BILLY WAYNE LITTLE v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: January 29, 1999; 10:00 a.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1997-CA-003007-MR
BILLY WAYNE LITTLE
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BATH CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM B. MAINS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CR-0008
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, JOHNSON AND KNOX, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Billy Wayne Little (Little) appeals from the
judgment of the Bath Circuit Court entered on October 21, 1997,
that convicted him of incest (Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS)
530.020) and persistent felony offender in the second degree (KRS
532.080(2)).
Little entered a conditional guilty plea pursuant
to Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 8.09 and has
appealed the circuit court’s denial of his motion to suppress
evidence based on his claim that his Miranda1 rights were
violated.
We affirm.
On February 24, 1997, Kentucky State Police Detective
Matt Sparks (Det. Sparks) drove his police cruiser to Little’s
home to investigate allegations of sexual abuse made by Little’s
daughter.
When Little came outside, Det. Sparks identified
himself as a police officer, explained the purpose of his visit
and informed Little of the allegations that Little’s daughter had
made.
Det. Sparks then told Little that he wanted to ask Little
some questions, but explained that Little was not under arrest,
did not have to speak with him and could leave at any time.
However, Det. Sparks did not advise Little of his constitutional
right to remain silent.
After Little agreed to talk, Det. Sparks
interviewed Little in the front seat of the police cruiser.
In
the interview, taped by Det. Sparks, Little admitted having sex
with his own daughter.
Following the confession, Little was indicted on one
count of incest, and one count of being a persistent felony
offender in the second degree.
Little moved to suppress the
confession, claiming that as the “focus of the investigation”, he
should have been informed of his rights prior to questioning.
Following a hearing, the circuit court denied the motion, holding
that Little had not been in custody, thus negating the need to
inform him of his rights pursuant to Miranda.
1
Little then
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d
694 (1966).
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entered a conditional plea of guilty to both charges, reserving
the right to challenge the circuit court’s suppression ruling.
Little received a prison sentence of ten years.
This appeal
followed.
Little argues that the Supreme Court of Kentucky has in
numerous decisions recognized that the so-called Miranda rights
must be read to a defendant once the defendant has become the
“focus of the investigation.”
Little argues that the Supreme
Court has repeatedly invoked the “focus of the investigation”
test, first enunciated in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84
S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964), in decisions such as Grooms v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 756 S.W.2d 131, 140-141 (1988), Skaggs v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 694 S.W.2d 672, 677 (1985), Wills v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 502 S.W.2d 60, 63 (1973), and Jasper v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 471 S.W.2d 7, 9 (1971).
While Little
acknowledges that this Court in Farler v. Commonwealth, Ky.App.,
880 S.W.2d 882 (1994), addressed this issue and reached the
conclusion that Miranda rights are required only when a defendant
is in custody, he argues that Farler conflicted with Supreme
Court precedent, and thus, was incorrectly decided.
In Farler,
this Court stated as follows:
While Miranda did consider whether the
suspect was the focus of an investigation,
“Miranda implicitly defined ’focus’ for its
purposes, as ’questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action in any significant
way.’” Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S.
341, 96 S.Ct. 1612, 48 L.Ed.2d 1 (1976). As
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the Court held in [Oregon v. Mathiason, 429
U.S. 492, 97 S. Ct. 711, 50 L. Ed.2d 714
(1977)]:
[P]olice officers are not
required to administer
Miranda warnings to
everyone whom they
question. Nor is the
requirement of warnings
to be imposed simply
because the questioning
takes place in the
station house, or because
the questioned person is
one whom the police
suspect.
Id. 429 U.S. at 495, 97 S.Ct. at 714.
Id. at 884-885.
While we agree with Little that our Supreme Court has
never explicitly rejected the “focus of the investigation” test
in favor of the “in custody” test, we believe that recent Supreme
Court decisions have had the effect of adopting the “in custody”
test.
Subsequent to Farler, the Supreme Court in Wells v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 892 S.W.2d 299, 302 (1995), stated: “Miranda
v. Arizona requires the express declaration of a defendant’s
rights prior to custodial interrogation.
is the remedy.”
Otherwise suppression
More recently, in Hourigan v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
962 S.W.2d 860, 864 (1998), the Supreme Court stated that
“[b]ecause Appellants were not in custody, they were not entitled
to be given Miranda warnings.”
The approach followed by the Supreme Court of Kentucky
in Wells and Hourigan is consistent with the approach followed by
the United States Supreme Court in Stansbury v. California, 511
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U.S. 318, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293, 298 (1994).
The Court
stated:
We held in Miranda that a person
questioned by law enforcement officers after
being “taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way” must first “be warned that
he has a right to remain silent, that any
statement he does make may be used as
evidence against him, and that he has a right
to the presence of an attorney, either
retained or appointed.” 384 US, at 444, 16 L
Ed 2d 694, 86 S Ct 1602, 10 ALR3d 974.
Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 322, 114 S.Ct. at 1528, 128 L.Ed.2d at
298.
While Escobedo used the phrase “focus of the
investigation” and while the Supreme Court of Kentucky in Grooms,
Skaggs, Wills, and Jasper continued to use this phrase subsequent
to Miranda, we believe that the decision of this Court in Farler
and the subsequent Supreme Court cases of Wells and Hourigan
clearly demonstrate that the rule followed in Kentucky is whether
the suspect is “in custody” and not whether he is the “focus of
the investigation.”
Since Little was not in custody when he made
incriminating statements to the police, he was not entitled to be
given Miranda warnings.
The trial court was correct in denying
the motion to suppress, and accordingly, the judgment is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Hon. A. B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Hon. Mark Wettle
Louisville, KY
Hon. Christopher M. Brown
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE:
Hon. Christopher M. Brown
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
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