TONY REYNOLDS v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: May 21, 1999; 10:00 a.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1997-CA-003159-MR
TONY REYNOLDS
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM ALLEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM R. HARRIS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CR-000018
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
EMBERTON, KNOPF, AND KNOX, JUDGES.
KNOX, JUDGE:
Tony Reynolds (Reynolds) appeals from his
conviction by an Allen County Circuit Court jury of the offense
of first-degree bail jumping.
Reynolds was sentenced to five
years, to be served consecutively with a prior ten-year sentence
stemming from convictions of criminal attempt to commit murder
and first-degree burglary.
In March 1995, Reynolds was found guilty of criminal
attempt to commit murder and first-degree burglary and sentenced
to ten (10) years.
He appealed that conviction and was released
on an appeal bond in the amount of $25,000.
By way of order
setting Reynolds’ bail pending appeal, the trial court permitted
Reynolds to deposit ten percent (10%) of the amount of the bail,
with the remaining bail amount secured by sureties.
Among the
conditions in that order, dated June 22, 1995, “nunc pro tunc” to
June 20, 1995, were the following:
(4) A nonfinancial condition, that the
defendant shall report to Allen County
Probation Officer Todd Calvert each week,
during which time he shall be subject to
warrantless searches and seizures and drug
and alcohol testing;
. . . .
At such time as the defendant shall meet the
financial conditions (10% cash deposit and
court approved surety) of bail, he shall be
released into the custody of his surety to be
taken to the office of the Clerk of this
Court, where he and his surety shall execute
the required bail bond, and a copy of this
order, signed by the defendant and by his
surety, shall be appended as a part of his
bail bond and made a part thereof so as to
incorporate the above-stated nonfinancial
conditions into the bail bond.
On June 22, 1995, Reynolds, with his surety, executed
an appeal bond.
The conditions stated therein were to “not
committ [sic] anymore offenses, keep circuit clerk advised of any
change in address and attend all court proceedings.
SEE
CONDITIONS LISTED ON ORDER SETTING BAIL DATED 6-22-95.”
Further,
the bond contained the following language: “DUE in courtroom ____
at ____ AM/PM on
WHEN NOTIFIED
or when notified and you
must appear at all subsequent continued dates.
appear __________________[.]”
You must also
Reynolds’ address was listed as
122 Corinth Road, Portland, Tennessee 37148.
Reynolds then appealed his convictions for criminal
attempt to commit murder and first-degree burglary to this Court,
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which affirmed.
After being notified of Reynolds’ unsuccessful
appeal, the trial court, by order entered October 16, 1996,
issued a bench warrant for Reynolds’ arrest, directing that
Reynolds “shall forthwith surrender himself into the custody of
the Kentucky Department of Corrections for service of sentence
herein[.]”
The Allen County Circuit Clerk was instructed to send
copies of the order to Reynolds’ trial counsel, the public
advocate who represented Reynolds on appeal, and the prosecuting
authorities.1
When Reynolds did not surrender himself, the trial
court, by order entered November 22, 1996, summoned the sureties
on Reynolds’ bond to court for the purpose of considering their
liability on Reynolds’ appeal bond.2
Pursuant to the order, a
hearing on the matter was held on December 3, 1996.
A subsequent
hearing involving the same issue was held on December 17, 1996.
Reynolds did not appear at either of the hearings.
Finally, on
February 15, 1997, the trial court’s bench warrant was served
upon Reynolds, and he was arrested.
Reynolds’ trial for bail jumping was set for November
5, 1997.
Just prior to the commencement of the trial, the
Commonwealth moved to amend the indictment which charged that
Reynolds committed the offense of bail jumping “on or about or
during and between October 16, 1996, and November 22, 1996.”
The
1
At trial, the circuit clerk testified her computer records
showed that Reynolds was also sent a copy, although the order did
not state he was to be notified.
2
We are unable to locate that particular order in the
record. However, there appears no question but that Reynolds was
not notified of the order.
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Commonwealth proposed the indictment read that Reynolds committed
the offense “on or about or during and between November 22, 1996,
and February 15, 1997,” taking the position it could not prove
that Reynolds had received the court’s order of October 16, 1996,
directing Reynolds to surrender himself.
However, the
Commonwealth contended, it could present evidence of Reynolds’
actions taken after the court issued its order of November 22,
1996, setting a hearing on the issue of the sureties’ liability,
which would indicate that Reynolds knew, and had been duly
notified, that he was to appear in court.
