SIMMS 208, INC. v. DANNY R. TUNGATE; JOSEPH E. COX, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF KAREN COX, DECEASED, AND FRIEDA COX, HIS WIFE
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RENDERED: June 4, 1999; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1997-CA-002949-MR
SIMMS 208, INC.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM TAYLOR CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM HALL, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-CI-00080
DANNY R. TUNGATE; JOSEPH E. COX,
INDIVIDUALLY AND AS ADMINISTRATOR
OF THE ESTATE OF KAREN COX, DECEASED,
AND FRIEDA COX, HIS WIFE
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: EMBERTON, GUIDUGLI, AND MILLER, JUDGES.
MILLER, JUDGE: Simms 208, Inc. (Simms 208), brings this appeal
from a September 12, 1997, judgment of the Taylor Circuit Court
entered upon a jury verdict.
We affirm.
On December 16, 1995, Karen M. Cox (Karen), age 16, a
passenger in her own vehicle, died as a result of injuries
sustained in an accident in Campbellsville, Taylor County,
Kentucky.
The vehicle was operated by her boyfriend, Danny R.
Tungate (Danny), age 19, and was also occupied by Shane Cox, age
15.
It was determined that Danny was intoxicated at the time of
the accident.
Co-appellees Joseph E. Cox, individually and as
administrator of the estate of Karen Cox, and Frieda Cox (the
Coxes) filed an action against Danny in the Taylor Circuit Court
on March 11, 1996, to recover damages incident to their
daughter's death.
On April 16, 1996, Danny filed a third-party
complaint against appellant Simms 208, a retail beverage business
located in Marion County.
The Coxes amended their complaint on
July 16, 1996, to assert dram shop liability against Simms 208.
Upon trial of the case, the jury apportioned awards for
funeral expenses; loss of society, companionship and services;
and destruction of Karen's power to earn money.
Additionally,
the jury awarded punitive damages against Simms 208.
Simms 208
appeals from the judgment entered upon this verdict.
The ultimate issue at trial centered upon whether the
teens had purchased alcoholic beverages from Simms 208 before the
ill-fated accident.
The query was answered in the affirmative.
Although Simms 208 makes no serious attempt to contradict this
finding, it assigns numerous errors, which, it claims, compel
reversal.
We shall address each in what we believe is logical
order.
Simms 208 contends that because the alcoholic beverages
were purportedly sold in Marion County, the venue of this action
was improperly laid in Taylor County.
Simms 208 directs our
attention to Ky. Rev. Stat. (KRS) 452.450 and Copass v. Monroe
County Medical Foundation, Inc., Ky., 900 S.W.2d 617 (1995).
are not convinced as to the applicability of Copass, wherein
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We
there were divers defendants and independent torts.
In the case
at hand, we are faced with a wrong that was committed in Marion
County resulting in an actionable tort in Taylor County.
The
wrong at issue came to fruition only upon Karen's death in Taylor
County.
KRS 452.450 permits suits against corporations to be
brought either where the “tort is committed” or where the
corporate business is situated or the agent resides.
Thus, we
believe the subject tort was “committed” in Taylor County within
the purview of KRS 452.450.
In any event, we are not faced with evaluating or
distinguishing Copass.
Venue is waived unless the issue is
raised by a Ky. R. Civ. Proc. (CR) 12 motion or in a responsive
pleading.
CR 12.08(1).
Finding no such assertion in this case,
we believe any question as to improper venue was waived.
Long after the case was filed, Simms 208 attempted to
change venue under KRS 452.010(2).
as required by KRS 452.030.
denying the motion.
The motion was not verified
This alone was sufficient basis for
Nevertheless, we observe that the object was
to change venue based upon adverse publicity in Taylor County.
The record, however, is devoid of significant publicity involving
Simms 208.
As we understand the matter, publicity was primarily
directed toward the tragedy of Karen's death and not toward the
fault or blame of Simms 208.
