DIANA KAY LEE v. DILLARD LEE
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RENDERED: April 30, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1997-CA-003187-MR
DIANA KAY LEE
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM ADAIR CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PAUL JONES, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 94-CI-00179
v.
DILLARD LEE
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
EMBERTON, GARDNER, AND MILLER, JUDGES.
MILLER, JUDGE:
Diana Kay Lee (Diana) appeals from the Adair
Circuit Court’s November 7, 1997, amended findings of fact,
conclusions of law and decree of dissolution of marriage.
We
affirm.
The parties were married in 1983 and separated in 1994.
In October 1994, Diana filed a petition for dissolution of
marriage from her husband, Dillard Lee (Dillard).
She requested
equal division of the parties’ marital property, custody of the
parties’ one child, and an award of child support.
During
pendency of the proceeding, Diana submitted two depositions and
Dillard submitted one, all of which included various tax
documents in addition to other documents.
In June 1997, the case
was submitted to the trial court for decision.
On July 10, 1997, the trial court entered a decree of
dissolution with findings of fact and conclusions of law.
The
court found that the parties jointly owned divers marital
property including a 3.85 acre tract of land, a 12 acre tract of
land, a mobile home, several vehicles, and several pieces of
construction equipment and tools that Dillard used in his work.
The trial court awarded Diana the realty, the mobile home, and a
tractor; Dillard was awarded the equipment and tools.
The court
also found that the parties had accumulated marital debt on the
realty and the equipment.
The court assigned the $8,000 mortgage
debt on the realty to Diana, and assigned the equipment debt to
Dillard.
Neither party sought maintenance.
On July 21, 1997, Diana filed a motion to alter, amend
or vacate the decree of dissolution.
She objected to the trial
court’s failure to assign specific values to the marital property
and failure to award her maintenance.
Diana also requested that
Dillard be required to pay the realty indebtedness because the
mortgage proceeds had been used in his business.
Dillard filed a
response arguing that the record supported the trial court’s
judgment.
On November 7, 1997, the trial court issued an amended
findings of fact, conclusions of law and decree of dissolution of
marriage.
The court indicated that it did not list specific
values because the parties failed to provide explicit valuations
for much of the property and because Diana stated in her
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deposition that a realty and mobile home award would offset an
equipment award.
The trial court amended the decree by providing
more explanation for several of the factual findings but did not
alter the decree's substantive aspects.
This appeal followed.
Diana argues that the trial court erred by failing to
assign specific monetary values to each item of marital property
and by failing to consider awarding her maintenance.
Diana
contends that the trial court was required to make specific
valuation assessments of each item of property in order to divide
the assets appropriately.
We disagree.
Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 403.190(3) creates a
presumption that all property acquired after the marriage and
before a decree of legal separation is marital.
See also
Stallings v. Stallings, Ky., 606 S.W.2d 163 (1980).
Subsection
(1) states that the trial court shall divide the marital property
“in just proportions” considering all relevant factors including
the contribution of each spouse to acquisition of the property,
the value of the property set apart to each spouse, the duration
of the marriage, and the economic circumstances of each spouse.
KRS 403.190(1)(a)-(d).
This statutory standard does not require
an absolute equal division of marital assets.
Russell v.
Russell, Ky. App., 878 S.W.2d 24 (1994), and Quiggins v.
Quiggins, Ky. App., 637 S.W.2d 666 (1982).
The trial court has
wide discretion in the division of marital property.
See Cochran
v. Cochran, Ky. App., 746 S.W.2d 568 (1988), and Johnson v.
Johnson, Ky. App., 564 S.W.2d 221 (1978).
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This Court reviews the
trial court’s decision on property division only for an abuse of
discretion.
Herron v. Herron, Ky., 573 S.W.2d 342 (1978).
In the case at bar, the trial court found that one 3.85
acre tract of land given to Diana by her grandfather was her
nonmarital property.
property.
All other property was found to be marital
The court awarded Diana 15.85 acres of realty, the
mobile home located thereon, and a tractor; it awarded Dillard
various tools, a dump truck, a 1964 Chevy truck, and a trailer.
The court assigned an $8,000 debt on the realty to Diana; to
Dillard it assigned $12,000 in debts associated with the other
items.
Diana indicated in her deposition that if the court
awarded her the realty, mobile home, and tractor, “[t]hat would
probably offset somewhat what Dillard owns in Western Kentucky
and all of his equipment.”
value for the realty.
Diana failed to provide a monetary
After review of the record, we cannot say
that the trial court abused its discretion in dividing the
marital property.
In addition, Diana’s reliance on Brandenburg v.
Brandenburg, Ky. App., 617 S.W.2d 871 (1981), is misplaced.
Brandenburg set forth a formula for determining apportionment
between marital and nonmarital property.
The case did not
purport to deal with distribution of solely marital property, as
is the case at hand.
Therefore, it is not applicable to the
situation involving valuation of marital assets without a
nonmarital component.
Diana also complains about the absence of an award of
maintenance.
Maintenance determinations are within the sound
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discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal
absent a clear abuse of discretion.
See Clark v. Clark, Ky.
App., 782 S.W.2d 56 (1990), and Calloway v. Calloway, Ky. App.,
832 S.W.2d 890 (1992).
The record reflects that Diana sought
temporary maintenance, but the trial court denied the request and
ordered Dillard to pay $250 per month on the mortgage debt during
pendency of the divorce.
In Diana's motion to alter, amend or
vacate the trial court’s original dissolution order, which
granted no maintenance, she merely requested that Dillard be
required to continue paying on the mortgage debt.
Diana failed
to adequately seek or support a request for permanent
maintenance.
Consequently, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by not awarding same.
For the foregoing reasons, the decree of the Adair
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
NO APPELLEE BRIEF
David F. Smith
Russell Springs, Kentucky
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