepting the guilty plea.
We are also persuaded by the case of People v. Franco,
supra, where the trial court allowed a guilty plea to be
withdrawn pursuant to N.Y.Crim.Pro. § 220.60(3)(McKinney 1993),
which is similar to our own RCr 8.10, and then reinstated the
guilty plea upon a motion to reconsider by the prosecution.
Court stated:
In the absence of fraud, once a court
accepts a guilty plea, it has no inherent
power to set aside the plea without the
defendant’s consent. . . .
A court may vacate a plea on application
of the prosecutor, where it was obtained by
fraud or misrepresentation, provided there is
no constitutional impediment. (Matter of
3
(...continued)
evidence; (e) the judgment is void, or has
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a
prior judgment upon which it is based has
been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is
no longer equitable that the judgment should
have prospective application; or (f) any
other reason of an extraordinary nature
justifying relief. The motion shall be made
within a reasonable time, and on grounds (a),
(b), and (c) not more than one year after the
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or
taken. A motion under this rule does not
affect the finality of a judgment or suspend
its operation.
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The
Lockett v. Juviler, 65 N.Y.2d 182, 490
N.Y.S.2d 764, 480 N.E.2d 378). . . .
The Court of Appeals has noted as to the
grant of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea
that: “We should say flatly and finally that
a plea so allowed to be withdrawn is out of
the case forever and for all purposes”. . . .
Id., 557 N.Y.S.2d at 8.
The Commonwealth argues also that the case sub judice
is similar to People v. Wilkens, 139 Mich.App. 778, 362 N.W.2d
862 (1984), where that Court reinstated a previously withdrawn
guilty plea.
However, unlike the case sub judice, in Wilkens
the trial court’s decision to allow withdrawal of the guilty plea
was based on the trial court’s “mistaken” belief that state legal
precedent required the trial court to allow the withdrawal of the
guilty plea.
Id., 139 Mich.App. at 785, 362 N.W.2d at 866.
This
type of “mistake” did not occur in the case sub judice, and
therefore, Wilkens is not applicable.
“The presumption of innocence is fundamental to our
system of justice and should not be abrogated absent clear and
compelling authority.
supra, 934 P.2d at 153.
Here, that authority is absent.”
Beechum,
The trial court’s granting of Turner’s
motion to withdraw his guilty plea “was an act of judicial
discretion, and any change in the court’s earlier ruling
distinctly prejudiced the defendant by denying him a full trial.”
McGee, supra, 283 Cal.Rptr. at 531.
Thus, we hold that the trial court erred in
reconsidering the withdrawal of the guilty plea and in
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reinstating the guilty plea.
Accordingly, we reverse the
judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court and remand this matter
for a trial.
Due to our decision reversing and remanding, the
issue raised by Turner concerning the trial court’s in limine
ruling that allowed the admissibility of testimony regarding
certain prior bad acts is not ripe for our review.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Hon. Bruce P. Hackett
Hon. Daniel T. Goyette
Louisville, KY
Hon. A. B. Chandler III
Attorney General
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLANT:
Hon. Amy F. Howard
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
Hon. Bruce P. Hackett
Louisville, KY
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE:
Hon. Anitria Franklin
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
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