Change of venue is a matter solely within the trial
court's discretion and the trial court’s decision will not be
disturbed on appeal except upon a clear showing of abuse.
v. Watts, Ky., 436 S.W.2d 515 (1969).
Miller
Here, we find no abuse.
The circuit court correctly denied Simms 208's motion for change.
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We turn now to Simms 208's allegation that the court
erred in admitting certain irrelevant and prejudicial evidence.
Before discussing the specific claims, we note that the central
issue herein was whether Danny purchased from Simms 208 the
alcohol of which he became intoxicated.
Danny and Shane both
testified that on the day of the accident, they had entered Simms
208 and Danny had purchased a case of beer from an unidentified
clerk.
They testified that later that evening, Danny purchased
at Simms 208's drive-in window a half gallon of whiskey from one
Jimmy Sprowles.
It appears Danny consumed a considerable amount
of the alcohol before the accident.
Simms 208 denied the sales.
Simms 208 contends the trial court erroneously admitted
the following evidence: (1) testimony that Sprowles had been
convicted of five DUIs; (2) testimony that Simms 208 had a
reputation for selling to minors; (3) testimony that the Taylor
County Sheriff had previously issued warnings to Simms 208 for
selling to minors; and (4) that Simms 208 had received prior
citations from the Alcoholic Beverage Control (ABC) Board for
selling to minors.
Simms 208 claims it is entitled to reversal.
At the outset, we observe that the trial judge admitted
much of the evidence complained of because he felt it appropriate
upon the claim for punitive damages.
Accordingly, citing Ky. R.
Evid. (KRE) 105,1 he instructed the jury to consider certain
evidence only as it pertained to those damages.
In this regard,
we feel constrained to note that admissibility or rejection of
evidence is not governed by the prayer for damages.
1
The limited admissibility rule.
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In a tort
action predicated upon negligence, all relevant, probative and
otherwise competent evidence is admissible regardless of whether
there is a claim for punitive as well as compensatory damages.
The theory of punitive damages is that when an award is made for
compensatory damages, the jury, in its discretion, may award an
additional sum as punitive damages upon the same evidence as a
deterrent to the type of conduct.
See Ashland Dry Goods Company
v. Wages, 302 Ky. 577, 195 S.W.2d 312 (1946).
Punitive damages
are not predicated upon the actor's unsavory character but rather
upon the gravity of his act.
If the actor is negligent and his
conduct is so egregious as to be elevated from ordinary
negligence to the level of gross negligence in the eyes of the
jury, the jury may award punitive damages.
The rules pertaining
to admissibility of evidence are the same.
Perforce, we are of
the opinion that the trial court's admission of certain evidence
with limitation of its consideration to punitive damages under
KRE 105 was fallacious thinking.
We now examine the evidence
complained of to determine whether same was properly admitted.
Indeed, the evidence was properly admitted only if it would have
been admitted without regard to the prayer for punitive damages.
First, Simms 208 complains of the receipt of evidence
that Sprowles had five DUI convictions.
Upon examination of the
record, we find that this information was offered by Sprowles in
an unresponsive answer.
The Coxes’ counsel had asked Sprowles
how many times he had visited an alcohol rehabilitation center.
Sprowles responded that he had five DUI convictions.
Apparently,
the implication was that if he had received five DUI convictions,
he would have had several occasions to visit a rehabilitation
-5-
center.
Under the circumstances, we do not think said injection
of Sprowles's DUI experiences constituted reversible error.
Next, Simms 208 maintains that evidence of its
reputation for selling alcohol to minors was improperly admitted.
Having reviewed the record, we believe it is more specifically
complaining about the introduction of evidence of prior bad acts
-- selling alcohol to Danny and other minors.
ever selling alcohol to Danny.
Simms 208 denied
It is, therefore, our opinion
that such evidence was admissible under KRE 404(b) to prove
identity of the vendor of the alcohol that Danny consumed on the
night in question.
