JERRY LEE ROBERTS v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: March 26, 1999; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1997-CA-003210-MR
JERRY LEE ROBERTS
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GARY D. PAYNE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CR-00985
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
DYCHE, GUIDUGLI, AND MILLER, JUDGES.
MILLER, JUDGE:
Jerry Lee Roberts (Roberts) appeals from a
December 10, 1997, judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court.
We
affirm.
On November 27, 1995, Roberts was arrested for
operating a motor vehicle while he was under the influence of
intoxicants (DUI)(Ky. Rev. Stat. (KRS) 189A.010) and for driving
on a DUI suspended license (KRS 189A.090).
After appearing in
district court for arraignment on November 28, 1995, Roberts
appeared again on December 5, 1995.
On that date, his
preliminary hearing was continued to December 19, 1995, and his
bond was reduced.
Bond was posted on December 9, 1995,
whereupon, Roberts signed two documents indicating he would
return to court on December 19, 1995.
custody thereafter.
He was released from
Roberts failed to appear in court on
December 19, December 20, or December 27, 1995.
He finally
appeared in court on July 23, 1997.
Roberts was subsequently indicted for fourth offense
DUI, a felony; driving on a DUI suspended license; and bail
jumping in the first degree (KRS 520.070).
He was also charged
as a persistent felony offender (PFO) in the second degree (KRS
532.080).
The bail jumping charge emanated from his failure to
appear in district court in December 1995.
Roberts made an oral
motion to sever said charge from the indictment but same was
denied.
A jury trial ensued on November 3, 1997, wherein Roberts
was found guilty of all underlying charges.
He pled guilty to
the PFO charge in exchange for the Commonwealth’s recommendation
of a total sentence of five years.
On December 10, 1997, Roberts
was sentenced in accordance with the plea agreement.
This appeal
follows.
Roberts’s sole argument is that the circuit court erred
by overruling his motion for severance of the bail jumping
charge.
We disagree.
Ky. R. Crim. P. (RCr) 6.18 provides for
the joinder of offenses if they are “based on the same acts or
transactions connected together.”
A trial judge is given broad
discretion as to joinder, and his decision will not be overturned
unless it constitutes a clear abuse of discretion.
Violett v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 907 S.W.2d 773 (1995) (citing Schambon v.
-2-
Commonwealth, Ky., 821 S.w.2d 804 (1991), and Wilson v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 695 S.W.2d 854 (1985)).
A significant factor
in determining whether joinder is proper is whether “evidence of
one of the offenses would be admissible in a separate trial for
the other offense.”
Id. at 775 (citing Spencer v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 554 S.W.2d 355 (1977)).
In a separate trial for bail jumping, Roberts’s DUI
charge would have been admissible as proof that he failed to
appear in court “at a specified time and place in connection with
a charge of having committed a felony.”
KRS 520.070.
Similarly,
proof of Roberts's bail jumping would have been admissible as
evidence of guilt in a separate DUI trial.
See Commonwealth v.
Howard, Ky., 287 S.W.2d 926 (1956), and Napier v. Commonwealth,
306 Ky. 75, 206 S.W.2d 53 (1947).
In sum, we cannot say the
circuit court abused its discretion by overruling Roberts's
motion for severance.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Fayette
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Gary T. Bradbury
Lexington, KY
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General
and
Dina Abby Jones
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
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