STEPHEN ROSS COLLINS v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: August 27, 1999; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1997-CA-003193-MR
STEPHEN ROSS COLLINS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE MARY C. NOBLE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 91-CR-000713
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, COMBS, AND McANULTY, JUDGES.
McANULTY, JUDGE: Stephen Ross Collins (hereinafter, appellant)
appeals the Fayette Circuit Court's denial of his RCr 11.42
motion alleging numerous errors in his trial, in particular with
the performance of his counsel.
Finding no error, we affirm.
A Fayette County Grand Jury charged appellant with
murder on September 13, 1991, for the shooting death of Brian
White.
Appellant was tried by a jury and found guilty of first
degree manslaughter.
The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed his
conviction in a unanimous opinion.
On May 1, 1997, appellant filed a motion to vacate his
conviction pursuant to RCr 11.42.
The circuit court appointed
counsel to represent appellant.
Appellant thereafter filed a
motion to amend the order in which he asserted that he did not
wish to be represented by counsel, and stated that he wanted to
secure an attorney for assistance with witnesses for an
evidentiary hearing only.
The Fayette Circuit Court entered an
order allowing appellant to proceed pro se.
The Commonwealth
filed a response to appellant's RCr 11.42 motion.
On November
11, 1997, the Fayette Circuit Court denied appellant's RCr 11.42
motion to vacate.
This appeal followed.
Appellant's first claim of error is that KRS 503.050,
governing the use of physical force in self-protection, is void
for vagueness because it does not encompass the “right to defend
against multiple assailants.”
We find that appellant raised this
issue on direct appeal in his argument that he should have been
permitted an instruction which included language regarding others
acting in concert with the victim.
The Supreme Court declined to
address it because it was unpreserved for review.
We find that
this issue was a matter for direct appeal, not collateral attack.
RCr 11.42 is not for the purpose of permitting a criminal
defendant to retry issues which could have and should have been
raised in the original proceedings.
788 S.W.2d 500, 501 (1990).
Brown v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
Although appellant frames the issue
as one of vagueness, the issue is the same as appellant's demand
for a multiple aggressor instruction and we will not review it.
Second, appellant alleges that the statutory definition
of “serious physical injury” in KRS 500.080(15) is void for
vagueness for not explaining precisely what is meant by
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“prolonged” injury or disfigurement.
Again, this is an issue
which would have been properly raised at the trial and on direct
appeal; it is not proper for a RCr 11.42 motion.
Brown, supra.
Next, appellant alleges numerous instances of
ineffective assistance of counsel at his trial, as well as
instances of prosecutorial misconduct which he contends his
counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge.
As the issues
of prosecutorial misconduct could have and should have been
raised on direct appeal, Brown, supra, we review these solely for
a determination of counsel's effectiveness.
In order to establish a claim of constitutionally
ineffective assistance of counsel, appellant must show that his
counsel's performance was deficient to such an extent that the
integrity of the proceedings was impaired.
Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed.2d 674
(1984).
To meet the burden of proof, appellant must first show
that his counsel's performance was deficient, and second that the
deficient performance prejudiced his defense.
Id. at 687, 104 S.
Ct. at 2064, 80 L. Ed.2d at 693; Gall v. Commonwealth, Ky., 702
S.W.2d 37, 39 (1986).
Appellant's first claim of ineffectiveness is that his
counsel erred in failing to challenge the definitions of
“wantonly and recklessly” given with the “erroneous belief”
qualification to the self-protection instruction.
We find that
although defense counsel did not raise this precise issue on
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appeal,1 the Supreme Court examined the instructions and held as
follows:
After reviewing the self-protection
instruction that was submitted to the jury,
we concur with the trial court's ruling that
it properly instructed the jury as to the law
pursuant to KRS Chapter 503.
Because the Supreme Court reviewed the self-protection
instruction for error and found none, we conclude that defense
counsel did not err in failing to challenge the instruction on
the grounds appellant now raises.
The instruction given was the
accepted instruction on the erroneous belief qualification at the
time of appellant's trial.
As a result, we do not believe that
appellant has shown any prejudice, and he has failed to establish
ineffectiveness of counsel.
Next, appellant challenges his counsel's crossexamination of an eyewitness to the shooting, arguing in essence
that the examination could have been done more effectively.
Appellant does not identify any essential evidence bearing on the
witness's testimony or credibility which was not before the jury.
This is a mere attempt to second-guess counsel's trial strategy
and retry the case collaterally.
433 S.W.2d 117, 118 (1968).
attorney ineffectiveness.
Dorton v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
This is insufficient to establish
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 681, 104 S.
Ct. at 2061, 80 L. Ed.2d at 694.
1
As a result we cannot find that
According to the Supreme Court's Opinion, appellant
challenged the self-protection issue on the grounds that the
self-protection instruction should have stated that he was under
no duty to retreat or flee, and should have included language
regarding others acting in concert with the victim.
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the result of trial would have been any different if the crossexamination had been done as appellant now argues.
Appellant raises additional arguments about various
witnesses his attorney could have called to the stand, or the
manner in which he questioned a doctor who testified.
Again,
this is merely second-guessing of defense counsel's strategy,
without any showing that the strategy employed by his attorney
was deficient.
The trial court correctly found that this did not
suffice to establish ineffective assistance of counsel.
Dorton,
supra; Strickland, supra.
Next, appellant argues that his attorney should have
moved to suppress the photographic lineup identification
evidence.
Appellant has not shown any legitimate reason for his
counsel to have challenged the photo identification process and
thus has not shown deficient performance or prejudice.
Appellant designates his subsequent series of arguments
as both prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of
counsel.
We have reviewed these complaints, which concern the
prosecutor's closing argument and his questioning of appellant at
trial, and find no error.
Even considering the comments
cumulatively, as appellant urges us to do, we do not find there
would have been a different result in this case had counsel
objected to the prosecutor's comments.
The statements appellant
cites were all reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence in
the case, and thus were fair comments on the evidence.
Commonwealth, Ky., 839 S.W.2d 550, 557 (1992).
ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
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Bush v.
We find no
Finally, appellant argues that the circuit court erred
in not appointing counsel to assist him in “investigating” his
claims in this RCr 11.42 proceeding.
This was proper since
appellant asserted in the trial court his resolve to represent
himself, and only wanted an attorney to assist in investigation
and at a hearing.
556, 557 (1984).
See Allen v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 668 S.W.2d
Moreover, an RCr 11.42 proceeding is not for
the purpose of conducting a “fishing expedition” to develop
issues.
Jones v. Commonwealth, Ky., 388 S.W.2d 601, 603 (1965).
There was no error.
For all the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of
the Fayette Circuit Court which overruled appellant's RCr 11.42
motion to vacate.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Stephen Ross Collins, pro se
West Liberty, KY
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Samuel J. Floyd, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
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