WILLIAM ARTHUR DAVIS v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
August 13, 1999; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1997-CA-003117-MR
WILLIAM ARTHUR DAVIS
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JESSAMINE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROBERT J. JACKSON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 94-CR-00116
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, COMBS, AND McANULTY, JUDGES.
McANULTY, JUDGE:
William Arthur Davis (appellant) was convicted
in 1995 of sodomy and three counts of rape committed against his
daughter.
Court.
His conviction was affirmed by the Kentucky Supreme
Appellant thereafter filed motions to vacate his
conviction pursuant to RCr 11.42 and CR 60.02, and requested that
the Jessamine Circuit Court consider the motions together.
Appellant also sought an evidentiary hearing and appointment of
counsel.
The trial court denied appellant's motions on November
26, 1997, and this appeal followed.
Appellant first alleges that the trial court erred in
not granting an evidentiary hearing and the appointment of
counsel.
It was unnecessary for the court to appoint counsel to
supplement the RCr 11.42 motion since appellant's allegations are
refuted solely by reference to the record.
Commonwealth v.
Stamps, Ky., 672 S.W.2d 336 (1984); Hopewell v. Commonwealth,
Ky.App., 687 S.W.2d 153 (1985).
An evidentiary hearing is not
required when the issues raised may be fully considered by resort
to the court record or when the allegations are insufficient to
warrant a hearing.
Newsome v. Commonwealth, Ky., 456 S.W.2d 686,
687 (1970); Hopewell, supra.
There was no need for an
evidentiary hearing in this case.
Appellant asserts that his trial counsel was
ineffective.
The standard for assessing whether counsel was
constitutionally effective is set forth in Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed.2d 674
(1984), and was adopted in Kentucky in Gall v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
702 S.W.2d 37, 39 (1986), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1010, 92 L.
Ed.2d
724, 106 S. Ct. 3311 (1986).
Appellant must show both
that his attorney made errors so serious that he was not
functioning as counsel for purposes of the Sixth Amendment, and
that the errors deprived appellant of a fair proceeding whose
result is reliable.
Id. at 687, 80 L. Ed.2d at 693.
Our review
of counsel's performance is highly deferential, and counsel's
action is presumed to have been within the wide range of
reasonable, professional assistance.
Id. at 689, 80 L. Ed.2d
694.
Appellant's allegation is that he alerted his trial
counsel to three witnesses who should have been called to
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at
testify, but counsel refused to call these witnesses or even
investigate their assertions.
We find no error.
First,
appellant names two witnesses who would have testified that the
prosecutrix had made a “false” claim against another man for rape
at some time before this case was tried.
It was not error for
counsel to decide not to pursue this line of defense as it is of
questionable relevance and admissibility, providing only
impeachment on collateral facts.
See Chumbler v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 905 S.W.2d 488, 495-496 (1995).
There is no error for
counsel to fail to introduce inadmissible testimony.
Appellant further alleges his counsel should have
called a third witness who would have testified that the
prosecutrix had stated to him that if her brother went to prison
on sexual abuse charges, she would bring sexual abuse charges
against appellant.
As these bare allegations are not supported
by sufficient facts, they do not provide a basis for relief.
Lucas v. Commonwealth, Ky., 465 S.W.2d 267, 268 (1971).
For all
of these witnesses, appellant has not established prejudice, as
he has failed to demonstrate that there would have been a
"reasonable probability" of a difference in his trial.
See Hayes
v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 837 S.W.2d 902, 904-905 (1992).
Additionally, appellant raises claims of specific error
from his trial such as a delay in prosecution, admission of
hearsay testimony, lack of physical and medical proof of the
offenses, and cumulative error.
claims.
We decline to review these
Issues which could have and should have been raised on
direct appeal cannot be raised by way of RCr 11.42 or CR 60.02.
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McQueen v. Commonwealth, Ky., 948 S.W.2d 415 (1997); Brown v.
Commonwealth, Ky. 788 S.W.2d 500, 501 (1990).
The foregoing
claims could have been raised in appellant's direct appeal, and
we find that he has waived them by not raising them earlier.
Wherefore, we affirm the order of the Jessamine Circuit
Court which denied and dismissed appellant's RCr 11.42 and CR
60.02 motions.
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ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
William Arthur Davis, pro se
Burgin, KY
A. B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Todd D. Ferguson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
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