Simms 208 next complains of the receipt of evidence
that the Taylor County Sheriff had previously issued warnings for
its sale of alcohol to minors.
Our examination of the record
reveals that Simms 208's motion in limine concerning such
evidence was never ruled upon.
Nor was there a contemporaneous
objection made when the evidence was offered at trial.
we perceive no error.
Perforce,
Cf. Tucker v. Commonwealth, Ky., 916
S.W.2d 181 (1996).
Simms 208 complains of evidence concerning ABC
citations.
We find no such evidence in the record.
Simms 208
points us only to evidence of a “citation” from the Taylor County
sheriff.
Such evidence, however, is not the basis of its
complaint; Simms 208 specifically refers to ABC citations.
Upon the whole, we find no reversible error in the
admissibility of evidence.
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Simms 208 alleges that the trial court erred in
instructing the jury on the common law standard for punitive
damages rather than the statutory standard set forth in KRS
411.184.
We are unable to assign merit to this contention as the
common law standard of gross negligence prevails.
See Williams
v. Wilson, Ky., 972 S.W.2d 260 (1998).
Simms 208 challenges the jury verdict in that the jury
first returned a “0" verdict for destruction of Karen’s power to
earn money.
The Coxes’ counsel requested the jury be returned to
the jury room for reconsideration of this matter.
court complied.
$1,100,000.00.
The trial
Upon reexamination, the jury awarded the Coxes
We are familiar with the wide range of cases
adressing this and similar matters since Stucker v. Bibble, Ky.,
442 S.W.2d 578 (1969).
Having reviewed same, we think the trial
court complied with the holding in Shortridge v. Rice, Ky. App.,
929 S.W.2d 194 (1996).
It is appropriate to return the jury to
reconsider a “0" verdict in cases such as this.
When a
reconsidered verdict is returned, the remedy of the aggrieved
party is to complain that the verdict is inadequate or excessive,
as the case may be.
Simms 208 also argues that the trial court erred in
failing to instruct the jury on two available “affirmative
defenses.”
It first maintains that the jury instructions should
have included certain protections found in KRS 413.241.
Specifically, it refers to the following provision:
(1)The general assembly finds and declares
that the consumption of intoxicating
beverages, rather than the serving,
furnishing or sale of such beverages, is the
proximate cause of any injury, including
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death and property damage, inflicted by an
intoxicated person upon himself or another
person.
In construing same, however, it is important to refer to
subsection (2) of said statute which reads in relevant part:
Any other law to the contrary
notwithstanding, no person holding a permit
under KRS 243.010, 243.030, 243.040, 243.050,
nor any agent, servant, or employe of such a
person, who sells or serves intoxicating
beverages to a person over the age for the
lawful purchase thereof, shall be liable to
such person or to any other person or to the
estate, successors, or survivors of either
for any injury suffered off the premises . .
. . (Emphasis added.)
We believe a plain reading of this statute establishes that while
it may indeed protect a tavern owner when it lawfully sells or
serves alcohol, it offers no such protection when the sale is
unlawful; that is, to an underage purchaser as in the instant
case.
Accordingly, we find no error in the omission of same from
the jury instructions.
Simms 208 next asserts that pursuant to KRS 244.080(1),
it was entitled to an instruction on whether it was “reasonable
to believe that Danny R. Tungate was of the age of twenty-one
(21).”
KRS 244.080(1) reads in relevant part:
. . . except that in any prosecution for
selling alcoholic beverages to a minor it is
an affirmative defense that the sale was
induced by the use of false, fraudulent, or
altered identification papers or other
documents and that the appearance and
character of the purchaser were such that his
age could not have been ascertained by any
other means and that the purchaser’s
appearance and character indicated strongly
that he was of legal age to purchase
alcoholic beverages . . . . (Emphases added.)
