RICHARD WESLEY LUNSFORD v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: December 17, 1999; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1997-CA-003040-MR
RICHARD WESLEY LUNSFORD
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GARY D. PAYNE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 1997-CR-00841
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
KNOPF, MILLER, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
The appellant, Richard Wesley Lunsford, appeals
from a judgment of conviction by the Fayette Circuit Court on the
misdemeanor charge of violation of a Domestic Violence Order (KRS
403.763).
Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
In early 1997, Lunsford shared a residence with
Christina Charles in Lexington, Kentucky.
Christina’s ten (10)
year old son Dakota Charles lived with them.1
On March 5, 1997,
Dakota threw a plastic bottle at a car as it drove past his
house.
1
After speaking with the driver, Lunsford took Dakota back
Christina’s daughter also lived in the residence.
into the house and reprimanded him.
spanked Dakota with a wooden paddle.
Shortly thereafter, Lunsford
Several days later,
Dakota’s grandparents called the police after they noticed that
the spanking had caused substantial bruising on Dakota’s
buttocks.
Eventually, Lunsford was charged with second degree
criminal abuse of Dakota because of this incident.
On March 10, 1997, Christina obtained an Emergency
Protective Order (EPO) restraining Lunsford from any contact or
communication with Dakota, and ordering Lunsford to vacate the
residence shared by the parties.
On March 24, 1997, the Fayette
District Court entered a Domestic Violence Order (DVO), extending
the terms of the EPO until March 23, 2000.
On April 29, 1997,
Lunsford was arrested at Christina’s residence for violation of
the DVO.
Prior to trial, Lunsford’s counsel moved to sever the
charges pursuant to RCr 9.16.
The trial court initially agreed
with Lunsford, and granted the motion to sever.
However, after
Lunsford’s counsel made a motion in limine to exclude evidence of
a pending harassment charge against Lunsford and a violation of
bond conditions that he have no contact with the child, the trial
court reversed its prior ruling and denied the motion to sever.
The matter then proceeded to a jury trial.
At the conclusion of
the trial, the jury found Lunsford not guilty of the criminal
abuse charge, but found him guilty of violating the DVO.
The
jury fixed his punishment at a fine of $50.00, which the trial
court imposed.
This appeal followed.
Lunsford’s sole ground for appeal is that the trial
court erred in denying his motion to sever the charges.
-2-
Lunsford
argues that he was prejudiced by being forced to defend both the
criminal abuse charge and the DVO violation at the same time.
He
further contends that the evidence regarding the criminal abuse
charge was not relevant to the question of whether he violated
the terms of the DVO.
RCr 9.16 permits a trial court to order separate trials
of offenses named in a multi-count indictment if it appears that
a defendant will be prejudiced by a joint trial.
Where all of
the charges involved criminal occurrences closely related in
character, circumstance and time, and the offenses are
sufficiently interwoven with each other, and the facts to be
proved are overlapping, the trial court is within its discretion
to join the various offenses for trial.
Hayes v. Commonwealth,
Ky. 698 S.W.2d 827, 829 (1985).
In the present case, the charges were marginally
relevant to each other because the DVO was issued based on the
events that gave rise to the criminal abuse charge.
However, the
charges were otherwise unrelated in time, character and
circumstance.
Second degree criminal abuse is a class D felony,
KRS 508 110, while violation of a DVO is a class A misdemeanor,
KRS 403.763.
Furthermore, it was not necessary to prove the
circumstances forming the basis for the DVO to prove that
Lunsford violated the terms of the DVO.
Thus, the events
occurring prior to the issuance of the EPO or the DVO were not
relevant to the charge.
Nonetheless, we cannot find that Lunsford was
prejudiced by joinder of the charges.
As noted above, the jury
found Lunsford not guilty on the criminal abuse charge.
-3-
Thus, it
cannot be said that he was prejudiced by admission of the
evidence regarding his violation of the DVO.
As for the DVO
violation, Lunsford’s defense was that Christina had invited him
to the house to talk about their differences, and that Dakota was
not home at the time.
He also contends that he was unsure
whether the DVO prohibited him from having contact with
Christina, or just Dakota.
Thus, Lunsford contends that he did
not intentionally violate the DVO.
However, KRS 403.760 provides that violation of the
terms or conditions of a protective order after service of the
order shall constitute contempt of court.
“A person is guilty of
a violation of a protective order when he intentionally violates
the provisions of an order issued pursuant to KRS 403.715 to
403.785 with which he has been served or has been given notice.”
KRS 403.763(1).
At the time Lunsford was arrested, the DVO
provided that Lunsford was to have no contact with Dakota.
It
further provided that he “is not to be around Respondent’s Mother
or Members of his family.”2
There is no dispute that Lunsford
had been served with the DVO and was familiar with its
conditions.
Thus, the fact that Christina may have invited
Lunsford to her house is not an absolute defense to the charge of
violating the DVO.
The jury obviously considered it to be a
mitigating factor, however, since it imposed no jail time and
only a $50.00 fine on Lunsford.
In light of all of the
circumstances of this case, we do not believe that a substantial
2
The DVO was subsequently amended by agreed order to
prohibit Lunsford only from violent contact with Dakota or
Christina.
-4-
possibility exists that the result would have been different had
the trial court granted the motion to sever.
conclude that the error, if any, was harmless.
Therefore, we
RCr 9.24.
Accordingly, the judgment of conviction by the Fayette
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Gene Lewter
Lexington, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler, III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Samuel J. Floyd, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
-5-
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