The trial court
sustained the Commonwealth’s motion to amend.
In addition, Reynolds’ counsel moved the court to
disallow the testimony of the local probation officer the
Commonwealth sought to call.
At the hearing held on this motion,
the Commonwealth represented that the probation officer was
expected to testify that, after the opinion affirming Reynolds’
convictions was issued by this Court, Reynolds, who had
previously met with the probation officer weekly as required by
the conditions of his bond, failed to meet with the probation
officer further.
However, because the Commonwealth had failed to
inform Reynolds’ counsel of its intent to call the probation
officer as a witness, the trial court sustained Reynolds’ motion
to disallow that testimony.
At trial, the Commonwealth called only the Allen County
Circuit Clerk.
With respect to the trial court’s order of
November 22, 1996, setting the hearing upon the issue of the
sureties’ liability on Reynolds’ appeal bond, the circuit clerk
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testified that notice of the hearing was sent to the prosecuting
authorities, defense counsel, and the attorneys for the sureties.
No notice was sent to Reynolds.
Reynolds presents two arguments in this appeal: (1)
because he was not given a time certain for his appearance in
court, he cannot be convicted of first-degree bail jumping; and,
(2) he was prejudiced by the belated amendment of the indictment
charging him with first-degree bail jumping.
KRS 520.070, the statute setting forth the elements of
first-degree bail jumping, reads in pertinent part:
(1) A person is guilty of bail jumping in the
first degree when, having been released from
custody by court order, with or without bail,
upon condition that he will subsequently
appear at a specified time and place in
connection with a charge of having committed
a felony, he intentionally fails to appear at
that time and place.
(2) In any prosecution for bail jumping, the
defendant may prove in exculpation that his
failure to appear was unavoidable and due to
circumstances beyond his control.
Reynolds argues since the appeal bond signed by him on
June 22, 1995, provides that he is to appear in court only “when
notified,” he was not directed to appear “at a specified time,”
pursuant to the statute, and therefore cannot be convicted of
first-degree bail jumping.
Having found no Kentucky authority on
point, we note that Indiana courts addressing statutes of similar
language have taken the position that one cannot be convicted for
the offense of failure to appear where he was not notified, upon
his release from custody on bail, to be in court at a specified
time.
Pennington v. State, 426 N.E.2d 408 (Ind. 1981).
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Here, the jury heard no evidence that Reynolds was
told, upon his release on bail, to be in court at a specified
time.
Rather, the jury heard testimony only that Reynolds’ first
notification that he was to be in court was the order of November
22, 1996, setting a hearing upon his sureties’ obligations.
However, no notice of that hearing was mailed directly to him.
Rather, all notices were mailed to other persons, including
Reynolds’ counsel.
Considering the express language of KRS
520.070 that a defendant be notified upon release of a specified
time and place for appearance, we do not believe the Commonwealth
sustained its burden of proving the elements of bail jumping in
the first degree.
We note with interest that Reynolds’ appeal bond of
June 22, 1996, incorporated the conditions set forth in the trial
court’s order setting Reynolds’ bail pending appeal, one of which
was that Reynolds report weekly to the probation and parole
officer.
At the hearing addressing Reynolds’ motion to disallow
the probation and parole officer’s testimony, the Commonwealth
represented that the officer would testify that Reynolds indeed
met weekly with him until this Court issued its opinion affirming
Reynolds’ convictions, at which point Reynolds failed to meet
further with the officer.
We believe the fact that Reynolds met at weekly
intervals with the probation and parole officer constitutes
evidence that Reynolds understood he had an obligation to do so
as a condition of his release.
Further, we believe Reynolds’
failure to comply with that condition after his convictions had
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been affirmed by this Court constitutes evidence that he did,
indeed, jump bail.
However, since the probation and parole
officer did not testify, the jury did not hear that evidence,
which would have been the only testimony presented that Reynolds
had been directed to meet at specified times and places as a
condition of his release.
Since the jury heard no such evidence,
we believe that Reynolds’ bail jumping conviction must be
reversed.
Because Reynolds’ conviction is being reversed on the
grounds that the jury did not hear evidence that as a condition
of his bail Reynolds had been directed to appear at a specified
time and place, we need not address the issue raised by Reynolds
related to the amendment of the indictment.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we reverse the
judgment of the Allen Circuit Court.
KNOPF, JUDGE, CONCURS.
EMBERTON, JUDGE, DISSENTS.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Irvin J. Halbleib
Louisville, Kentucky
A. B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Matthew D. Nelson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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