-8-
It is our opinion that the record is devoid of any evidence that
would indicate Danny presented false identification to obtain the
alcohol in question.
Simms 208's defense was that it did not
sell alcohol to Danny on the day in question.
As such, we do not
believe the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on
this affirmative defense.
Moreover, we question the
applicability of this affirmative defense to a civil action.
Last, Simms 208 makes a rather perfunctory argument
that the trial court should have instructed the jury on an adult
standard for Karen Cox.
Simms 208 does not direct us to the
challenged instruction, the preservation of error, or supporting
authority.
We nevertheless conclude that under the totality of
the circumstances in this case, any error in this regard was
harmless. CR 61.01.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Taylor
Circuit Court is affirmed.
EMBERTON, JUDGE, CONCURS.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE, CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART
BY SEPARATE OPINION.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE, CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART.
respectfully dissent.
I
I believe the decision of the trial court
denying the appellee’s motion for a new trial should be reversed
and the case should be remanded to the trial court accordingly.
The trial court ignored the law of this Commonwealth with respect
to inadequate verdicts, which is stated succinctly in Cooper v.
Fultz, Ky., 812 S.W.2d 497, 499 (1991):
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It is indeed a “booby trap” to send back a
jury which flatly decided that the claimant’s
pain and suffering is worth nothing to
replace the “-0-” with a dollar amount. If
“-0-” is inadequate, this forces the lawyer
seeking to represent a litigant who has just
been abused by an inadequate jury verdict to
further jeopardize his client’s interest by
asking that this hostile jury reconsider.
Erasing the zero and replacing it with a few
dollars will not correct the inadequacy. The
first verdict as completed should be received
and should be subject to a motion for a new
trial which should be granted unless there is
countervailing evidence such that the jury’s
verdict, taken as a whole, withstands the
test of inadequacy.
The majority’s reliance on Shortridge v. Rice, Ky.
App., 929 S.W.2d 194 (1996), in this case is misplaced.
In
Shortridge, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff
for $5,000 in medical expenses and zero for pain and suffering.
After repeated requests for reconsideration of the zero award for
pain and suffering by the plaintiff, the trial court ordered the
jury to reconsider the issue.
Thereafter, the jury awarded the
plaintiff $1,000 for pain and suffering.
The plaintiff then
moved the trial court for a new trial claiming that the verdict
was inadequate.
The trial court denied the plaintiff’s motion.
On appeal, we stated that:
While we agree wholeheartedly with Cooper, we
cannot overlook [the plaintiff’s] insistence
that the trial court order reconsideration.
We will not fault the court for complying
with that insistent request.
Id. at 196 (emphasis added).
The special circumstances presented in Shortridge are
not present in the case sub judice.
In this case, the appellees
moved for reconsideration after the jury returned a verdict in
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favor of the appellees but awarding “-0-” for destruction of the
deceased’s power to labor and earn money.
The appellant opposed
reconsideration of the verdict and moved for a new trial.
The
trial court ordered reconsideration contrary to current
authority.
After the jury awarded $1,100,000 upon
reconsideration, the appellant again moved for a new trial and
the trial court again denied such motion.
In Shortridge, we refused to order the new trial
because the very party who insisted on reconsideration sought a
new trial due to what it perceived as an inadequate verdict upon
reconsideration.
However, we specifically endorsed the decision
in Cooper with regard to inadequate verdicts.
In the present
case, the appellee moved for reconsideration, which the appellant
opposed by moving for a new trial.
Since the jury verdict was
complete, the trial court should have denied appellee’s motion
for reconsideration and instead ordered a new trial.
issue, the trial court clearly erred.
On this
For this reason alone, I
would reverse and remand.
On all the other issues raised on appeal and addressed
by this Court, I would concur.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Frank Hampton Moore, Jr.
Bowling Green, KY
Robert Spragens, Jr.
Lebanon, KY
and
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Gregory Y. Dunn
Horse Cave, KY
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