TIM DONOVAN V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: May 21, 1999; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1997-CA-003072-MR
TIM DONOVAN
V.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS B. WINE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-CR-1668
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION VACATING AND REMANDING
* * * * * * * *
BEFORE:
GUDGEL, Chief Judge; COMBS and GARDNER, Judges.
GUDGEL, CHIEF JUDGE: On June 6, 1996, appellant Tim Donovan was
arrested on a warrant issued on June 4 charging him with the
felony offense of first-degree rape.
Prior to his arraignment,
Donovan’s bond was reduced by a district judge to $20,000/10%
and, after a third party deposited the necessary $2,000, he was
released from custody.
Donovan was represented by a private
attorney during his June 7 arraignment, and a preliminary hearing
was scheduled for June 28.
Donovan was allowed to remain free on
his previously posted bond.
On June 28, the case was ordered transferred to the
Jefferson County Grand Jury.
On July 23, Donovan was indicted by
the grand jury on one count of first-degree rape.
He was
arraigned on the charge on July 29 and, once again, he was
allowed to remain free on the $20,000/10% bond posted earlier.
On June 9, 1997, after the continuance of at least two scheduled
trials, the court permitted Donovan’s private attorney to
withdraw from the case.
After Donovan failed to appear for a
scheduled status conference fifteen days later, the court issued
a bench warrant for his arrest and fixed his bond in the amount
of $50,000 full cash.
Donovan was subsequently arraigned on the
warrant, and his bond was again fixed at $50,000 full cash.
Moreover, the public defender’s office was appointed to represent
him, and a $40 administrative fee was assessed against him.1
Next, on July 24 an assistant Jefferson Public Defender
filed a motion seeking an order reducing Donovan’s bond.
On July
29, after a hearing, the court ordered the reinstatement of the
$20,000/10% bond posted by Donovan’s surety at the time of his
initial arrest, and Donovan once again was released from custody.
A jury trial finally commenced on October 30, 1997.
At
the trial’s conclusion the jury returned a not guilty verdict,
and the court thereafter entered a final judgment.
Without
conducting a hearing, the court also ordered Donovan to pay the
public defender’s office a $2,000 recoupment fee (later reduced
to $1,250), to be deducted from the $2,000 deposited by Donovan’s
1
Although the court apparently based its order appointing
the public defender upon its review of an affidavit of indigency,
neither the affidavit nor a copy thereof was filed in the record.
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surety as money bail pending further orders of the court.
This
appeal followed, raising the sole issue of whether a recoupment
fee may be assessed, pursuant to KRS 31.120(4), against a
defendant who is represented by the public defender and acquitted
of the charged offense.
At the outset, we note that the court exceeded its
authority by ordering $1,250 of the ten percent bail, posted by
Donovan’s surety, to be held in escrow for payment of the
recoupment fee adjudged against Donovan.
It is clear that a bail
order automatically terminates if, as here, a principal is
acquitted.
RCr 4.54(2).
Moreover, bail money may be applied for
collateral purposes only if it was posted by the defendant.
4.46(1).
See also KRS 431.530(5); KRS 431.532(4).
RCr
Hence,
Donovan’s surety was entitled, upon Donovan’s acquittal, to an
immediate refund of the entire $2,000 which he earlier posted on
Donovan’s behalf.
The court had no authority to continue holding
$1,250 of that amount in escrow pending further orders.
Moreover, the court erred by summarily entering an
order imposing a recoupment fee without providing notice or
conducting a hearing to determine, as of the date of his
acquittal, whether Donovan was still a needy person as required
by KRS 31.120(1) or whether he had the ability to pay a
recoupment fee as required by KRS 31.120(4).
Clearly, no
citation of authority is needed to support the proposition that
before Donovan could be ordered to pay a recoupment fee, he was
entitled to all of his procedural due process rights, including
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but not limited to notice and an evidentiary hearing regarding
his ability to pay such a fee.
It is clear, therefore, that the
court’s summary order must be vacated.
On remand, the court should provide notice to Donovan
and conduct a hearing to determine whether he has the ability to
pay a recoupment fee and, if so, to determine the amount and
terms of such payment.
At the hearing, Donovan should be
afforded his full procedural due process rights including the
assistance of counsel.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the
court should make the necessary written findings and should enter
an appropriate order based thereon.
It is possible that, after a hearing on remand, the
court will conclude that Donovan does not have the ability to pay
a recoupment fee and will not order him to do so.
If that
occurs, the principal issue raised on appeal, regarding whether
an acquitted defendant may constitutionally be required to pay a
recoupment fee, will be rendered moot.
Sound principles of
judicial restraint dictate that we should refrain from addressing
that issue until such other time as it is properly before us on
appeal from a valid order imposing such a fee.
For the reasons stated, the order appealed from is
vacated, and this matter is remanded to the trial court for
further proceedings consistent with our views.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Daniel T. Goyette
Jefferson District
Public Defender
A.B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Matthew D. Nelson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
Frank W. Heft, Jr.
Chief Appellate Defender
Jefferson District
Public Defender
Louisville, KY
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